

The
Thetean

The
Thetean

A Student Journal for
Scholarly Historical Writing

Volume 47 (2018)

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The *Thetean* is an annual student journal representing the best of historical writing by current and recent students at Brigham Young University. All papers are written, selected, and edited entirely by students. Articles are welcome from students of all majors, provided they are sufficiently historical in focus. Please email submissions as an attached Microsoft Word document to theteansubmissions@gmail.com. Manuscripts must be received by mid-January to be included in that year's issue. Further details about each year's submission requirements, desired genres, and deadlines should be clarified by inquiring of the editors at the same address.

Publication of the *Thetean* is generously sponsored by the Department of History, in association with the Beta Iota Chapter of the Phi Alpha Theta National Honor Society. Material in this issue is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the views of the editors, Phi Alpha Theta, the Department of History, Brigham Young University, or The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. All copyrights are retained by the individual authors.

Phi Alpha Theta, Beta Iota Chapter
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah

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Preface

IN EARLY 1791, A FRUSTRATED AND CANTANKEROUS GERMAN PHILOSOPHER, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, found himself, once again, out of a job. Having quarreled with a prospective employer in Warsaw, he resolved to visit Königsberg on his way home to call on one of the greatest thinkers of the age, Immanuel Kant. Unfortunately, the interview did not go well for the younger man. Unable to bear the disfavor of his idol, Fichte set himself to writing an explosive Enlightenment treatise in Kant's style, ambitiously entitled *Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation*. He sent it to Kant a mere six weeks after their first meeting. The older man was impressed enough to arrange for its publication. However, in a fateful twist that would guarantee Fichte's fame, the publisher released the first edition of the tract anonymously (apparently due to delay in securing the approval of the censors). So closely was Fichte able to imitate Kant's style and scope, its first reviewers assumed that Kant himself had to be the author. One amazed reviewer, upon discovering his mistake, hailed the true author as "a third sun in the philosophical heavens."¹ Fichte was vindicated.

Fortunately for us, things don't (usually) work quite the same way here in the BYU history department. Young students are not spurned by their professors until, locked up in Special Collections, they manage to spin a work of scholarly gold from the straw of adolescent ambition. Instead, BYU professors offer careful, committed mentorship to their charges, asking questions, offering suggestions, and providing encouragement throughout the historical research and writing process. Undergraduates do not—indeed, probably cannot—earn being taken seriously as scholars worthy of this type of mentorship; it is gift of

1. Daniel Breazeale, ed., *Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988), 6–9.

grace bequeathed by dedicated faculty to all alike, and one of the things that most makes the university system worth preserving. It is through this system, which mixes the master's methodological expertise with the apprentice's youthful panache, that the best undergraduate scholarship, the type sought after by *The Thetean*, is produced.

However, if we are not careful, striving students can end up feeling more like Johann Fichte than Susannah Morrison (whose two publications in the present volume represent her fourth and fifth in this journal overall). The pages of world literature and fiction are literally littered with resentful youth, from Cain in the Bible to the wizard Ged in the late Ursula K. LeGuin's *Earthsea* cycle, who did not receive the kind of enthusiastic patronage they thirsted for. The temptations to the professor are many: on its surface, history is a much more individually-driven discipline than some of the others on campus. Plus it can be fun to turn students loose without supervision and see what their febrile minds come up with. And anyway we live now in a hyper-individualistic and meritocratic society; the more ancient model of patronage relationships can seem outmoded, even to those whose job it is to live in the past. Those who are able to overcome the structural obstacles between themselves and their young charges, however, have, at least, the work of the nine students in this volume to show for it.

Unlike the departmental paper awards listed in the back of this volume, subject area is not considered in determining publication in the Thetean. We seek to publish the ten best papers produced in the department the previous year, period. This often results in some rather interesting, and often unexpected clusterings of topics—which we hope provides fruitful fodder for the journal's readers to make thematic connections, if nothing else. Zachary Osborne's and Natalie Larsen's papers on the Latter-day Saint movement, for example, together cause us to question the types of sources we privilege in evaluating the development of religious theology and practice. Mitch Rogers and Peter Abernathy invite us to reconsider the motivations of the actors in recent conflicts, cold and hot. Susannah and Miranda Jessop remind us of the enormous power wielded by (audio)visual media to spread ideology and shape values across the twentieth century. Finally, just in time for the hundredth anniversary of its effective dissolution in the aftermath of World War I, a trio of papers explore the complex legacy of the Ottoman Empire for modern notions of ethnic identity, law, and history. Much credit goes to Professor Isom-Verhaaren for opening up this neglected avenue of research to a generation of students since her arrival at BYU nearly three years ago.

In every issue, there is at least one paper not easily classified. This year the honor goes to Katie Richards, whose side-splitting, breezily written history of pay toilets will leave you . . . well, rushing to use one of America's free public restrooms. Written for an environmental history capstone with Professor Miller, it's an ideal example of the way faculty mentorship enables students to carry off unique and ambitious research projects successfully.

And of course, thanks go this year's talented editorial staff for pushing the author's to greater heights of technical and organizational precision. They have each been a delight to work with. Mitch, Abby, Maren, Mary, Sarah, Porter, Emily, Mariah, Oscar—thank you. Your dedication and good humor were remarkable and sustaining as we plowed through sixty submissions in our quest to reset the journal's footing. Dr. Rensink, our faculty advisor, was also a great support and encouragement.

Our friend Johann Fichte quickly shook off his reliance on Kantian forms and founded his own school of German idealism. Most of the students published here will, regardless of future profession, likewise soon grow out of their intellectual training wheels, and one day look back on their undergraduate productions with a mixture of chagrin and bemusement. But, we must hope, their work, and this institution, will carry on, a repository of talent, a monument to striving, a testament to youth.

—*Ian McLaughlin*
Editor-in-Chief



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“It’s a Privilege to Pee” The Rise and Demise of the Pay Toilet in America

Katie Richards

IN 1995, GREG KOTIS BOARDED A PLANE FROM CHICAGO WITH \$300 IN his pocket and a desire to see the sites of Europe. He ran out of funds quickly, and spent the next two weeks scraping by in London, Berlin, and Barcelona. He managed to obtain cheap food and lodgings, but one unforeseen expense on his travels was the pay-for-use bathroom facilities he encountered on the streets. The impact of his experiences in Europe eventually developed into *Urinetown*, a Broadway musical about a town plagued by drought and therefore forced to charge its citizens to use the public toilets and to severely punish them when they refused. One of the opening songs of the musical, appropriately entitled “It’s a Privilege to Pee,” includes the following lyrics:

“Water’s worth its weight in gold these days,
No more bathrooms like the olden days,
You come here and pay a fee,
It’s a privilege to pee.”

Kotis intended *Urinetown* to be “a grand, ridiculous reflection of the world as we know it,” as a commentary on the relationship between the public and the private and the role of both entities in providing for human needs and protecting human dignity, and as a narrative of the sometimes conflicting human—and particularly American—values of pleasure, convenience, personal freedom,

and free enterprise.¹ Should the use of the toilet be considered an inherent human right and a service which the government should provide free of charge to all citizens? Or does it fall within the category of daily and necessary services, provided by either the government or the private sector, for which we should not mind paying a fee? The questions Kotis posed in his unorthodox musical production are not new to this century, and indeed were at the heart of the decades-long debate that eventually saw the elimination of pay toilets in America all together.

The battle over pay toilets in the United States began as early as 1893 at the Chicago World's Fair. Though some complaints about pay toilets were published in newspapers as early as the late 19th century, pay toilets were largely accepted (or at least tolerated) by Americans for many decades. Social and cultural norms—mainly, issues of propriety—were one reason to maintain the status quo. It was simply improper (and also a bit embarrassing) to discuss toilets and their implied bodily functions in polite middle-class society. Once a few early crusaders began to challenge those norms, it would take a fierce twenty-year legislative battle to ban pay toilets altogether, one state at a time. Throughout the 20th century, municipal governments and their citizens recognized the need for more public restrooms, though few foresaw the complexities that would develop in the movement to meet that need. Charging patrons to use the toilet began as a pragmatic means of paying for such projects, but evolved into a debate of morals and ethics. Failure to ensure human health and safety, accusations of gender/class discrimination, and the violation of a basic human right were included in the arguments of individuals and institutions that were against pay toilets in America from the 1940s until the start of their widespread elimination in the 1970s. The rights of private businesses, economic/environmental necessity, and protection against crime and vandalism formed the basis of the arguments of those who were for pay toilets during the same era.

The debate of the constitutionality in allowing and in prohibiting pay toilets bounced back and forth throughout the years between legislators, lobbyists, business owners, and coin-lock companies. In 1970, Los Angeles was the first American city to outlaw pay toilets in government-owned buildings, and for the next few years other cities and states followed suit by outlawing toilets in public spaces. While a few states did go so far as to restrict or ban pay toilets in privately-owned buildings or in all buildings open to the public, most private-pay toilets quietly disappeared as America moved toward the 21st century. Today, although

1. Kotis and Hollmann, *Urinetown*, xii–xiv.

they flourish in other countries around the world, pay toilets in the United States are generally unheard of and many young Americans may find it hard to believe that they were once a regular feature in American communities.

Academic scholarship on the history of pay toilets in America is virtually non-existent. Journalist Aaron Gordon’s brief article, “Why Don’t We Have Pay Toilets in America?”, written for *Pacific Standard* magazine in 2014, is the most comprehensive publication on this rather specific topic. Gordon’s very brief history of the pay toilet is followed by a history and analysis of the actions of the Committee to End Pay Toilets in America (CEPTIA), founded in 1970. Gordon argues that this group was fundamental in the campaign to ban pay toilets in America, due in large part to its “non-combative rhetorical approach” of raising public awareness, lobbying, and encouraging non-violent protest of the coin-operated commodes. While this article is valuable for its insight into CEPTIA and the motives of its founders, it is limited in that it does not include many of the main players who were also significant to this movement, nor does it seek to analyze the sequence of events that led to the circumstances which made CEPTIA—and the banning of pay toilets—so successful.² In light of the lack of a definitive history, other sources that draw parallels between pay toilets and the privatization of the commons must and will be consulted throughout this paper. However, its main purpose will be to use primary sources such as newspapers in an attempt to tell the little-known story of the rise and demise of American pay toilets, and to provide the context in which one may draw conclusions as to why pay toilets are no longer a common feature of American society.

The political and social environment of the 1960s and 1970s—the growth of social movements such as Civil Rights, anti-war, environmentalism, second-wave feminism, etc.—fostered the mindset that brought about social change, even in something as minor as public restroom facilities. The nature of social activism at the time allowed for the success of groups like CEPTIA, truly “a product of its time, place, and circumstance.”³ Feminism was particularly fertile soil for the growth of the anti-pay toilet movement; following feminist legal victories of the 1960s and in light of the foundation of the National Organization of Women in 1966, as well as increased interest in the Equal Rights Amendment, pay toilets were a concrete cause behind which women of all circumstances could unite. Women’s rights—and human rights—eventually won out against

2. Aaron Gordon, “Why Don’t We Have Pay Toilets in America?” *Pacific Standard Magazine*, September 2014, accessed 12 October 2016, <https://psmag.com/why-don-t-we-have-pay-toilets-in-america-26efede62d6b#.o3xkaxasp>.

3. Gordon, “Why Don’t We Have Pay Toilets in America?”

the interests of government officials and pay toilet manufacturers in milestone states such as California and New York, and the war was more easily won in other states after that. It was not so much a change in the rhetoric of the anti-pay toilet arguments that brought about their long-due demise in the 1970s as it was a shift in the citizen's relationship and interaction with his or her government, as well as new interpretations of basic human rights as they relate to the public and the private spheres. Eventually, and at the insistence of many of their constituents, U.S. legislators decided that people have the natural right to relieve themselves, free of charge, when nature calls.

Early History of Pay Toilets in America, 1893-1960

The Chicago World's Fair in 1893 seemed to be the first occasion to spark the debate surrounding pay toilets in the United States, and additionally set a precedent for how they would be installed and maintained in the decades to follow. The Clow Sanitary Company took part in the preparations for millions of visitors by providing 2,221 lavatories in thirty-two locations throughout the Exposition. About one-third of these toilets were free for public use, but those were not fitted with luxuries such as soap, towels, brushes, and personal attendants. The price of admission to use the pay toilets was a ticket which cost a patron 5 cents per use.⁴

An article that appeared in newspapers in a few states announced the appearance of the pay toilets, complaining that the Clow Sanitation Co. "lev[ied] tribute on the necessities of nature."⁵ This and other articles conceded that the fair did comply with legal requirements to provide some free toilets, but claimed that the free facilities were not only unsanitary but also difficult to find.⁶ Two written complaints (both by women) eventually reached President Higinbotham, head of the exposition corporation, and led to some improvements (such

4. *Report of the President to the Board of Directors of the World's Columbian Exposition* (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1898), 219-220, accessed 14 November 2016, <https://books.google.com/books?id=VV0AAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA220&dq=%22world%27s+columbian+exposition%22%22clow%22#v=onepage&q=%22world's%20columbian%20exposition%22%22clow%22&f=true>.

5. See "The Toilet Room Concession," *Freeborn County Standard*, 29 March 1893.

6. "The Toilet Room Concession," *Freeborn County Standard*, 29 March 1893. See also "The Concessionaire," *Democratic Northwest and Henry County News*, 5 May 1893: "Signs are conspicuous directing the visitor to the pay toilet rooms, but you need a search warrant to find the free ones."

as signs painted on free toilets, as well as the construction of free toilets in buildings that had previously lacked them), but Higinbotham still maintained that the contract entered into with the Clow Sanitary Co. required that one in every three toilets be free.⁷ Reactions to the pay toilets were not all negative, however. Multiple newspapers reminded readers that they need not use the pay toilets unless they chose to.⁸ One article specifically condemned the many "women murmurs of discontent" as "entirely uncalled for," because, even in buildings where free toilets were not found, women were at perfect liberty to ask the attendants and use the toilets devoted to employees.⁹

The pay toilet experiment at the World's Fair in Chicago yielded mixed results. Before 1893, the Clow Sanitary Co. had been contracted to provide the free toilets at the Fair in Philadelphia in 1876 and in Paris in 1889, but it seems the company took it upon themselves to make a profit of the venture in 1893. An official report of the Chicago Fair published in 1898 admits to some misunderstandings and misrepresentations as to the nature of the contract, but does not go into further detail. This confusion seems to have been superseded by the fact that, after some initial complaint, visitors to the fair realized that free toilets were in fact available and, furthermore, many of the patrons did not mind paying the fee for the extra luxuries provided.¹⁰ Civilians may have also been placated by the knowledge that the fair was a temporary event. They could spend a day or two enjoying the exhibitions and paying a nickel whenever necessary, but then return to the daily reality of free toilets at railroad stations, department stores, hotels, and within their own homes. This reality, however, was about to change.

In the decades following the 1893 Chicago World's Fair, pay commodes became more common in large American cities. The first coin-lock pay toilet in the United States is believed to have been installed at the railroad station in Terre Haute, Indiana, mostly as a measure to prevent non-ticket-holding customers from taking advantage of the new indoor plumbing.¹¹ In 1911, the

7. "Free Closets Too Scarce," *Chicago Tribune*, 14 June 1893; "Free Closets for the Public," *Chicago Tribune*, 16 June 1893.

8. See "The Public Comfort: How Visitors are Cared for at the World's Fair," *Middletown Times-Press*, 27 May 1893.

9. "Plenty of Free Toilet-rooms," *The Inter Ocean*, 10 May 1893.

10. *Report of the President*, 219–220.

11. While this is a commonly believed story of origin, there is no readily available evidence to support it. See Donald White, "The Hoosier Day," *Rushville Republican*, 17 July 1975; "Spare a Dime," *The Independent Record*, 10 July 1977.

All newspaper sources in this paper can be accessed through newspapers.com.

new passenger terminal of the Northwestern Line in Chicago boasted “the latest step in perfection of travel comfort,” including both public (free) and pay toilet rooms for men. Notably, the newspaper announcements did not list pay toilets in the ladies’ rooms, suggesting that women were not charged to use those facilities.¹² The Progressive Era saw the frenzied construction of comfort stations (restrooms, usually underground, in public places like parks and plazas), and those constructed in locations throughout Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Ohio—to name a few—made it common practice to install a few pay toilets alongside the free toilets.¹³ In the 1940s and 50s, in other public spaces such as railroad stations, bus stations, parks, turnpikes, and airports, pay toilets were either installed by municipal legislators or proposed by local citizens.

The arguments in support of pay toilets were varied and included offsetting the costs of maintenance, generating city revenue, and providing safer and cleaner restroom facilities for the general public. In these arguments, the precedent set by the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair is subtly evident. Municipal governments capitalized on the revenue-making scheme first started by the Clow Sanitary Co. and transformed it into a morally appropriate enterprise that would benefit both patron and collector. Some of the revenue would, of course, be used to pay attendants to keep the facilities respectable and janitors to keep the facilities clean.¹⁴ Perhaps most interesting is the various ratios of free toilets to pay toilets that appeared to echo the “one in three is free” mentality of 1893. American citizens, it seems, continued to tolerate the existence of pay facilities (even those that did not provide extra luxuries) so long as they were given the choice to use free ones.

12. “Passenger Terminal Chicago, Chicago & North Western Ry,” *The Daily Herald*, 9 June 1911.

13. For example, the comfort station at the square in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, offered nine free toilets, two pay toilets, and sixteen urinals for the men, and six free toilets and two pay toilets for the women. See “Comfort Station Will Be Opened in a Few Days,” *Wilkes-Barre Times Leader, the Evening News*, 16 December 1913.

14. With pay toilets, “the station would pay for itself in no time at all.” See Lola Hill, “Daily Piqua-isms,” *The Piqua Daily Call*, 27 June 1945.

Pay toilets would generate enough revenue to “pay someone to . . . check the revenue from the parking meters” in downtown Mattoon, Illinois. See “Letters to the Editor,” *Journal Gazette*, 2 September 1948.

A report by a Women’s Club in New York declared lavatories in the subways as “far from sanitary,” and proposed that the installation pay toilets and other income-producing concessions would address the issue. See “Tube Comfort Stations Hit as Nuisances,” *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 10 May 1932.

Serious complaints about pay toilets in articles and letters to the editor were few and far between before the 1960s.¹⁵ If mentioned at all, the pay toilet was treated unapologetically as a normal aspect of everyday life.¹⁶ Additionally, many newspapers published annual treasury reports outlining the exact revenue taken in by the city's pay toilet facilities, thus allowing the average citizen to plainly recognize the impact of his/her occasional 5 or 10-cent contribution to public welfare.¹⁷ In spite of early crusades against pay toilets by a few unsuccessful legislators as early as 1931, the general American public seemed either contented to use the few free public toilets available or convinced that the benefits outweighed the costs.¹⁸ The rhetoric of human injustice—and indeed, discrimination against women—did not make its appearance in newspapers during the first half of the twentieth century as it had during the World's Fair. Though their initial introduction into American culture was somewhat shocking, pay toilets managed to maintain a fairly easygoing relationship with the American public before the social and political tides turned in the 1960s.

15. One paper did publish the words on a billboard outside of Pierre, South Dakota, which read: "We have no foreigners, doormen, or pay toilets," though the tone is humorous rather than protesting. See "Miscellany," *Rushville Republican*, 20 September 1940, accessed 14 November 2016. A different article a few years later joked that soon Americans would see coin-operated street lights. See "This and That," *The Ottawa Herald*, 12 Feb 1958. Other papers, however, unabashedly ran ads for the the General Service Company and American Coin Lock Co., Inc. (coin lock manufacturers for public toilets. See *Reading Times*, 23 May 1930.

16. "Dime Snatchers," *The Ottawa Herald*, 10 January 1961.

17. For example, the *Reading Times* told its readers that in 1922, the men's pay toilets in the new comfort station generated \$802.50, while the women's generated \$209.00. "Cost of City Comfort Station," *Reading Times*, 4 January 1932. Other treasurer's receipts only listed the combined revenue of male and female pay toilet facilities. See, for example, "Treasurer's Report for Town of Bremen" from Bremen, Indiana, from 1923 to 1926: *The Bremen Enquirer*, 4 January 1923; *The Bremen Enquirer*, 3 January 1924; *The Bremen Enquirer*, 8 January 1925; *The Bremen Enquirer*, 14 January 1926.

18. Though the quality of upkeep of public toilets appeared to diminish as the century progressed, government officials and regular civilians alike seemed to believe that pay toilets meant cleaner and better facilities. See promotion of pay toilets by Virginia Health Department in "Sanitary Inspection," *The Times Dispatch*, 8 November 1917. See also a woman's assessment of disgraceful state of ladies' restrooms in the Bloomington courthouse, and claim that pay toilets would solve the issue: "Says Restroom Disgrace," *The Pantagraph*, 16 December 1954. See also one of the first published complaints that pay toilets (in a New York railroad station) were no cleaner than free toilets: Inez Robb, "Mighty Goals Can Wait for Cleaner Rest Rooms," *El Paso Herald-Post*, 17 Feb 1955.

Assemblywoman March Fong and Pay Toilets in California

The state of California played a significant and pioneering role in the fight to eliminate pay toilets from America's restrooms. In January 1955, Assemblyman Charles Meyers (D) introduced a bill requiring businesses with pay toilets to have at least one free toilet as well.¹⁹ The bill was shot down without discussion in the Senate Public Health Committee six months later.²⁰ Over ten years later, Assemblyman Walter W. Powers (D) went a step further and seemed to have more impact on the general public, or at the very least, he received more press coverage. In 1968, he introduced a bill to outlaw pay toilets in all public buildings within the state. The *Independent* in Long Beach called Powers a "folk hero," and quoted both a paragraph from Assembly Bill 1784 and a number of letters Powers received from supporters of the legislation.²¹ Powers himself was also quoted defending his bill against the few who opposed it (mostly operators of laundromats or service stations) by assuring them that it would not affect private establishments. The director of the Sacramento Metropolitan Airport was quoted as a defender of pay toilets, saying that pay locks deter vandalism and promote cleanliness and safety. The newspaper acknowledged that in spite of the opposition and the failure of Meyers' attempts in the past, the significant public support of the growing movement may buoy the bill's success.²² Just days later, other newspapers reported that, after considerable debate in which Powers argued discrimination against women and taxation of a necessity, his bill was also "flushed down the drain."²³ Another year would pass before California's successful anti-pay toilet champion would make her first appearance.

19. "Bill in California Aimed at Pay Toilets," *Oshkosh Daily Northwestern*, 22 January 1955. Another paper later claimed that Meyers' legislation was dubbed by newsmen as the "One in three must be free" bill, suggesting that the ratio of free toilets to pay toilets had become more balanced—or perhaps more in favor of the latter—in recent decades. See "Won't Have to Spare Dime if Bill Passes," *Independent*, 11 June 1968.

20. "Free Public Privy Bill Meets Its End," *The San Bernardino County Sun*, 4 June 1955.

21. The assemblyman received a postcard with the message: "PLEASE PERMANENTLY OUTLAW ALL CRUEL AND INHUMAN PAID TOILETS" (in all capital letters). A letter from a woman in Long Beach said that "pay toilets are demeaning to the human animal." See "Won't Have to Spare Dime if Bill Passes," *Independent*, 11 June 1968.

22. *Ibid.*

23. "Pay Toilets Hit," *Independent*, 17 April 1968.

In April 1969, California Assemblywoman March Fong (D) made headlines with her dramatic and symbolic spectacle of taking a sledge hammer to a porcelain toilet on the steps of the State Capitol Building. In March of that year, she had introduced a bill proposing a ban on pay toilets in all state and local government-operated buildings, though it was voted down by an all-male committee after a representative from the city's Public Utilities Commission informed them that—in addition to cleaner facilities—the pay toilets at the San Francisco International Airport brought in an annual net profit of \$48,456.²⁴ However, the very public portrayal of Fong's bill may have opened the way for the City Council of Los Angeles to ban pay toilets in city-owned buildings in 1970.²⁵

Although Fong focused on other issues over the next few years, she was consistently remembered by the public for her commode stunt.²⁶ In April 1973, she introduced the pay toilet ban bill yet again. Although opposed heavily by the Nik-O-Lok Co. (a major manufacturer of pay toilet coin locks), her bill managed to clear the first committee hurdles in January 1974, then barely passed through the Senate, and was finally signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan in September 1974.²⁷ Fong called the progress a victory over "the special interests who have opposed this bill for over four years," referring to Nik-O-Lok as well as the County Supervisors Association and the Association of California Airport Executives.²⁸ The new law went into effect the following year.²⁹

March Fong's victory was relatively short-lived. In the years following the 1975 legislation, she received many letters of complaint from confused Californians who wondered why they still encountered pay toilets in buildings and

24. "Bill Would Ban Pay Facilities For Airports," *The Fresno Bee The Republican*, 6 March 1969; "Bay Area Unit Votes Against Free Toilets," *The San Bernardino County Sun*, 20 April 1969. See also "Pay Potties to Stay in Public Buildings," *The San Bernardino County Sun*, 26 April 1969, which referred to Fong as the "Joan of Johns."

25. On the basis that "we can't refuse people their natural rights for want of a dime." See "No Price on 'Rights,'" *The Times*, 24 January 1970.

26. See "Pay-Toilet Foe is on Warpath," *Independent*, 13 May 1969; "'Ban the Can' Law Proposed by Legislator," *Santa Cruz Sentinel*, 11 March 1970.

27. "Assembly Panel OKs Free-toilet Measure," *The San Bernardino County Sun*, 24 January 1974; "Pay Toilet Ban Bill Progresses," *The Argus*, 28 May 1974; "Reagan Flushes Away Locks on Pay Toilets," *Daily Independent Journal*, 26 September 1974.

28. "Pay Toilet Ban Bill Progresses," *The Argus*, 28 May 1974.

29. The *Redlands Daily Facts* called 1974 "a banner year for women" where public policy was concerned, referring to the pay toilet ban as one of more than thirty five bills extending women's legal rights. See "Host of New Laws Go Into Effect Jan. 1," *Redlands Daily Facts*, 1 January 1975.

spaces open to the general public. Some of Fong's constituents had evidently misunderstood that her bill only banned pay toilets in government-owned buildings, such as airports. She replied to these complaints explaining that while she and others had sponsored legislation that would have banned pay toilets in all public buildings—as well as restricted pay toilets in some private buildings, such as hotels, gas stations, and theaters—this legislation was rejected.³⁰ While the newspapers do not expound on that rejection, it can be reasonably assumed that the bills following Fong's successful one were opposed by private business owners and coin-lock companies, both of whom considered pay toilets a profitable business. The refusal of California legislators to outlaw pay toilets completely suggests support of the argument that “the commons” (goods and services available to all based on citizenship) can indeed be privatized. Pay toilets, then, hung in a kind of limbo between the private and public, between a right and a privilege. They were considered a common service that the government should provide for free to its citizens, but also a commodity that could be controlled completely by private owners.

Pay Toilets in the other Forty-Nine States

While the pay toilet drama unfolded in California, other municipal governments in other states were having their own debates over the issue. Between 1955 and 1972, bills to restrict or completely ban pay toilets in public buildings were proposed, debated, and defeated in House and Senate committees in New Mexico, Illinois, Minnesota, Tennessee, Maryland, Nebraska, Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania. In 1973, after a long campaign to end pay toilets at O'Hare International Airport, Mayor Richard J. Daley suddenly signed the decree to eliminate pay toilets in all three of Chicago's airports as “part of the women's liberation movement,” in spite of the estimated annual loss of \$125,000–\$225,000 in city revenue.³¹ Shortly afterwards, the Chicago city council voted to outlaw pay toilets in all public buildings.³²

30. “It's Pay as You Go for Most People,” *Valley News*, 16 August 1977; “Bill Would Allow Less Pay Toilets,” *Independent*, 24 June 1975; “State Smoking Curb Bill Beaten in Senate Panel,” *The Bakersfield Californian*, 21 August 1975.

31. “Airport Pay Toilets Axed,” *The Times Recorder*, 28 February 1973; “Daley Nixes Pay Toilets,” *Tyrone Daily Herald*, 28 February 1973.

32. “Toilets Freed,” *Lincoln Evening Journal*, 15 March 1973.

Between 1973 and 1977, twenty-four additional states were added to the list of state legislatures that proposed pay toilet bills, in varying degrees of restriction and with varying degrees of success. According to an article by *The Associated Press*, in May 1975 the states of Maryland, Minnesota, Wyoming, Alaska, Florida, and California had already passed laws against pay toilets in public buildings.³³ Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Tennessee followed suit in 1976. Each state deserves its own paper describing the drama of the arguments made by supporters and opponents alike, but generally speaking, the arguments of legislators across the country were heavily inclined toward the idea that pay toilets were an infringement of a basic human right, and that they especially discriminated against women and the poor.

The first state to ban pay toilets in a private space was Michigan. In 1975, at the insistence of the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, legislation was passed in that state which prohibited pay toilets in any bar or restaurant licensed to sell alcohol, on the basis that pay commodes in such establishments greatly inhibited and discriminated against "female inbibers [*sic*]."³⁴ A number of other states toyed with the idea of restricting or banning pay toilets in private buildings in the mid-to-late 1970s. The New Hampshire House of Representatives passed a bill prohibiting pay toilets in "all buildings open to the public," unless a free toilet was also available.³⁵ The Connecticut legislature discussed the rights of businesses to charge customers to use the toilets and decided to propose a bill that would allow for pay toilets in private buildings only if free toilets existed as well, but required the business owners to provide a key for those customers who lacked the necessary change to open the pay toilet door.³⁶ Washington's Equal Potty Rights Act of 1977 enforced almost identical

33. "Women's Lib Has Reached Pay Toilets," *Great Bend Tribute*, 19 May 1975. Maryland had, in fact, not banned all pay toilets, but had passed legislation requiring an equal number of pay toilets and free toilets in public restrooms. See "Senate Passes Bill Requiring Free Toilets," *The Capital*, 14 March 1975. Two days later, Nevada would also get rid of its last pay toilet (in the Reno Airport). See "Pay Toilets Banned," *Ames Daily Tribune*, 21 May 1975.

34. "No Need for Dimes," *The Ludington Daily News*, 29 January 1975.

35. "Free Toilet Bill Faces the House," *Nashua Telegraph*, 12 February 1975.

36. "Pay Toilet Issue Argued at Legislative Hearing," *The Bridgeport Telegram*, 22 March 1975. Tokens were also introduced (by Nik-O-Lok) as a way to allow business owners more control over their pay toilets without angering customers who were caught without a dime. See "Token Remedy," *Clovis News-Journal*, 7 April 1977.

measures, but required that half of all toilets in the state be free toilets.³⁷ The states of New York, Illinois, and Tennessee were successful in outlawing all pay toilets in their respective states, including those in private buildings.³⁸

Interestingly, there is very little to be found in newspapers in the way of complaints by business owners against such legislation. One article in a Pennsylvania newspaper did mention the reactions of “merchants, gas station owners, and other business firms” to a pay toilet ban bill being considered by the Philadelphia City Council: security, sanitation, and the cost of maintenance were all included in their complaints against the bill.³⁹ The ambiguity of phrases such as “all buildings open to the public” may have also been cause for confusion, complacency, or criticism on the part of establishments that blurred the lines of private and public (gas stations, for example, are privately owned and serve those in need of gasoline and/or food, yet any member of the general public may step inside). With or without the complaints of private businesses, most states were unwilling to pass legislation that restricted or banned all pay toilets, suggesting respect for the affairs of private businesses as well as the belief that restrooms could be a privatized service. It can only be assumed that in the decades leading up to and into the 21st century, private businesses eventually gave in to anti-pay toilet sentiment and that most removed their pay toilets of their own free will.

There are many factors that may explain why the pay toilet debate dragged on almost constantly for so many years. Perhaps one of the most significant is the fact that many simply did not take the discussions seriously. The journalists who reported the legislative happenings could not help but include bathroom humor and toilet puns in their articles, and often commented on the jokes made by legislators during the debates as well.⁴⁰ Male legislators were usually more inclined to treat the matter lightly, overlooking cries of “female discrimination” because those realities were not part of their personal daily experience.

37. The legislation specifically prohibited “discrimination in restroom charges between facilities used by men and facilities used by women.” See “Johns for Janes May Be Equal,” *The Daily News*, 20 May 1977.

38. “Mother of Free Toilets: Liberating Restrooms is Her First Goal,” *The Morning Herald*, 1 February 1945; “Pay Toilets Banned,” *Freeport Journal-Standard*, 21 February 1976; “Airports Bemoan Pay Toilet Loss,” *The Courier News*, 31 March 1976.

39. *Gettysburg Times*, 11 September 1976.

40. Additionally, some legislators and civilians alike blamed the Democrats for the anti-pay toilet movement, and complained that they should focus on more serious and fundamentally constitutional issues. See “Dreiling Still Advises,” *The Leavenworth Times*, 30 January 1977.

Even among women themselves, feminism was a complicated issue, and public toilets were rolled up in that issue. Senator Karen Burstein (D), affectionately dubbed the "Mother of Free Toilets," argued for the banning of pay toilets in New York in 1975. She clearly framed the issue as one of women's rights, calling attention to the inequality between the sexes as evidenced by free public urinals; she even suggested that her bill was related to the Equal Rights Amendment movement. Even into the 1970s, fears of possible implications of the ERA subsisted among middle and working class women, including the violation of privacy where traditional gender-segregated spaces were concerned.⁴¹ Burstein was quoted in an article refuting these concerns, declaring specifically that the federal Equal Rights Amendment would not—just as states' ERAs had not—require or permit "joint toilets."⁴² Although the feminism movement was thriving compared to previous decades, there were still men and women who were wary. Another factor, of course, was the fierce opposition from special interest groups such as coin lock companies, airline companies, bus companies, and others that benefited financially from the pay toilet enterprise. It was, essentially, two basic American principles pitted against each other: the rights to capitalism and free enterprise versus the rights to basic freedom and human decency.⁴³ State legislatures evidently found it difficult to protect and defend both.

Nik-O-Lok and Pay Toilets in New York

While many of the states' anti-pay toilet legislation faced opposition from coin lock manufacturing companies, that of New York received the most aggressive response. The law outlawing any fee for the use of a toilet was to go into effect on September 1, 1975. As previously mentioned, this legislation was particularly significant because it not only banned pay toilets in public buildings, but outlawed all pay toilets within the state of New York.⁴⁴ In August 1975, the

41. Janet K. Boles, *The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process* (New York: Longman, 1979), 33–36.

42. "Mother of Free Toilets," *The Morning Herald*, 1 February 1945.

43. Nik-O-Lok once refuted pay toilet opponents' assertions that people should not have to pay for a basic necessity by arguing that food, clothing, and burial expenses are also necessities, but are nowhere provided for free. See "'Flush for Freedom:' Pay Toilet Downfall," *Panama City News-Herald*, 12 August 1974.

44. "Women Win," *Wellsville Daily Reporter*, 11 July 1975.

Nik-O-Lok Co. obtained a temporary injunction delaying the enforcement of that law. A statement from the manager of Nik-O-Lok's New York district claimed that "while we respect the rights of some people who object to pay toilets, we must consider the rights of those who prefer the privacy and cleanliness afforded by coin-regulated rest rooms."⁴⁵ The company challenged the constitutionality of the pay toilet law, and the ensuing court case lasted for months.⁴⁶ In January 1976, New York Supreme Court Justice Edward Conway declared free public toilets "a necessity" and upheld the new law.⁴⁷ As New York was the first state to ban all pay toilets within the entire state, Nik-O-Lok likely recognized its influence as a beacon to other states seeking such legislation, as well as the significance of the state's large urban population as it related to pay toilet revenue. It is no surprise that the coin lock company fought so hard to keep privately-owned pay toilets in New York a private affair.

By the mid-twentieth century, Nik-O-Lok was the largest coin-operated lock manufacturing company in the United States, leasing and servicing locks on around 25,000 pay toilets throughout the country. The company used its influence to lobby in a number of states besides New York. After Chicago banned pay toilets in the city airports in 1973, a Nik-O-Lok representative claimed that the mayor's gesture would backfire and require airlines to increase their fares. Interestingly, he also admitted that pay toilets were a "necessary evil."⁴⁸ Besides employing spoken testimonials from its representatives, the company also published a pamphlet entitled "Why Pay Toilets?"—which contained over 180 purportedly unedited comments from satisfied customers—and presented the pamphlet in debates within various state legislatures.⁴⁹ The company continuously argued that pay toilets were necessary to provide civilians with clean and safe facilities, and that any revenue made by contracted companies was used for maintenance.⁵⁰ After its court case with the state of New York, Nik-O-Lok continued to lobby with waning enthusiasm, until in 1977 it flew a "flag of

45. "Ban on Pay Toilet Fought in Court by Lock Company," *Wellsville Daily Reporter*, 29 August 1975.

46. See *Nik-O-Lok Company v. Carey*, 52 A.D. 2d 375, 384 N.Y.S. 2d 211, 1976.

47. "Anti-Pay Toilet Law Sustained," *The Daily Messenger*, 30 January 1976.

48. "Tempest in a Potty at Chicago Airports," *The Charleston Daily Mail*, 3 March 1973.

49. See Hugh McDiarmid, "Columbus Comment," *News-Journal*, 13 July 1975.

50. Including the claim that pay toilets had a "psychological" effect on people, "proof that people don't pay to vandalize." See "Business Booms for Pay Toilets," *Anderson Daily Bulletin*, 7 March 1973.

truce" and conceded its approval of the half-free toilet, half-pay toilet measures that were still active in many states.⁵¹

CEPTIA and Friends

The unique grassroots activist culture of the 1970s provided a climate that allowed normal civilians to band together and support their local legislators and/or counter opposition from companies such as Nik-O-Lok. As early as 1964, newspapers reported youths in West Virginia parading door-to-door to protest pay toilets.⁵² The Youth International Party, founded in 1967 and commonly called "Yippies", added abolishing pay toilets to their liberal, counter-cultural political platforms.⁵³ Predecessors to CEPTIA (the "Committee to End Pay Toilets in America") included F.L.U.S.H. ("Free Latrines Unlimited for Suffering Humanity") in Idaho and APT ("Against Pay Toilets") in California, Minnesota, and Illinois. These fledgling societies, respectively, wore buttons to promote their cause and encouraged people to put strong tape on pay toilet locks in order to prevent them from locking.⁵⁴ Those two organizations, however, lacked what CEPTIA managed to acquire: a cult following of people who took the matter seriously.

CEPTIA held its first official meeting in Dayton, Ohio in June 1970. Its founders were a group of four high school/college-aged students, two of whom were inspired by an annoying encounter with pay toilets along the Pennsylvania Turnpike.⁵⁵ The attendance at that first meeting was 48 people, but by 1976 they boasted 1,500 to 1,800 members in seven different chapters around the country.⁵⁶ "It's hard to get people to take us seriously," said Michael Gessel,

51. John D. Lofton, Jr., "Undone Stories of '77," *The Piqua Daily Call*, 30 December 1977.

52. "City Youths Fight 'Pay Toilets,'" *Beckley Post-Herald*, 19 August 1964.

53. Marquis Childs, "Familiar U.S. Political Structure Will Never Be the Same Again," *Progress Bulletin*, 16 October 1968.

54. "F.L.U.S.H.?" *Idaho State Journal*, 18 August 1971; Lyle W. Nash, "Reporting At Large," *Arcadia Tribune*, 8 June 1969.

55. The founders were Ira Gessel, Michael Gessel, Steven Froikin, and Natalie Precker (three males and one female).

56. Mike Cowdery, "Join the Joiners!" *The Pick and Axe*, 21 April 1976; Gordon, "Why Don't We Have Pay Toilets In America?" In 1975, lifetime membership in the organization cost a one-time fee of 50 cents. See the *Free Toilet Paper*, vol. IV, no. 1, February 1975, pg. 4.

youngest of the CEPTIA founders, in an article by *The Wall Street Journal* in 1973. However, CEPTIA played the humorous nature of the cause to their advantage in calling people's attention to the issue. The organization created an anthem, with lyrics such as "We'll flush them out!/We'll wipe them out!/We pledge, O CEPTIA!" It sponsored the annual "Thomas Crapper" award, given to individuals who made outstanding contributions in the fight against pay toilets.⁵⁷ It also produced a quarterly newsletter for its members entitled the *Free Toilet Paper*, filled with detailed arguments against pay toilets as well as reports of the progress of the anti-pay toilet crusade in various states.⁵⁸ CEPTIA's credo combined simple logic with youthful—and perhaps dramatic—passion: "As long as people's body functions are restricted just because they do not have a piece of change, there is no true freedom."⁵⁹

CEPTIA strongly discouraged violence and vandalism, and instead advocated various "methods of resistance" by which protesters could make their frustrations known and evade paying a dime to use the toilet.⁶⁰ The founders and chapter presidents lobbied their views by way of press conferences and legislative debates, proving directly effective in Chicago, Florida, and Alaska.⁶¹ One issue of the *Free Toilet Paper* claimed that a telephone poll conducted by the Akron *Beacon Journal* concluded that three out of five respondents felt that pay toilets did not contribute to restroom cleanliness.⁶² CEPTIA even directly

57. Cowdery, "Join the Joiners!"

58. One issue featured a story entitled "The Toilet Zone," a parody of the television show "The Twilight Zone" in which a fictional pay lock manufacturer is doomed to an eternity of wandering through the afterlife with no dime to open the pay toilets he had installed during his time on Earth. See Byron E. Calame, "Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?: Group Assails Pay Toilet," *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 April 1973, pg. 2, accessed 6 December 2016, <http://search.proquest.com/hnpwallstreetjournal/docview/133813903/D254A8E451584485PQ/1?accountid=4488>.

59. "Expression Used by Kipling," *Albuquerque Journal*, 19 January 1976.

60. These methods included "The American Crawl" (crawl under the door), "The Sacrificial Lamb" (hold the door open for others) and "The Stuff" (insert paper, wax, chewing gum, or quick-drying cement into the lock). See "Some New Guerrilla Tactics," *Ames Daily Tribune*, 12 January 1973.

61. Kenneth Franckling, "Pay Toilet Controversy Just Beginning to Flush," *The Lowell Sun*, 2 January 1974.

62. The same issue also quoted from a study conducted by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which claimed that pay toilets drove the public from downtown living/shopping areas, and were a prime reason for the decline of downtown areas in general. See the *Free Toilet Paper*, vol. IV, no. 1, February 1975, pg. 1.

challenged Nik-O-Lok by creating a pamphlet entitled "Why *Not* Pay Toilets?", which reportedly featured the organization's first widespread usage of the feminist argument against pay toilets.⁶³ One of CEPTIA's last hurrahs was a state-wide drive in Massachusetts in 1975, on the 200th anniversary of Evacuation Day, in which they called paying to use the toilet an "unjust tax, like the one that angered George Washington." During the event, Gessel also called pay toilets "instruments of sexual discrimination, painful inconveniences, and a cruel form of biological exploitation," forcefully summing up what had basically been CEPTIA's platform since its inception five years earlier.⁶⁴

The founders of CEPTIA decided to disband the organization in 1976, declaring that they were satisfied with their accomplishments thus far. Michael Gessel, along with the Wall Street Journal, estimated that of the 50,000 pay toilets in the U.S., as many as half had been removed. The Nik-O-Lok Co., however, scoffed at that estimate and disagreed with CEPTIA's notions of success, claiming that the nation's largest pay toilet manufacturer was "still alive and healthy."⁶⁵ The impact of CEPTIA and other groups, however, was too large to ignore. They were propelled by the momentum of anti-pay toilet legislation proposed and debated in various states since the 1960s, and by the many public complaints made during and before that decade. Its message was nothing particularly new, but its timing and delivery were impeccable. As Michael Gessel himself stated: "In the current social and political climate, pay toilets probably would have been abolished in the next 10 or 20 years without us. We just speeded up the process."⁶⁶

In spite of the apprehensions surrounding feminism and the ERA, "discrimination against women" was a powerful rallying cry in the anti-pay toilet movement. CEPTIA claimed on multiple occasions that its membership was mostly made up of "indignant, outraged women."⁶⁷ Women got involved in the movement in other ways as well. Some women were called upon to testify in legislative debates in support of pay toilet ban bills based on their own

63. Gordon, "Why Don't We Have Pay Toilets in America?"

64. "Drive Launched Against Pay Toilets," *Nashua Telegraph*, 18 March 1975.

65. "Flushed with Success, Group to End Pay Toilets Quits," *News-Journal*, 15 August 1976.

66. "Flushed with Success, Group to End Pay Toilets Quits," *News-Journal*, 15 August 1976.

67. Calame, "Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?" pg. 3.

traumatic experiences with pay toilets.⁶⁸ The National Organization of Women also made occasional comments and public appearances on the anti-pay toilet scene, including a protest at the Stapleton International Airport in Colorado in 1974.⁶⁹ Representatives of airports and bus stations often claimed that the women's restrooms were much dirtier and more vandalized than men's, but women countered on both the legislative floor and in newspaper editorials that such companies were shirking their maintenance responsibilities and that pay toilets were no cleaner or safer than free toilets. One woman journalist argued that pay toilets actually "make criminals of us all," because if the free toilet line is too long and/or a woman is caught without a dime, she would be easily inclined to slip underneath the stall without paying.⁷⁰ In short, what began as a perhaps sincere attempt by the state to promote moral improvement and provide women with equal opportunities for privacy and decency resulted in a barrage of "indignant, outraged women" fighting to reclaim a natural human right. Women either tolerated or suffered in silence for decades, but the 1960s and '70s provided an environment in which their political voices were heard.

Conclusion

News of pay toilets in the popular press died down significantly after 1977. It can only be assumed that the states that failed to pass laws completely outlawing pay toilets in the early 1970s quietly did so in the ensuing decade or so, seeing as there are virtually no pay toilets still existing in America today. The battle over pay toilets was long and hard-fought on both sides. While lock manufacturing companies such as Nik-O-Lok and government-owned businesses such as airports had the upper hand for the better part of the century, the 1960s and 1970s saw the system of policy change within American politics at work. Ultimately, the opponents of pay toilets prevailed in large part due to a changing political environment and new social movements. The persistence of state legislators combined with the enthusiasm of grassroots activists eventually overpowered the economic interests of both states and institutions. The feminist movement in particular made a great difference, as pay toilets, from

68. "Woman Objects to Pay Toilet," *The Courier-Gazette*, 22 March 1977.

69. "NOW Protests Pay Toilet Ratio," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 17 October 1974.

70. Mary K. Shell, "'Oughta Be a Law'—What Do You Suggest?" *Daily Independent Journal*, 8 September 1971.

the start, were considered by some as a uniquely feminine issue, and then eventually accepted as such by most. Fundamentally, however, pay toilets affected people of both sexes and of all ages, races, classes, and social backgrounds, and were considered by those who opposed them as a human rights issue worth fighting for.

The elimination of pay toilets from American cities was considered by many to be a victory, but it also raised further questions. Over the course of the century, the American public seemed to want to both have its cake and eat it too. It claimed that public toilets were a basic necessity and should be provided by the state, but that the state had no right to exercise financial control over such facilities. The lack of restrooms in a public building might be considered an outrage, yet the regulation of such facilities caused some civilians to complain of "government intrusion in every facet of our lives."⁷¹ What exactly are the responsibilities of the state when it comes to bodily functions and personal privacy? These issues are, of course, still relevant today. Consider, for example, the recent debates surrounding the "tampon tax" and the lack of feminine hygiene products in public bathrooms.⁷² What determines the difference between a privilege and a right? Perhaps it is the availability of the product or service, or the way in which it is used, or its usefulness to all human beings, or the cost of its maintenance/production, or the value/demand it creates, or perhaps it is all of that and more. If history is any indication of future events, we can be sure that as time goes on, what we give value to will likely change. In the meantime, however, may we continue to relish the experience of entering a public toilet without having to pay a dime.

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71. "Legislators Work on Bills," *The Daily Herald*, 21 January 1974.

72. Tamara Ingram, "Why women shouldn't be taxed on feminine products," *Campaign US*, 7 March 2018, accessed 9 March 2018, <https://www.campaignlive.com/article/why-women-shouldnt-taxed-feminine-products/1458821>.



*Battle of Manzikert. Diorama at the Istanbul Military Museum.
Wikimedia Commons.*

“Some Dreamers of the Golden Dream”

The Construction of the Golden Age Myth(s) in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul

Ian McLaughlin

BETWEEN 1648 AND 1656, TWELVE DIFFERENT MEN SERVED AS grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire. Unnerved by the apparent administrative crisis, the boy sultan Mehmed IV asked one of them why, if “during my father’s reign, the treasury was sufficient for Janissary salaries and other expenditures . . . this [was] not the case now?”¹ The vizier dutifully conducted an audit of the state’s finances to answer the boy’s question, but the dismal results angered Mehmed enough to have his chief adviser executed. A modicum of political stability returned to the realm with the ascension of the Köprülü family to grand vizierate in 1656, but the financial troubles of Mehmed’s minority were the result of more than a half-century of protracted wars, internal rebellions, and massive demographic change.²

Dubbed “the crisis of the seventeenth century” by scholars, the period resulted in deep introspection among Ottomans of different social classes

1. Qtd. in Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 50.

2. Sam White, “The Little Ice Age Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: A Conjuncture in Middle East Environmental History,” in Alan Mikhail, ed., *Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2012), 74.

and schools of Islamic interpretation and practice.³ Although modern historians tend to attribute the crisis to factors beyond political (or sometimes even human) control, the structure of Mehmed's question to his grand vizier and his subsequent actions indicate that the Ottomans themselves saw the instability of the realm as the result of (reversible) mismanagement.⁴ However much the participants of these debates disagreed on the nature of this mismanagement or on the proper way to remedy it, they all agreed that at one time things had worked. As a boy, Mehmed IV believed this time was during the reign of his father Ibrahim; in adulthood, Mehmed agreed with others that it was the reign of Suleiman the Lawgiver (1520–1566). If only the Ottomans could return to those past forms of administration, many reasoned, all would be well again. Others still looked to a religious golden age during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad.

In the end, rulers throughout the seventeenth century innovated rather than drawing on tradition. The semi-feudal system of *timar* holders, for example, was altered drastically by the introduction of lifetime tax-farming contracts and the regular rotation of provincial administrators was ended.⁵ In spite of these developments, the Ottomans never embraced innovation as a principle. Instead, the ruling classes, the religious hierarchy, and the people of Istanbul continued to look to a mythical "golden age" for inspiration and renewal. While this golden age was at any rate more the product of imagination than of fact, I argue that there were two principal historical candidates: the reign of Sultan Suleiman in the previous century, and the time of the Prophet Muhammad, nearly a millennium prior.

Throughout the period of crisis, public opinion in the empire oscillated between the two golden ages until a synthesis was forged. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, advice writers of the Ottoman bureaucracy, narrowly focused on matters of governance and elite status, pined for the time of Suleiman. Towards the middle of the century, those influenced by the Kadizadeli preacher movement pressed for a religious reformation that, in ways similar to the European Protestant Reformation, would return society strictly to the

3. See Madeleine Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 166–168.

4. Leslie Pierce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford UP, 1993), 154.

5. Karen Barkey, "In Different Times: Scheduling and Social Control in the Ottoman Empire, 1550 to 1650," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no. 3 (1996), 481.

practices found in the religion's original holy texts—the Qu'ran and the Hadith, both originating from the Prophet Muhammad. Ultimately, these two threads of golden age thinking, religious and administrative, converged as the strongly pious adult Mehmed IV and his Kadizadeli court preacher, Vani Mehmed Efendi, laid the public relations groundwork for the second siege of Vienna in 1683.

The Idea of the Golden Age and Islam

Although it has a particular resonance in Islam, the contested idea of the golden age goes back at least to the time of the ancient Greeks. The archaic poet Hesiod, for example, wrote of a "golden race" whose members lived "peaceful, untroubled lives, [while] the earth supplied all their wants."⁶ Centuries later, Democritus contested this view, arguing on the contrary that humanity emerged from the dark ages of barbarism only once it acquired language, tools, and fire. Plato, however, defended the golden age idea, advancing a view that became commonplace in the Roman and, later, the Muslim world. According to him, technology and sophistication brought moral decay with them; the simple, uncluttered time before the invention of "culture" had been the real human paradise. After all, Prometheus, who had given fire to man, was also responsible for bringing the plagues of Pandora. This story sufficiently established the gods' feelings about civilization and progress. Finally, and most crucially, the late stoic philosopher Posidonius specifically blamed more complex forms of society for corrupting the simplicity of true religion, leading to the introduction of extraneous rituals and dulling mankind's spiritual connection with God.⁷

In Islam, the idea of a golden age goes back to the Qu'ran itself. In sura 5, verse 3, the Lord declares, "This day I have perfected your religion for you, completed my favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion." Based largely on this verse, Muslims came to believe that the Prophet and his companions had lived a perfect version of Islam, and that *bid'ah* (innovation) in religious matters was both unnecessary and undesirable. Nevertheless, Muslims differed on how literally to take the injunction against innovation. To cite one

6. Kenneth J. Reckford, "Some Appearances of the Golden Age," *The Classical Journal* 54, no. 2 (1958): 79.

7. Reckford, "Golden Age," 80–81.

example current in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: should spoons and pants—clearly alien to seventh-century Arabian society—be forbidden?⁸

Imam Birgivi Mehmed Efendi's answer to the question of innovation in the influential sixteenth-century treatise called *The Way of Muhammad* adhered closely to the ways of Muhammad's lifetime. His answer laid much of the ideological groundwork which later Ottoman commentators would draw upon to determine a golden age. The imam did not go to the lengths of condemning the use of spoons (as some of his later followers did); for him, the prohibition against bid'ah only applied in "its strictly religious context" to "forms of worship."⁹ Even when it came to religion, Birgivi allowed that many practices introduced after Muhammad's lifetime, such as attaching minarets to mosques, were suitable adaptations to changing social contexts. Minarets, for example, may be necessary "so that the call to prayer can be heard from further places" in cities.¹⁰ Even so, Birgivi strongly condemned any change past what he viewed as acceptable: "the following of pernicious innovations is more harmful than not following the way of the Prophet at all."¹¹

To Birgivi, these "pernicious innovations" mostly came from certain sects of Sufism (the mystical practice of Islam).¹² He decried those "mystics" who would, on the basis of a pretended "inner knowledge" or "inspiration," justify their clear deviations from orthodox Islamic practice.¹³ Unfortunately, it is not altogether clear which practices the imam has in mind: whether he would forbid *raks* (dancing for enjoyment, which was widely forbidden in traditional Islam), for example, or *devrân* (a ritual dance, or "whirling," which has a religious meaning for Mevlevi Sufis), or whether he thought *devrân* constituted a barely-disguised form of *raks*.

Above all, for Birgivi, the issue of spiritual authority was more important than any particular practice. He contended that those who took their rapturous mystical experience as a source of theological knowledge were likely to go astray at some point, which to him meant rejecting the authority of the Prophet. Hence, he lamented the existence of some "who call themselves Sufi and claim

8. Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima* (New York: NYU Press, 1972), 108–9.

9. Imam Birgivi, *The Path of Muhammad: A Book on Islamic Morals and Ethics* (Bloomington: World Wisdom, Inc., 2005), 71.

10. Birgivi, *The Path of Muhammad*, 72.

11. Birgivi, 73.

12. Interestingly, Birgivi was affiliated with a Sufi order himself.

13. Birgivi, 74.

that their *shayks* (masters) look upon God twice daily.”¹⁴ Were that claim true, he averred, it would elevate Sufi shayks above both Muhammad and Moses—a positively blasphemous idea. Thus, Birgivi concluded, all true religious expression must lead toward imitation of the Prophet.¹⁵

The Rise of the Kadizadelis and the Muhammadan Golden Age

Birgivi’s diatribe, however extreme, fit comfortably within the concerns of his time period and provided the basis for Muhammadan golden age thought.¹⁶ In fact, the late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, under pressure to define itself in opposition to the Shi’a Safavid Empire in Iran, expressed a prolonged ambivalence toward Sufism. Ibn-i Kemal, who would eventually rise to be the head of the Ottoman Islamic establishment (*sheyhülislam*) under Suleiman, changed his position on the legality of certain Sufi practices no less than three times; moreover, this conflicted attitude was not confined to Kemal. There was a rising tide of anti-Sufism in the capital, which compelled Sufi shayk Sünbül Sinan Efendi to write a pamphlet defending Sufi ritual practices. Sinan Efendi’s apology convinced the presiding sheyhülislam—who went so far as to declare his prior position apostate (*kufi*) in his private notes on Sünbül’s treatise—and, eventually, Kemal. Overall, this episode demonstrates that the scholarly elite, when left to their own devices, were open to competing and nuanced interpretations of Islamic law and practice.

However, when Kadizade Mehmed Efendi began his career as Friday mosque preacher in Istanbul in the 1620s, the private nature of the debate over Sufism and other “innovatory” practices became shockingly public. Having become disillusioned with Sufi spirituality, Kadizade arrived in the capital eager to begin a spiritual reformation among the masses.¹⁷ His energetic sermons, which condemned everything from using coffee to making pilgrimages to the tombs of saints, garnered him attention and advancement opportunities; his superiors moved him to larger and larger mosques as time went on. As Madeleine Zilfi has shown, the promotion of preachers within the imperial mosque system

14. Birgivi, 91.

15. Birgivi, 75; Zilfi, 166.

16. Birgivi, xiv.

17. Baer, 65.

“depended on their ability to hold a crowd.”¹⁸ Kadizade and, eventually, his followers and imitators, drew attention not only through sheer individual charisma, but through (somewhat ironically) innovative sermonizing techniques. Instead of reworking famous sermons, as had been customary, Kadizade gave highly original diatribes commenting on “the contemporary scene” and calling out specific individuals for their apostate practices.¹⁹

Both Zilfi and Douglas Howard stress the accessible, if crude, distillation of doctrine in explaining Kadizade’s mass appeal, but his ability to relate his sermons to the anxieties and upheaval of the era seem just as important.²⁰ Istanbul was a city threatened not many years before the preacher’s arrival with invasion by the Çelali rebels.²¹ It seems logical that many would be worried about how to restore their mighty city to divine favor and protection. In any event, the debate over how to put the empire back on stable footing now extended far beyond the court elite to the common resident of the imperial capital. Kadizade gave them a simple solution, familiar to all students of Biblical prophets: Repent! If they could return to the practices prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad, the empire would surely begin to flourish again. By the 1640s and 1650s, after Kadizade’s death, the followers of his movement were repeatedly incited to riots, during which they shut down Sufi lodges and coffeehouses.²² The Kadizadelis continually tried to harness the power of the state for their goals, with intermittent success, especially under the reign of Mehmed IV (1648–1687).

Nearly all the innovations condemned by the Kadizadelis as a source of Ottoman decline, with the exception of tobacco, had been practiced well before the multiple military and social crises of the early seventeenth century. Even the first coffeehouse in Istanbul had been established during the reign of Süleyman.²³ In most ways, then, the reform movement seemed uniquely aimed at restoring society to the age of Muhammad, with little thought to the history of the Ottomans. However, there was at least one important sense in which

18. Zilfi, 164.

19. Zilfi, 163.

20. Howard, 153.

21. White, 77–78.

22. Fariba Zarinebaf, “Policing Morality: Crossing Gender and Communal Boundaries in an Age of Political Crisis and Religious Controversy,” in *Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries*, ed., Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2016).

23. The year was 1555. See Uzi Baram, “Clay Tobacco Pipes and Coffee Cup Sherds in the Archaeology of the Middle East: Artifacts of Social Tensions from the Ottoman Past,” *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 3, no. 3 (1999), 142.

Kadizade’s preaching seemed to overlap in its concerns and aims with the elite authors of the advice literature (discussed in the section below). In trying to harness the power of the state, encouraging the Sultan to fulfill his traditionally Islamic duty of “judging with justice,” the popular fundamentalist preacher was also not-so-subtly promoting royal authority.²⁴

The sermon where Kadizade expounded on the Qur’anic phrase “judging with justice” was given in 1633.²⁵ Murad IV, who was in attendance, had only just assumed full power after ten years in which his mother Kösem had effectively ruled the empire as regent.²⁶ It is fully possible that, like many of his contemporaries, Kadizade saw the rise of women within the imperial household as one reason for imperial decline.²⁷ For the advice writers especially, the erosion of strong sultanic authority since the days of Suleiman was an alarming sign.²⁸ In sharing in this diagnosis, the Kadizadeli movement, though ostensibly advancing the Prophet Muhammad’s day as the golden age, apparently also had the reign of Suleiman in mind.

Advice Literature and the Administrative Golden Age

Before and during the time of the Kadizadeli, the genre of advice literature flourished in the Ottoman realm. In a time of rapid change, educated civil servants, fearful of being pushed out by a new ruling elite, eagerly jockeyed for status by appealing to Ottoman tradition in pamphlets addressed to the sultan. The nature of that Ottoman tradition, however, was nearly impossible to pin down. As the empire expanded in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, administrative positions were increasingly reserved for two groups: *sipahis*, or cavalry who held the right to tax revenues within a designated locale (timars); and *devshirme* recruits—converted slaves from Christian families raised in the palace. However, many *reaya* (anyone outside of these two groups) continued to aspire for position.²⁹ During times of war, the Sultan allowed many *reaya* into

24. Howard, 153.

25. Katib Çelebi, *The Balance of Truth* (London: Allen & Unwin, 2008), 121.

26. Zarinebaf 198.

27. Baer, 60–61; Zarinebaf 201.

28. Pierce 170–173.

29. Linda T. Darling, “The Sultan’s Advisors and Their Opinions on the Identity of the Ottoman Elite, 1580–1653,” in *Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries*, edited by Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2016), 172–173.

the timar system, as the existing population of sipahis was insufficient. However, as population pressures grew and the empire stopped expanding during the later reign of Suleiman, positions became scarce and the descendants of sipahis lobbied to make the system exclusively hereditary.

With the outbreak of two separate conflicts around the turn of the seventeenth century, with Hapsburg Austria on one front and Safavid Iran on the other, outsiders were recruited in large numbers once more. As these two conflicts dragged on for years with little prospect for definitive resolution, the outsiders who became sipahis took much of the blame in the advice literature. One advice writer accused the officers of negligence and cowardice, and recommended that future sipahis be recruited exclusively “from the [ranks of the] capable and the just.”³⁰ Another had a similar position, arguing that children of sipahis were far more likely to demonstrate military valor than unreliable outsiders.³¹

By the time that Koçi Bey wrote a pamphlet addressed to Murad IV in 1631, the image of reliable and noble insiders, threatened for positions and status by unworthy provincials, had become a trope of advice literature. Ignoring the shifty, on-again off-again history of reaya in the military and administrative hierarchy, Koçi located their admission into the ranks to 1584, in the period soon after Suleiman’s reign had ended (1520–1566) but strangely after Mustafa Ali had first complained about the issue in 1581. This discrepancy is explained when one considers that, like the other advice writers, Koçi Bey was not so much relaying the facts of history as “creating an *image* of pure and valorous sipahis of the past by which to denigrate the inefficient sipahis . . . of his day.”³² Even more explicitly than any of the others, however, Koçi located the golden age of administration “in the reign of Sultan Suleiman.”³³

The Siege of Vienna and the Ideological Synthesis

Sometime in the early 1660s, a charismatic Friday mosque preacher by the name of Vani Mehmed Efendi, in the mold of Kadizade himself and of his

30. Darling, “Ottoman Elite,” Isom-Verhaaren and Schull, eds., *Living*, 177.

31. Darling, “Ottoman Elite,” Isom-Verhaaren and Schull, eds., *Living*, 178.

32. Darling, “Ottoman Elite,” Isom-Verhaaren and Schull, eds., *Living*, 179; emphasis added.

33. Darling, “Ottoman Elite,” Isom-Verhaaren and Schull, eds., *Living*, 179.

religious philosophy, captured the attention of Sultan Mehmed IV. Soon the young sultan, still in his early 20s and susceptible to influence, began bestowing lavish gifts on the preacher. Mehmed's mother Hatice Turhan, a powerful figure who had served as regent during his minority, also developed a close relationship with Vani. By the 1670s, the preacher was accompanying the sultan on military campaigns, tutoring the imperial princes, and receiving a stipend from the imperial treasury.³⁴ In 1679–1680, he wrote an inflammatory Qur'anic commentary that may have induced Mehmed to attempt his ill-fated siege of Vienna in 1683.³⁵

Vani began the commentary by quoting several verses enjoining the people of God to conquest. For Vani (and, indeed, for Mehmed), a return to *ghaza*, or holy conquest in the name of Islam, was just as necessary to a renewal of the state as was abandonment of heretical Sufi practices. However, at this point of the commentary, he wisely passed over whatever lapses in *ghaza* he thought the last century's Ottoman sultans might have been guilty of in order to turn his fire on to the Arabs: "Oh Arabs, you do not fight on the campaign for Byzantium. . . . Because for a long time the Turks have been the ones who are the *mujahids* waging *ghaza* against the Byzantines and Europeans by land and sea in the East and West."³⁶ He proceeded to quote a reputed prophecy of Muhammad's about the fall of Constantinople at the hands of "the sons of Ishmael." The standard interpretation always considered any "sons of Ishmael" to be Arabs, as they claimed to descend from Abraham through the child of his maidservant Hagar. But Vani, through an ingenious bit of mythical genealogy, asserted that the Prophet must have been referring to the Turkish people—who after all actually did conquer Constantinople—by that phrase. To Vani, the Turks had not only become guardians of the holy places of Islam (Mecca and Medina), but had inherited the role of the religion's purveyors from the Arabs, starting with the 1071 Battle of Manzikert.³⁷ Moreover, God had allowed the Arab lands to come under Turkish dominion as punishment for neglecting their divine role.

34. Baer, 109–113.

35. Baer, 209; Zilfi, 156–158.

36. Qtd. in Baer, 207.

37. Qtd. in Baer, 208–209. At the Battle of Manzikert, the Seljuk Turks beat the Byzantine army, opening the way for the Turks to settle in Anatolia. (Apparently, Vani has no qualms conflating Seljuk and Ottoman Turks, presumably because they shared the same imagined descent from Ishmael.)

Vani Mehmed Efendi's narrative of Turkish ascension and appropriation of traditionally Arabic roles allowed him to merge the two Golden Ages of seventeenth-century Ottoman thought. First, he reminded his audience that fulfilling the imperative of conquest is an important part of returning to the Prophet's path; then, he recast the Ottoman/Turkish conquest narrative in these new terms, arguing that the conquests of Mehmed II and Suleiman were a continuation of sacred Islamic history. In other words, on one level, he straightforwardly advocated for a return to the conquering sultans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But many had been arguing for this, and Mehmed, who frequently led his troops into battle, had come to embody it.³⁸ Vani's great contribution was to imply that to return to the Suleiman's time and to return to Mahammad's time could be one and the same thing, through a combination of renewed spiritual dedication and military-administrative competence.

Conclusion

Throughout the seventeenth century, as the Ottomans battled repeated crises, they struggled to come to terms with this chronic instability and to diagnose solutions for it. A religious golden age and an administrative golden age both provided touchstones for reformers eager to set the agenda. The former offered justification for spiritual cleansing, while the latter served as a rationale for administrative overhaul and renewed military adventurism. Generally, these two golden ages appealed to different segments of the population: the masses found the simpler narrative of spiritual decline and renewal more compelling, whereas the administrative elite grasped for more material explanations of where the state had gone wrong.

However, the two golden ages were often conflated, and eventually collapsed in Vani Mehmed Efendi's compelling synthesis. This suggests both the persistence of societal demands for golden age myths, and their inherent malleability. As the conveniently inaccurate dating of court writers and religious preachers demonstrates, the construction of these myths depends upon a pre-existing canon of indisputably praiseworthy historical figures and texts, which are drawn upon as areas of consensus during times of instability. Generally, there will be as

38. On the desire for militarily active sultans, see Pierce, 168–172; on Mehmed, see Baer, 140–142.

many narratives competing as there are figures in this canon. Reformers, then, variously seize on the narratives most suited to cloaking their own agenda in a veil of ancestral approval. Vani’s genius was to grasp the essential compatibility of the dominant Ottoman golden dreams, weaving them together in a way that still has the capacity to resonate among Turkish Islamists today.³⁹

Ian McLaughlin is a senior studying history, specializing in modern European history—though you wouldn’t know that from his dual minors, Classics (Ancient Greek emphasis) and Latin American Studies (Portuguese emphasis), nor indeed from the subject of the present paper. He first became interested in the Ottoman Empire through their civilization’s (rather Eurocentric) representation as devilishly overpowered gunpowder-blasting heathens in Microsoft’s Age of Empires II: The Conquerors’ Lepanto Campaign. He wishes to thank Professor Isom-Verhaaren for her piercing insight, honest questioning, and conspiratorial friendship. After graduation, Ian plans to pursue a PhD.

39. See “Turkey’s president invokes a millennium-old battle,” *The Economist*, September 9, 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21728649-ancient-call-nationalism-turkeys-president-invokes-millennium-old-battle>. In the speech described, current Turkish President Recep Erdogan paints a picture of Seljuk Turks marching “With a Turkish flag in one hand and Islam’s green banner in the other.” What a “Turkish” national flag would look like in 1071 is an open question.



The Revolution of 1821. Wikimedia Commons.

“A Kindred Sigh for Thee”

British Reactions to the Greek War of Independence, 1821–1824

Susannah Morrison

Introduction

The Greek War of Independence, spanning from 1821 to 1832, was one of the bloodiest anti-imperial conflicts of the nineteenth century, fought by Greek insurgents against their Ottoman Turkish overlords. Unfolding in the direct aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the political and military drama in Greece was eagerly followed in newspapers across Western Europe. But from the first reports of the outbreak of war in 1821, the fight for Greek independence commanded the particular attention and sympathy of the British middle-class as had few other international crises before.

Late Georgian England conceived of itself as the natural civilizational heir to the artistic, cultural, and political legacy of ancient Greece.¹ Viewing the Greek Revolt as a modern-day continuation of the quasi-mythic wars of ancient Greece, educated British on all sides of the political spectrum saw the revolution through the lens of the archetype of classical warfare: a clash of civilizations between the enlightened Occident and the barbaric Orient. A flood of well-educated and predominantly aristocratic volunteers, including Lord Byron, travelled from Britain to Greece to physically take part in the revolt, but

1. Lucy Pollard, *The Quest for Classical Greece: Early Modern Travel to the Greek World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 157–158.

these extreme demonstrations of solidarity were also matched by an outpouring of popular domestic support.² Despite the public's avid interest in the situation, however, the post-Napoleonic British government was unwilling to risk involvement in another Continental land and naval war, and so adopted and strictly enforced a policy of neutrality towards the Greek War of Independence between 1821 and 1827.

This contrast in reactions—from the keen interest and support of the public to the stagnant hesitation of the government—forms a revealing juxtaposition. As reflected in newspapers from this period, British citizens from across the political spectrum were actively interested in and supportive of the Greek War. Belying the conservative political ethos of their age, the British public were inclined to view the Greek Revolt, not as an atheistic orgy of violence like the French Revolution, but instead, as a virtuous crusade in defense of Christianity. Confronted with reports of Turkish atrocities against Orthodox Greek belligerents and civilians, the British felt themselves “bound by every tie of religion and morals” to assist and alleviate the Greeks’ suffering through any means possible.³ Ordinary members of the British public, confronted by their government’s refusal to engage, expressed their support through extensive private fundraising campaigns. Appeals for the British government to intervene were based, at least in part, on a shrewd political awareness; not simply driven by Christian compassion and civilizational solidarity, educated British persuasively argued that their government’s involvement in Greece was essential to ensuring Britain’s continued competitiveness in the ongoing Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry.

Historical Background

In the 1820s, in the direct aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe held only a tenuous grip on peace. Under the direction of statesmen such as Austria’s Chancellor, Prince Metternich, and Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, the 1815 Congress of Vienna had reorganized the balance of power on the Continent in order to check the territorial ambitions of the Great Powers (France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia). The Ottoman Empire was not formally party

2. The classic work on the Philhellenic volunteers of Western Europe is William St. Clair’s *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

3. “Greece”, *Morning Chronicle*, London, 26 December 1823.

to the Congress of Vienna, but its presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Balkan Peninsula was considered essential to maintaining this tentative status quo, as Ottoman territorial claims blocked the advance of the Russian Empire into the Orthodox nations of the Balkans.⁴ Taking place in the long shadow cast by the twenty-five-year-long juggernaut of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress—and the culture which emerged therefrom—was explicitly anti-revolutionary, anti-nationalist, and pro-status quo. Therefore, the Greek Revolt posed an existential threat to the achievements of Vienna.

In spite of the geopolitical danger posed by the Greek War of Independence, it nevertheless enjoyed an unusually high degree of overseas support, particularly in Britain. This was due, in large part, to the philhellenism prevalent among the educated segment of British society. This emotional attachment to Greece was informed more by a sense of civilisational debt to the achievements of the classical world than by any interest in the realities of the modern country.⁵ After all, the Greece of the nineteenth century bore very little resemblance to the idealized figment of Western imagination. Its classical heritage had largely been overwritten by 1,400 years of Orthodox Christianity, 1,000 years of Byzantine rule, and almost 400 years of Ottoman suzerainty; its culture, religion, and language owed a greater debt to medieval Byzantium than to ancient Athens.⁶ The realities of the modern country, however, were of little interest to the vast majority of foreign commentators, except for when they supported the narrative of a pagan past and a Christian present which classically educated British found endlessly compelling. Public interest in the Greek Revolt hinged entirely on this sentimental and intellectual attachment to a mythologized version of Greece; after all, as other scholars have pointed out, other comparable anti-Ottoman revolts in the Balkans, such as the First Serbian Revolt (1804–1813), were essentially ignored in the West.⁷

4. Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 224.

5. Terence Spencer, *Fair Greece, Sad Relic!: Literary Philhellenism from Shakespeare to Byron* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), vii.

6. Theodore G. Zervas, *The Making of a Modern Greek Identity: Education, Nationalism, and the Teaching of a Greek National Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 11–15; David Roessel, *In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37.

7. See Lawrence P. Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question,” *Slavic Review* 37, no. 3 (September 1978), 421–439.

A high degree of international sympathy, however, did not necessarily translate into international support. The most immediate source of foreign support for the Greek Revolution came from Russia, as a result of the intimate cultural bond shared by the two branches of Orthodoxy.⁸ Drawing upon a strong base of popular domestic support across all segments of society, Tsar Alexander I made extensive overtures to the Great Powers of Western Europe throughout the summer of 1821, offering an allied military intervention in exchange for a shared partition of a liberated Greece.⁹ Such an intervention would interfere with an imperial power's sovereign right to handle internal dissent among its own population; it would, therefore, violate the principle of "moral restraint" which was supposed to maintain the balance of power in the post-Napoleonic world order.¹⁰ Although France and Prussia both toyed with the idea of accepting Russia's offer, Britain refused to even entertain the possibility of a Russian coalition. Instead, British diplomats retreated to a position of absolute neutrality, keen to avoid any entanglement with "the destructive confusion and disunion" engulfing southeastern Europe.¹¹ In the absence of any willing ally among the Great Powers, the Russians abandoned the venture, and Greece was, in turn, abandoned to its own devices.

Castlereagh's interest in maintaining neutrality was indelibly influenced by the profoundly conservative ethos in British politics at the time. Writing to the British ambassador to Constantinople, Lord Strangford, in the summer of 1821, Castlereagh reflected the enduring fear of revolution which embodied his political generation when he stressed the importance of keeping the Ottoman Porte "exempt from the revolutionary danger" which had plagued Europe for the preceding thirty years.¹² Therefore, regardless of Castlereagh's own personal sympathies for the Greek cause, it fell to him to develop a policy which would, he felt, preserve the balance of power in Europe.¹³ He clearly took this bur-

8. Theophilus C. Prousis, "Russian Philorthodox Relief During the Greek War of Independence," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 1 (1985), 32.

9. C.W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1973), 22-23.

10. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 79-84.

11. W.A. Phillips, "Great Britain and the Continental Alliance, 1816-1822," in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919*, vol. II, 1815-1886, ed. A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), 43.

12. Castlereagh to Strangford, 13 July 1821, in *Foreign Office Turkey Papers*, 97, quoted in Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence*, 20.

13. John Bew, *Castlereagh: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 533.

den of responsibility seriously, exhorting Strangford in Constantinople to put aside “the merits of the case” for Greek independence, and to instead, “awaken [the Ottoman Porte] to the necessity of asserting its power over an infuriated people.”¹⁴ To this extent, the moral rightness (or lack thereof) of the Greek cause was utterly immaterial.¹⁵ Indeed, Castlereagh would not give even token recognition of the Greeks as legitimate belligerents; instead, as reflected in his communique with Strangford, Castlereagh considered the Greeks a dangerous revolutionary contingent of agitated peasants, whose petty complaints threatened to topple the new post-Vienna world order. However, he was determined that, under his careful direction, Britain would remain impartial, respect the sovereignty of its allies, and ride out the storm, content in the knowledge that it was “impervious to all but cataclysmic upheavals.”¹⁶

“The Cross Against the Crescent”: Pan-Christian Support

Such a non-interventionist view of geopolitics, however, did not appeal to the British public—particularly the religious segment of the population. Indeed, most of the newspapers’ public appeals on the situation in Greece were addressed directly to Christian readers. A pointed announcement published in the Tory *Morning Post* in September 1823—“The religious communities . . . are bound by every tie, both as Christians and as men, to succour the Greeks and contribute towards their speedy restoration to the bosom of the European family”—may be taken as broadly representative.¹⁷ Ignoring the fact that the religion practiced by the Orthodox Greeks was radically different from that practiced by the majority-Anglican British, this imagined Christian kinship was treated as the most compelling reason for the British public to care about their Greek counterparts.

14. Castlereagh to Strangford, 5 August 1821, in *Foreign Office Turkey Papers*, 97, quoted in Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence*, 20.

15. John Bew, “‘From an Umpire to a Competitor’: Castlereagh, Canning, and the Issue of International Intervention in the Wake of the Napoleonic Wars,” in *Humanitarian Intervention: A History*, ed. Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 131.

16. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 96.

17. “Greece,” *Morning Post*, London, 16 September 1823.

The religious brotherhood between the British and the Greeks was, by no means, a naturally existing tie. Indeed, it was actively fostered and developed in the newspapers, as editors sought to smooth over the depth of the doctrinal schism between the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity, and to highlight the overriding importance of pan-Christian solidarity. “Much has been said against the Greek Clergy,” one radical Whig newspaper acknowledged, “and the Greeks have been represented as fanatics.”¹⁸ This Orthodox fervour was not viewed favourably in comparison to the subdued religious sentiment of Protestant Britain, but the author of the article hastened to correct these misconceptions, claiming, “the Greek Clergy are not without their defects, but they have been confounded with the Monks.” Writing almost a decade before Catholic emancipation, the author reflected the anti-monastic opinions then-prevalent among the British public, blaming the influence of nefarious monks for whatever “defects” might be present among the Greek clergy.¹⁹ Crucially, the writer deliberately noted that the Greeks felt no bigotry towards non-Orthodox Christians, insisting that, “in the greatest part of Greece, the discussions between the Greek and Latin Churches are forgotten.” The squabbles of medieval clerics should be meaningless to modern Europeans; instead, in the face of such overwhelming need, pan-Christian solidarity would be the only morally justifiable response.

An October 1821 editorial written by the Greek Committee, “to the British Public in general, and especially to the Friends of Religion,” likewise made use of this broadly Christian rhetoric.²⁰ Interestingly, the Greek Committee—dominated by philhellenes such as Lord Byron, whose reputations for hedonism and radical politics earned them an unsavoury reputation among the conservative public—did not appeal exclusively to philanthropically-inclined Christians, but instead, broadened their appeals to all members of the British public who considered themselves kindly disposed towards religion.²¹ Chris-

18. “Greece,” *Morning Chronicle*, London, 22 September 1821.

19. See Rene Kollar, *A Foreign and Wicked Institution?: The Campaign Against Convents in Victorian England* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2011). Although Kollar’s work deals directly with the backlash against nunneries, most of the concerns cited—including the perceived unnaturalness of celibacy, the suspect political loyalties of those in monastic life, and rumours of licentious practices taking place within convent walls—were equally applicable to both male and female monastic communities.

20. “The Cause of Greece: Appeal,” *Morning Post*, London, 30 October 1823.

21. Byron was, in fact, intensely religious and invested in Christianity—albeit not in a way recognisable to the dogmatism of mainstream nineteenth-century British religion. See

tianity was used as the most common denominator to draw interested readers into the Greek cause, invoked to create a sense of community and kinship between the authors and their audience. Indeed, the Greek Committee even explicitly disavowed their radical political associations, insisting that, “in their exertions . . . they have disclaimed . . . all other views than to co-operate in raising Greece, from her political and moral thralldom, to a place among the nations.” They repeated their broad invitation to the British public, clarifying that “he who agrees with them only in this, they would consider as their friend and fellow-labourer.” Using language generally reminiscent of Christ’s exhortations to his disciples in the Gospels, the Greek Committee sought to create a Christian space for middle-class citizens to lobby the government for institutional action.

This shared Christian narrative was further explored in the Greek Committee’s direct appeal to the British public. Indeed, the Committee situated the Greek Revolt within that Christian narrative, describing the Greeks as “[going] forth ‘conquering and to conquer.’” This phrase, drawn from Revelations 6:2, is highly significant. Within its New Testament context, this phrase described a rider going forth on a white horse, interpreted in one of the most influential biblical commentaries of the nineteenth century as the archetypal “symbol of Christian victory.”²² When viewed in this light, the Greek Revolt became a biblically-prophesied event, a cosmically-significant moment in the unfolding of the last days. The Greeks themselves ceased to be foreign revolutionaries, but divinely-ordained agents in the dispensing of the great and terrible justice of God, taking possession of their very own promised land. Those who opposed the conquering Greeks—both the Ottomans and their tacit supporters among the Great Powers—stood in the way of the apocalypse, blocking the fulfilment of the will of “the Great and Omnipotent Being, to whom [the Greeks] so solemnly refer[red] their righteous cause.” Almost precisely the same sentiment was expressed in a letter to the editor of the *Morning Post* a year prior in October 1822. The anonymous author here vehemently declared, “Surely Satan must have stood at the right hand of those Statesmen, whoever they may be, in whose evil counsels the system thus far practiced has had its origin.”²³ In both these

Gregory Olsen, “Byron and God: Representations of Religion in the Writings of Lord Byron,” PhD diss., University of Auckland, 2010, 8–22.

22. W. Boyd Carpenter, “The Revelation of St. John,” in *A New Testament Commentary for English Readers*, ed. Charles John Ellicott (London: Cassell & Co., 1878), 559.

23. “The Cause of Greece,” *Morning Post*, London, 3 October 1822.

documents, there can be no room for interpretational ambiguity. In the minds of the British public, the cause of the Greeks was inseparably connected with virtue, justice, and the fulfilment of prophecy—and only the direct influence of the devil could be sufficient to blind a Christian to this self-evident fact.

In order to further underscore the depth of Christian suffering in Greece, British newspapers sought to portray their opponents—the Muslim Ottomans—in as foreign and alienating a light as possible. Turks were almost universally called by religiously-charged names, such as “Mahometan” and “Mussulman.” The atrocities committed by Ottoman forces against Greek insurgents were framed in religious terms, as shown in one particularly impassioned display in the *Leeds Mercury* in 1821: “One of the principles of the Turkish government is never to pardon revolted infidels! They think themselves bound by no promise, by no oath, to the Sovereigns who do not observe the laws of Mahomet, and whom they call *hogs and dogs!*”²⁴ The author breathlessly continued through a graphic catalogue of anti-Christian atrocities, including the desecration of churches, the massacre of clerics, the crucifixion of Greek villagers, and the gang-rape and mass enslavement of Greek girls.

The perspective taken by the *Leeds Mercury* was similar to other newspapers of the time, which all viewed the situation in Greece, not as a political revolution begun by the Greeks and fought with atrocities committed on both sides, but as a “war of extermination, in which about four millions of Christians are left to the mercy of the whole Ottoman Empire, that has sworn to destroy them.”²⁵ The blame for the crisis—and the human cost thereof—was shifted entirely to the Ottomans, leaving the Greeks to occupy the role of innocent victims and oppressed Christians in the eyes of the British public. The European press also simply failed to report the numerous documented instances of horrific violence perpetrated by Greek rebels against their Muslim neighbours, such as the slaughter of 15,000 Muslim civilians in the Peloponnese out of an overall population of 40,000.²⁶ Bowing to the anti-revolutionary ethos of mainstream nineteenth-century British society, newspapers overrode the anti-imperial

24. “Greece,” *Leeds Mercury*, 10 November 1821. Emphasis preserved from original publication.

25. “Greece,” *Morning Chronicle*, London, 26 December 1823.

26. Lucien J. Frary, “Slaves of the Sultan: Russian Ransoming of Christian Captives during the Greek Revolution, 1821–1830,” in *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered*, ed. Lucien J. Frary and Maria Kozelsky (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 104.

actions of the Greeks with the anti-Christian actions of the Ottomans and, in so doing, presented a sanitized view of the conflict which would readily appeal to a wide cross-section of society.

Private Support and Charitable Donations

In the nineteenth century, the British middle-class became a philanthropic people. Influenced by William Wilberforce’s 1797 manifesto *A Practical View of Real Christianity*, middle-class British placed charity and good works—particularly on an international level—at the heart of their religious lives. As Victorian man of letters Edmund Gosse described, “Nowadays a religion which does not combine with its subjective faith a strenuous labour for the good of others is hardly held to possess any religious principle worth proclaiming.”²⁷ Although Gosse was addressing a slightly later period in the nineteenth century, this same attitude is plainly reflected in the religiously-based appeals for British intervention in the Greek War of Independence. It was not enough to merely privately support the Greeks, or to limit one’s response to “a kindred sigh” for their suffering.²⁸ Instead, with the government absenting itself completely from the conflict, it fell to the British people themselves to take concrete action, primarily in the form of financial donations.

These calls for concrete action were primarily sentimental, targeted to appeal to the reader’s sense of compassion—or perhaps, more accurately, sense of guilt. One article painted a melodramatic picture of, “thousands . . . driven from their homes . . . either seeking a refuge from the knife of the Infidel among the crags of Olympus . . . or, if armed, bravely opposing the enemy in the passes of Thermopylae, without bread to eat or raiment to cover them!”²⁹ From a rhetorical perspective, this appeal is fascinating. The choice to highlight Olympus and Thermopylae—places which loom large in the heroic tradition associated with ancient Greece—was clearly deliberate, and intended to appeal to the reader’s classical education. However, by invoking Crusader-era language in his reference to the “knife of the Infidel,” the author also highlighted the

27. Edmund Gosse, *Father and Son: A Study of Two Temperaments* (New York, 1907), 290, quoted in Frank Prochaska, *Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: The Disinherited Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3.

28. Mrs. McMullan, “Original Poetry,” *Morning Post*, London, 28 April 1821.

29. “Greece,” *Morning Post*, London, 16 September 1823.

Greeks' Christianity. In essence, the modern Greeks were seen to be re-enacting the history of their ancestors, fighting for their freedom in a physical landscape which occupied a prominent place in the mental geography of the educated British middle-class. In a single historical moment replete with romantic appeal and poetic justice, the modern Greeks were uniting ancient paganism, modern Christianity, and the clash of civilizations between East and West that runs through both traditions. By answering the physical needs of the impoverished insurgents, members of the British middle-class had the opportunity to act as temporal saviors of the Greek nation—and, thereby, earn a glorious place in this grand historical narrative.

Despite the persuasiveness of this rhetoric, the actual generosity of the British public appears to have been somewhat lacking throughout most of the early phase of the war. Indeed, newspapers reflected a prevailing anxiety regarding Britain's failure to match the philanthropic contributions made on the Continent. At the beginning of the war in 1821, one editorial, noting the "great exertions" made for the Greeks by the French, Germans, and Swiss, nervously cajoled, "The people of England are surely not more indifferent to the cause of humanity and Christianity than the people of the Continent!"³⁰ Financial contributions to the cause of Greek independence, then, were not merely a matter of supporting the Greeks, or of feeding a sense of British exceptionalism—but also a question of keeping up appearances in a charitable competition with the Continent. Particularly given the government's position of neutrality, private donations were one of the key ways to express support for the Greek cause, and the British middle-class was profoundly embarrassed at having their expressions of philanthropy overshadowed by donations from the Continent. By 1823, the problem was far from resolved, as another article noted, "the pastors of Switzerland and Germany, who are indigent in comparison with the pastors of England, have been first and foremost in the sacred duty" to raise and donate money to the Greek rebels.³¹ In other words, with the exception of a small minority, the British people were failing as much as the British government at showing solidarity and support for the embattled Greek cause.

With the middle class falling short in its donations, British philanthropists attempted to extend their fundraising into the working class. The most bizarre manifestation of this attempt to drum up cross-class support was in an extensive drive for farmers to immigrate to Greece. To this end, a short advertisement,

30. "Greece," *Morning Chronicle*, London, 20 September 1821.

31. "Greece," *Morning Post*, London, 16 September 1823.

bluntly explaining how British emigration would help the cause of Greek independence and briefly outlining the price of available local farmland and farm animals, was printed first in London's Whig *Morning Chronicle* and then subsequently reprinted in a variety of provincial gazettes.³² It is unclear exactly how successful these attempts to solicit emigration were—but, even so, they demonstrate an unexpectedly comprehensive nature of private support for the Greek Revolt within Britain. Provincial farmers were expected to be favorably inclined to plan their emigration around the needs of the cause of Greek independence. This demonstrates a clear general expectation that "no one should withhold" his support for Greece, "however small his means"—and therefore, in this way, "the expression of public opinion in England should be as universal as the sentiment itself."³³

Imperial Identity and Competition

In reality, the financial support of the British public, however generous, could not hope to be enough to turn the tide of the war definitively in favour of the severely outnumbered Greeks. Instead, the British people recognized that their government's official intervention would be necessary. From the very beginnings of the war, newspapers protested their government's position of neutrality, reflecting a general public opinion that this policy reflected poorly on the British public, and in no way represented the will of the people with regards to the benevolent role they wanted their country to play on the world stage. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, the British saw themselves as the natural hegemon of Europe, with a responsibility to use their diplomatic and, if necessary, military superiority for good.

Indeed, the British public saw a strong link between their recent victory in the Napoleonic Wars and their obligation to intervene in Greece. As one letter to the editor of the Conservative *Morning Post* demanded in October 1821, "England . . . has just experienced a signal and Providential deliverance from the greatest danger that ever menaced her . . . Are not such blessings accompanied with many duties?"³⁴ This argument saw England as having been uniquely

32. "Emigration to Greece," *North Devon Journal* (Barnstaple), 2 July 1824.

33. "The Spanish Cause: Legality of Transmitting Money and Arms to Spain and Greece," *Morning Post* (London), 7 July 1823.

34. "Important Considerations Relative to Greece," *Morning Post* (London), 30 October 1821.

singled out for deliverance in the recent Continental land war. By virtue of the “external security” now enjoyed as a result of this divine act of national salvation, England carried a special responsibility to act as a physical savior for other endangered nations.

The following year, in 1822, another editorial laid forth an even more explicit demand for action: “All we now ask is that the influence of this country may be exerted with her allies to prevent their interference in favour of the insolent and savage despot of Turkey.”³⁵ Crucially, the author was not demanding an active military intervention in Greece. Rather, he envisioned a comparatively moderate form of support, through the exertion of diplomatic pressure on the other Great Powers to not get involved in favour of Turkey. This writer conceived of Britain’s ideal role on the world stage as a primarily diplomatic, rather than military, strongman.

The advocates of British intervention in Greece did not rely on purely altruistic motives to make their case. Numerous newspapers speculated how an independent Greece would be uniquely advantageous to Britain’s commercial and imperial interests, particularly in the context of the uneasy peace on the Continent and the fear of Russian expansionism. The expectations of financial benefits were derived largely from the expectation of “rapid improvement” to Greece’s infrastructure and economy “which could not fail to take place under any Government, except a Turkish one.”³⁶ Ottoman rule had succeeded only in stunting and stagnating Greece’s economic development—whatever were to come next, be it independence or imperial partition, could only be an improvement, with the hypothetical benefits shared throughout the European economy at large. However, the lion’s share of those benefits would likely go to the Great Power to which “the Greeks owe[d] their liberation.”³⁷ Therefore, if “enterprising, ambitious, and powerful” Russia were to choose to intervene in Greece before Britain did, then Britain hypothetically stood to sustain a “very seriously dangerous” blow to its “commercial and maritime interests.” As theorized by newspaper commentators, intervention in Greece could, in fact, end up being crucial for purposes of remaining economically viable in the high-stakes game of imperial competition.

35. “The Cause of Greece,” *Morning Post* (London), 5 October 1822.

36. “Extract from the Allgemeine Zeitung,” *Morning Chronicle* (London), 1 October 1821.

37. “Policy of England at the Present Crisis with Respect to Greece,” *Morning Chronicle* (London), 29 October 1821.

However, the situation in Greece also had the opportunity to rewrite the political map of Europe altogether. Newspapers were hyper-aware of the Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry and enthusiastically embraced the notion that an independent Greece, established with British assistance, would ensure the presence of a friendly buffer state to block Russian “encroachments” into the Mediterranean.³⁸ Tsar Alexander I actually had no intention of taking action in Greece without the support of western allies, or indeed, of pursuing a platform of Mediterranean expansion; however, even so, the specter of unfettered Russian territorial ambition haunted British political commentators.³⁹ Russian expansion into the Balkans and Mediterranean—whether through the tsar setting up Greece as a nominally independent puppet-state or through an aggressive invasion and occupation of weakened Ottoman territory—would throw off the delicate balance of power in Europe entirely, and also threaten to end Britain’s claim to hegemonic status. Therefore, as dangerous as the Greek Revolt may seem, active British support for it would actually be more conducive to European peace than any other course of action.

“England, not Europe”: Parliamentary Perspectives

While the British public enthusiastically debated, discussed, and advocated for the cause of Greek independence, the dangerous situation in the Mediterranean was, likewise, being discussed in the Houses of Parliament. In some ways, Parliamentary debates on the Greek War of Independence paralleled the debates taking place in the public sphere. For instance, members of Parliament borrowed extensive religious language in their descriptions of the situation in Greece, with the Turks, in particular, almost always called “infidels.” Surprisingly, however, the Greek Revolt was not frequently discussed in either the House of Commons or the House of Lords, especially in comparison to other important issues of its day. For instance, a keyword search of the Hansard Parliamentary Archive database for the word “Greece” during the decade of the 1820s yields only 93 results, while a comparable search for the word “abolition” brings up 481 results. Clearly, as geopolitically sensitive and significant as the

38. “Extract from the Allgemeine Zeitung,” *Morning Chronicle* (London), 1 October 1821.

39. Alexander Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform, and Social Change, 1814–1914*, ed. Thomas C. Owen and Larissa G. Zakharova, trans. Marshall S. Shatz (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 34.

Greek Revolt was, it was hardly a key area of concern for lawmakers during this tumultuous period. However, the debates which did take place offer a fascinating comparative perspective on how those in positions of power were thinking of the situation in Greece.

Examining the records of Parliamentary debates, the reader is left with the sense that, on a personal level, members of Parliament, regardless of their orientation on the political spectrum, were wholly supportive of Greek independence. However, these same Parliamentarians felt that their hands were tied by their government's commitment to neutrality and by the demands of imperial governance—and so they struggled to avoid any hint of advocacy for British involvement in the crisis. For instance, the reformer Sir Francis Burdett echoed the opinions of the general public when he announced that “he wished heartily [Greece] was out of Turkish possession, and in the possession of the Greeks,” and that, “he was convinced that [an independent Greece] would be a great benefit to the Christian European world.”⁴⁰ However, Burdett gave no indication of supporting any kind of British intervention to bring this dream into the realm of reality. Indeed, as the Marquis of Lansdowne, a moderate Whig, claimed in a House of Lords debate, Parliament generally was of the opinion that, “it was not by direct interference that any good could be accomplished, or any progress made.”⁴¹ No explanation was ever given within the debates as to why direct intervention in Greece would be inefficacious; the closest approximation to an explanation was given in the House of Commons, when Tory Joseph Hume observed that Britain “had always been too anxious to mix itself in the broils of other states.”⁴² Britain's overeager involvement on the Continent in the preceding decade had carried a high price tag, with national debt skyrocketing to an estimated £834 million by 1815.⁴³ These pre-existing financial burdens—and the agitation of the liberal establishment against government spending on military expeditions on the Continent—must have played into Parliamentarians' eagerness to avoid interventionism in Greece.⁴⁴ Little wonder, then, that the vast majority of Parliamentarians were satisfied with vague, over-generalized expressions of support.

40. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, “Address on the King's Speech at the Opening of the Session,” HC, 5 February 1822, v. 6, cc. 19–93.

41. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, “Address on the King's Speech at the Opening of the Session,” HL, 5 February 1822, v. 6, cc. 3–19.

42. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, “Ionian Islands,” HC, 14 May 1822, v. 7, cc. 562–96.

43. Rory Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 376.

44. Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon*, 375.

There were, of course, voices of dissent from within the Parliamentary system, who echoed the inflammatory tone of the newspapers in their denunciation of the government's hypocrisy. Most prominent among these voices of protest was John Hobhouse, a friend of Lord Byron from their Cambridge days, who had accompanied Byron on his first voyage to Greece in 1809.⁴⁵ Hobhouse had served a sentence in Newgate Prison in 1819 as a result of his authorship of a highly radical political pamphlet, before experiencing a dramatic reversal of fortunes and being elected to the House of Commons in 1820.⁴⁶ Therefore, Hobhouse was something of an outsider and an anomaly within Parliament, occupying a position of isolation which enabled him to speak more boldly than many of his contemporaries.

This boldness was clearly displayed in the same debate referenced above, during which fellow radical Sir Francis Burdett spoke so noncommittally about the cause of Greek independence. On this occasion, Hobhouse unleashed a torrent of abuse against Castlereagh's government, furiously denouncing its obsession with maintaining the "peace of the grave" achieved at the Congress of Vienna. Castlereagh and Metternich's carefully-enforced status quo "had served to destroy the independence of every state in Europe," constituting "a disgraceful invasion of the rights of man, not to be paralleled in the history of the civilised world."⁴⁷ Hobhouse accused his fellow parliamentarians of "supporting . . . a system of tyranny and oppression" and, in their hypocrisy, giving lip-service to the cause of Greek independence, but in truth, having "not a single tear to shed for Greece." Hobhouse's aggressive anti-government attacks place him in the ranks of the most radical of public commentators. However, his role in Parliament as a self-appointed voice of conscience was largely overshadowed by his more moderate, mainstream colleagues, all of whom insisted that, contrary to the claims of "those gentlemen who appeared to possess a peculiar system for the better management of foreign affairs," "every thing which . . . was in the power of [the] government to effect, had been done."⁴⁸

45. See Peter Cochrane, *Byron and Hobby-O: The Relationship Between Byron and John Cam Hobhouse* (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 73–105.

46. Robert E. Zegger, *John Cam Hobhouse: A Political Life, 1819–1852* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 78–79.

47. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, "Address on the King's Speech at the Opening of the Session," HC, 5 February 1822, v. 6, cc. 19–93.

48. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, "Cause of the Greeks," HC, 15 July 1822, v. 7, cc. 1649–53.

To this end, Parliament seemed to expect the British people to accept the burden of responsibility to express their country's unofficial sympathy for the Greek War of Independence. As explored above, the British people unambiguously supported their Greek counterparts, publicly advocating and raising money for their cause. However, their action was ultimately stalled by the government's policy of neutrality; there was only so far that private individuals could advance their activism without official sanction and support. By contrast, multiple Parliamentary debates blamed the British people for their supposed lack of interest in the situation in Greece. Even in the context of debates sparked by public petitions brought before the House of Commons, members of Parliament still "heartily wished that there could be an expression of public sentiment . . . upon this Subject, which might convince the world that we were not indifferent to the great and holy war which the Greeks were now waging."⁴⁹ The majority of Parliamentarians felt themselves fundamentally unable to act—and so they shifted the blame for their own moral cowardice to the English people themselves, accusing their constituents of being self-absorbed and disinterested in the Greek cause.

Although the members of Parliament certainly felt an emotional tie to the Greek War of Independence, their enthusiasm was also tempered by their anxiety with regards to how the war in Greece was negatively impacting—and indeed, would continue to impact—British interests. The foreign policy of George Canning, who succeeded Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary in 1822, consistently prioritized the needs of Britain over the needs of Europe, and this policy was very much practiced in Greece.⁵⁰ In contrast to the political commentators in the newspaper, who saw the Greek Revolt as a positive opportunity for Britain to further secure its role as the uncontested leader of Europe, Parliamentarians saw it as a threat to British territorial concerns. The Ionian Islands, a strategically-located island chain off the west coast of the Greek mainland, had recently come under British authority as a protectorate under the terms of the Congress of Vienna. Although these islands gave Britain a valuable territorial foothold in the region, as well as unchallenged control over east-west shipping lanes in the northern Mediterranean, it also dragged the empire into an uncomfortably close geographic proximity to one of the most notable anti-imperial conflicts of the nineteenth century.

49. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, "Greek Cause," HC, 19 May 1826, v. 15, cc. 1271–5.

50. Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World* (London: G. Bell, 1925), 324.

The policy of neutrality was stubbornly observed on the Ionian Islands. Given the unique tensions observed on the ground—with hundreds of Ionians deserting their homes to join the fight on the mainland, mainlanders fleeing to the islands for refuge from the violence, and rebel groups agitating for the revolt to spread to the islands—this was a near-impossible feat of imperial administration.⁵¹ This untenable situation was discussed extensively in the House of Commons, as Parliamentarians struggled to articulate a policy which could calm the volatile situation in the islands, while not betraying any pro-Greek bias.⁵² Ultimately, the desire to maintain neutrality carried the day; Parliament approved the implementation of martial law in the Ionian Islands, and the wedge between the British administration on Corfu and the local population only continued to deepen.⁵³ As a result, members of Parliament were keenly aware of the fact that, should Greece gain its independence, the Ionians "would shake off [British] protection, in consequence of the . . . regulations with which it was accompanied."⁵⁴ Although the Ionian Islands had only recently been incorporated into the empire, the prospect of losing this strategic piece of land to an independent Greece was a grim one—and perhaps further helped to fuel Parliamentarians' ambivalence about furthering the cause of Greek independence.

Conclusion

In April 1826, representatives of Britain and Russia signed a protocol which laid forth a plan for peace in the Mediterranean: Greece was to remain a part of the Ottoman Empire, but was to receive internal autonomy. This protocol eventually became the foundation for the 1827 Treaty of London, which demanded the consent of the Greeks and Turks alike to an armistice, enforced by a Russian, British, and French coalition force, and the establishment of Greece as

51. Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 187; "Affairs of Greece," *Caledonian Mercury* (Edinburgh), 23 September 1822.

52. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, "Ionian Islands," HC, 14 May 1822, v. 7, cc. 562–96.

53. Thomas W. Gallant, "Peasant Ideology and Excommunication for Crime in a Colonial Context: The Ionian Islands (Greece), 1817–1864," *Journal of Social History* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1990), 488–489.

54. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, "Army Estimates," HC, 7 March 1825, vol. 12, cc. 957–64.

a fully independent nation.⁵⁵ To this end, an allied fleet under the command of Admiral Codrington sailed to Navarino Bay, situated off the southwestern coast of the Peloponnese, under vague instructions to stop any further fighting. However, actual military involvement came about largely by accident when the Ottoman navy mistakenly opened fire on Codrington's becalmed fleet.⁵⁶ Under attack, the allied forces returned fire—and within a few short hours, the Ottomans' Mediterranean navy was destroyed, effectively ending the possibility of any further Ottoman resistance to the imposition of the Great Powers' plan.

Despite the British government's initial resistance to the prospect of intervention in Greece, Britain ultimately played the definitive role in establishing an independent Greece. Given the widespread support of the British people for Greek liberation, it would only seem fitting that Britain took the lead in initiating the diplomatic efforts which led to the 1826 protocol and 1827 treaty. However, Westminster's choice to get involved in Greece was not, in fact, as a result of public advocacy. Rather, it was a decision born out of geopolitical necessity; with the drawn-out war in Greece sapping Ottoman resources and destabilizing the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean, the threat of Russian unilateral action in Greece and the Balkans was simply too great to be ignored any longer. It was only when an independent Greece became expedient to British interests that the diplomatic and military intervention took place—revealing a particular interpretation of what the British Empire ought to be and what role it ought to play on the world stage in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. The foreign policy established by Castlereagh, and largely reinforced by Canning, was essentially isolationist with regards to Europe, drawing Britain's focus away from the Continent and towards its overseas empire. Members of Parliament during this period were eminently aware of this ideological shift, and so subordinated their own personal viewpoints to the demands of this "Britain First" mentality. The eventual intervention in Greece should not be taken as a betrayal of that policy—but rather, as a roundabout way to self-servingly protect Britain's overseas imperial interests.

The middle-class, however, conceived of their country's role in a very different light. They were disinterested in an isolationist empire; rather, they wanted a benevolent empire, one which was engaged in world affairs, and which was an unambiguous force for good. They expected the conscience-driven diplomacy

55. Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece, 1770–1923* (London: Ernest Benn, 1972), 54–55.

56. Bew, "From an Umpire to a Competitor," 119.

wielded in the “moral crusade” against the slave trade, for example, to be transferred to all aspects of foreign policy.⁵⁷ The public wanted Britain to embrace a role as the natural defender of Christian civilization—and so, in the absence of government action, ordinary British took it upon themselves to voice and demonstrate their solidarity with the Greeks. This long-overlooked public advocacy campaign reflects a dramatic dichotomy between the will of the people and the actions of Parliament—a tension which would eventually lead to the Great Reform Act of 1832. More immediately, however, British support for the Greek War of Independence offers a fascinating glimpse into divergent perceptions of the empire’s duty on the world stage, at a crucial and vulnerable phase in its development.

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57. Keith Hamilton, “Zealots and Helots: The Slave Trade Department of the Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office,” in *Slavery, Diplomacy, and Empire: Britain and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1807–1975*, ed. Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 20.



Christian Missionaries in Armenia. TopFoto.

Defining Communal Identity in the Ottoman Empire

Hagop Gagosian and the Mormon Armenians, 1890–1910

Courtney Cook

FOR MUCH OF THE OTTOMAN HISTORY, THERE WERE NO ETHNIC OR religious requirements for Ottoman subjects to be categorized as Ottoman, or view themselves as such.¹ This speaks to the administrative ability of the Ottomans, given the diversity of peoples over which they reigned and the lack of inter-communal violence for most of Ottoman history. Ottoman expansion in the fourteenth century began with armies composed of Christians and Muslims alike.² Until the conquest of the Arab regions by Selim I in 1517, the Ottoman population was majority Christian. At its geographic peak, the Ottoman Empire reached across northern Africa and far into mainland Europe, encompassing a vast array of peoples who spoke countless different languages and practiced a plethora of religions. By 1831, census records show that the Anatolian and Rumeli provinces were 61 percent Muslim and 31 percent Christian, with a sizeable Jewish minority.³ Within each of these religious classifica-

1. Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull, “Introduction Dealing with Identity in the Ottoman Empire,” ed. Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull, *Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2016), 1–6.

2. Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 10.

3. Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1985), 21.

tions, however, are further divisions, between Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox Christians for example. The Ottoman Empire was also incredibly ethnically diverse. In the Balkans for example, Muslims could be Turkish, Albanian, or Bosnian while Christians could be Greek, Slavic, Albanian, or Armenian.⁴ Even these categories fail to account for all the complexities associated with categorizing religion and ethnicity.

In the nineteenth century, international pressures, territorial losses, and the rise of nationalism not only increased the importance of categorizing individuals and communities in the Ottoman Empire but also made the process more difficult. Although communities saw it as increasingly important to categorize individuals in the nineteenth century, the politicization of religious conversion and anti-Mormon sentiment within Protestantism created a set of individuals unable to be truly classified as belonging to any one group. This problem was exacerbated by the rise of nationalism, which caused further division within religious groups and ethnic communities, thus resulting in the rejection of individuals by the very groups they identified with.

The principal sources consulted are memoirs of Armenian converts to Mormonism, journals from Mormon missionaries, newspaper publications from the United States, as well as official statements from the Mormon church, Ottoman administration, and Hunchak Party. The memoirs of the Armenian Mormons warrant more extensive discussion. Hagop Gagosian completed his memoir in 1939, which was then translated by his son into English. While excerpts from his original diaries do survive, they remain untranslated from the original Armenian. By its very nature, the memoir is a limited source. Hagop gives an overview of his early life, but the majority of this memoir focuses on events which occurred while Hagop was in his twenties and thirties. Therefore, information about how the nationalist upheavals or Ottoman reforms affected Hagop's early life is simply unavailable. Furthermore, the memoir is subject to the bias of having been written down after the Armenian Genocide during World War I. This likely impacted what events Hagop chose to write about and how he chose to present those events. This is certainly true of the memoirs of Nishan Krikor Sherinian (written down 1936) and Arick Sherinian Kezerian (written down 1963), who frequently deviate from their respective narratives to harangue the Turks for the events of 1915–17, which they did not witness firsthand. However

4. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914*, 22. This list is in no way exhaustive. The intent is not to list every possible religion or ethnicity within the Ottoman Empire but merely to demonstrate the level of diversity which existed.

problematic, these memoirs provide an essential Armenian perspective, allowing for a thorough analysis of the situation of the Armenian Mormons in the Ottoman Empire.

Selim Deringil's scholarship on Ottoman efforts to legitimize their rule, and the interplay between western missionaries and the Ottoman government in the nineteenth century has come to provide the foundation for more recent works on the subject. While Deringil's work focuses on the Protestants as a general group, Seçil Karal Akgün and Karen M. Kern have written specifically about Mormon missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. Both focus on how the conflict between Mormons and Protestants affected the interactions between Mormon missionaries and the Ottoman government, with Kern analyzing the role of polygamy in particular. Information on the nineteenth century Armenian nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire comes largely from the work of Louise Nalbandian, whose research, although outdated, is still the seminal work on the subject. This study builds off the complexities presented by each of these scholars and focuses on how the situation of a few individual Armenians, as well as their self-perceived and assigned identities, fit within the framework these scholars have analyzed.

The Nineteenth Century: A Shift in Ottoman Identity

In the beginning of a century-long effort to westernize, the government issued the Hatt-i Serif of Gulhane in 1839, which laid out aims of religious equality throughout the empire. No longer would Christians be exempt from military service in exchange for paying the *jizya* tax. In order to "achieve effective administration of the Ottoman Government and Provinces," a "regular system of assessing taxes" and an "equally regular" method of military conscription would be established.⁵ The reforms were, in part, the product of nationalism which had taken hold in various provinces in the empire, particularly the Christian provinces. A series of Serbian revolts between 1804 and 1817 had resulted in a de facto independent Serbian state.⁶ After nine years of fighting, with the

5. "Hatt-I Serif of Gulhane," *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record Vol 1 European Expansion, 1535–1914*, ed. and trans. J. C. Hurewitz (New Haven: Yale University, 1975), 269–71.

6. Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005), 55.

help of Russia, Great Britain, and France, Greece was officially recognized as independent with the Treaty of London in 1830.⁷

In 1856, Sultan Abdulmecid issued another decree, reaffirming the privileges of the non-Muslims within his rule and expounding on how the policies established in 1839 would be put into place.⁸ The reaffirmation of Christian privileges in 1856 may well have been a direct product of the Crimean War, and its resulting territorial loss, during which Czar Nicholas I claimed to be the protector of all Orthodox Christians. This included the large number of Orthodox Christians living within the Ottoman Empire. Prior Russian intervention in Greece and Serbia made it clear that this was not an idle threat. In the face of foreign intervention on the behalf of the Ottoman Christian provinces as well as unrest in these provinces, the reform decrees represent the Ottoman government's renewed effort to make all its population feel Ottoman, regardless of religion.

To implement this new system, the government undertook a census of all the Ottoman provinces. Although the empire had a history of census taking, the censuses of the late nineteenth century were the first to register every member of a household. Such a record would ensure that each community was levied the appropriate taxes and that males could be properly registered for conscription. By the 1870s, the Ottoman government considered these registers a major priority.⁹ A report from the Council of State, established in 1867, explains,

To know the exact number of its own population is a great achievement in matters of order and regularity for a government interested in law, property safeguards, financial stability, and municipal order and security. The European States attach great and continuous care to the collection and distribution of information on the [entire] population. It is imperative, urgent, and essential for us to accomplish this important task [census and registration] in a perfect fashion.¹⁰

7. Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922*, 56.

8. "Sultan 'Abdulmecid's Islahat Fermani Reaffirming the Privileges and Immunities of the Non-Muslim Communities, 18 February 1856," *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record Vol 1 European Expansion, 1535–1914*, ed. and trans. J. C. Hurewitz, (New Haven: Yale University, 1975), 315–18.

9. Council of State in Kemal H. Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–93," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9, no 3 (Oct. 1978), 246.

10. Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–93," 242.

The system of registers implemented by the Council of State included the need to designate which *millet*, or administrative unit, each subject belonged to.¹¹ The term “millet” was initially used in the Qur’an to mean religion, without denoting any specific confession.¹² Evidence shows that in the Ottoman case, specific religious communities within the empire were often referred to as millets, including Muslims communities.¹³ It was in the late eighteenth century that the Ottomans began to refer to sovereign nations as millets. Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna during the French Revolution, first equated millet and nation state while trying to explain what was happening in France to his superiors.¹⁴ In a similar fashion, following the independence of Serbia and Greece, these states were often referred to in Ottoman documents as the Serbian millet or Greek millet.¹⁵ Thus, the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire politicized the designation of millets more than ever before.

The delineation of nineteenth-century millets was further complicated by the introduction of Protestant Christian sects via missionaries who began proselytizing within the empire around 1820. Among these missionaries were the Mormons, a controversial Christian sect established in New York in 1830 by the young prophet Joseph Smith.¹⁶ These missionaries entered the Ottoman domains intending to convert both Muslims and Christians. Despite Sultan Abdulhamid’s insistence to Sir A.H. Layard that any Muslim was welcome to convert to Christianity, “be he the sheik al Islam himself,” the government repeatedly restricted Christian missionaries’ ability to preach to Muslims.¹⁷ A Mormon missionary noted that “[Zeverhi] Efendi of the Department of

11. Karpas, “Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–93,” 148.

12. M.O.H. Ursinus, “Millet,” In *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman (Volumes X, XI, XII), Th. Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al., 1.

13. Ursinus, “Millet,” 1.

14. Yesil, Fatih, “Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi’s Observations,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 70, no. 2 (2007), 301–2.

15. Ursinus, “Millet,” 1.

16. “Mormon” was a nickname given to members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Although originally derogatory slang referencing the religion’s holy book, the Book of Mormon, in more recent decades the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has co-opted the nickname, giving it a more positive spin. For the sake of brevity, the term will be used throughout this paper in lieu of the church’s full name.

17. Jeremy Salt, “A Precarious Symbiosis: Ottoman Christians and Foreign Missionaries in the Nineteenth Century,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (1985), 57.

Justice said he thought it would be best to begin [preaching] and see if there were any here that would believe, adding the government would not interfere if we did not convert Turks.”¹⁸

The Ottoman government argued that preaching Christianity to Muslims fell under the prohibitions of Article 6 of the 1856 reform decree which prohibited hindering anyone’s profession of faith.¹⁹ Musurus Bey, the Ottoman ambassador to London stated that the government “retained the right and was under the necessity of preventing the propagation of any opinions insulting to the feelings of those who professed the religion of the State.”²⁰ In private, Sultan Abdulhamid II shared his concerns about Protestant missionary efforts.

In England, Russia, and France, there exist Bible Societies which become exceedingly rich through the donations of rich and fanatical Christians . . . Although the [governments] seem not to be involved in their activities, they secretly aid and abet them in sending missionaries. . . . By increasing the numbers of their followers this religious influence is then transformed into political leverage. . . . Although it is obviously desirable to take firm measures against them, if open opposition is brought to play, the Sublime Porte will suffer the vexing interventions of the three powers’ ambassadors. Thus, the only way to fight against them is to increase the Islamic population.²¹

This statement is emblematic of the changing nature of Ottomanism in the late nineteenth century. Following the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78 and the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire lost the eastern provinces of Kars, Batoum, and Ardahan to Russia, most of its European holdings to independence, and Cyprus to Great Britain.²² Thus, having been stripped of a large portion of the empire’s predominantly Christian provinces, under Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909) the projected state identity became increasingly Turkish and increasingly Muslim.²³ “The Turkish Government was never more determined than it is now to prevent all defection from Islam . . . It is now

18. MSS 2262, F.F. Hintze papers, 19th Century Western & Mormon Manuscripts, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University.

19. Salt, “A Precarious Symbiosis,” 58.

20. Salt, “A Precarious Symbiosis,” 58.

21. Sultan Adbulhamid II to his private secretary in Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, 114.

22. “The Treaty of Berlin 13 July 1878,” *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record Vol 1 European Expansion, 1535–1914*, Ed. and Trans. J. C. Hurewitz, (New Haven: Yale University, 1975), 413–414.

23. Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, 19–46.

a political rather than a religious principle, designed to maintain the strictly Mohammedan character of the Turkish Government, and to retain all political power in the hands of the Turks.”²⁴ Whereas the decree of 1856 was intended to ensure that the entire population of the empire felt “united to each other by cordial ties of patriotism,” by the late nineteenth century, Muslims felt their superior status being threatened and the empire’s remaining Christians felt frustrated when the equality professed by the 1839 and 1856 decrees turned out not to be what they expected.²⁵

The Rise of Armenian Nationalism

As Christians began to feel excluded by the changing indicators of Ottoman identity and independent Christian nations in the Balkans served as extant ideals, more nationalist movements took root, particularly among the Armenians. The Hunchak Party was founded in 1887 by Armenians in Switzerland who hoped to free their fellow Armenians from the grip of Ottoman rule. The Hunchaks quickly made a name for themselves as the most violent Armenian nationalists and dominated the nationalist movement until 1896 in the Armenian provinces of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, continually reaffirming their goal of an independent, socialist, Armenian state.²⁶ A party publication reads: “The Armenians must recover their independence no matter what. All is permitted in order to achieve this goal: propaganda, terror, merciless war of the partisans . . . Kill Turks wherever you find them and in whatever circumstances you find them! . . . Take revenge!”²⁷ In response to the rise of violent Armenian nationalist groups, Sultan Abdulhamid II reportedly shouted in an outburst of anger, “I have abstained till now from stirring up a crusade and profiting from

24. An Eastern Statesman in Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, 115–16.

25. “Sultan Abdulmecid’s *Islahat Fermani* Reaffirming the Privileges and Immunities of the Non-Muslim Communities” *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, 315–18; Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, 47–8.

26. Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1963), 104–131; Although outdated, this is the seminal work written on the Armenian revolutionary parties in the Ottoman Empire.

27. *The Hunchak* in Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism, and the Ottoman Armenians 1878–1896* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 61. *The Hunchak* was a series of pamphlets published by the party.

religious fanaticism, but the day may come when I can no longer curb the rights and indignation of my people at seeing their co-religionists butchered in . . . Armenia.”²⁸

The Huncakaks saw the western powers as key to the creation of an independent Armenian state, and spent much of their energy attempting to secure western intervention on their behalf.²⁹ They appealed to, and found a body of support among, the Protestant missionaries proselytizing to the Armenian people.³⁰ These missionaries wrote home about the condition of the Armenians and championed the Armenian nationalist cause both within the Ottoman Empire and outside of it. In the United States, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and the Evangelical Alliance lobbied to the U.S. State Department, seeking government assistance for the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire and more radical humanitarians formed the Friends of Armenia.³¹ Western intervention in the Armenian cause posed a serious threat to Ottoman rule.

The threat of the Armenian rebels within Ottoman borders was compounded by the many Armenian migrants who emigrated to the west. In the United States, the Ottoman ambassador Alexandros Mavroyeni spent much of his ten-year appointment focused on monitoring Hunchak activities among Armenians in the United States.³² Beyond securing public support in the United States, these Armenian migrants posed an additional threat. Those migrants who opted to return to the Ottoman Empire after having obtained United States passports could claim special privileges granted to foreigners, including exemptions from certain laws. This would allow the nationalists to terrorize the government without fear of legal repercussions. To prevent this from happening, the Ottoman government placed a total ban on Armenian emigration

28. Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, 46.

29. Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, 127.

30. Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, 114; Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, 46, 125; Ann Marie Wilson, “In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s,” *Le Mouvement Social*, no. 227 (Apr.–Jun., 2009), 31.

31. Wilson, “In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s,” 32–6.

32. Gutman, “Migrants, Revolutionaries, and Spies,” 288–96. Mavroyeni served as the Ottoman ambassador to the United States from 1886–96.

in 1888.³³ The ban was enforced through the use of identification cards, which were issued using the census records.³⁴ Despite this, over thirty-five thousand Armenians emigrated to the United States between 1888 and 1908.³⁵

In addition to seeking European and American support, the Hunchak party appealed to Protestant Armenians, Orthodox Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, and non-Turkish Muslims within the Ottoman Empire for help achieving their goals. Yet, defining what characteristics, ethnic, religious, or otherwise, made up the Armenian national identity proved problematic.³⁶ Whereas Greek nationalism had arisen within a single millet, the Armenian case was unique. Prior to the nineteenth century, all Armenians were categorized as a single millet within the Ottoman Empire, regardless of whether they were Armenian Orthodox or Armenian Catholic.³⁷ In 1830, the Armenian Catholic millet was recognized as separate from the Armenian Orthodox millet and in 1846 the Armenian Protestant millet followed suit.³⁸ In trying to unite Armenians against the Ottoman government, the Hunchaks were confronted by three different Armenian religious groups, or millets, and therefore in some sense by three different Armenian nations. The facets which made up personal and communal identity in the late-nineteenth century made categorizing an individual as belonging to a single nation impossible.

Hagop Gagosian: A Case of Conflicting Identity

One example of such an individual is Hagop Gagosian. “I, Hagop Tumas Gagosian . . . was born an Armenian.”³⁹ Born in Zara in 1868, the life Hagop led

33. Gutman “Agents of Mobility,” 48–50. The ban was lifted in 1908 following the ousting of Sultan Abdulhamid II.

34. Karpat, “Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–93,” 249–50; Gutman, “Agents of Mobility,” 50–51.

35. Gutman, “Agents of Mobility,” 48.

36. Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, III.

37. The distinction between Armenian Orthodox and Armenian Catholic became official in 1742.

38. Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2012), 7.

39. MSS 7785, Hagop Gagosian collection, 19th Century Western & Mormon Manuscripts, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University. Various spellings are given for the names of the Armenians, the result of both transliteration

would not have been unfamiliar to most Armenians in the nineteenth century.⁴⁰ As a youth he worked in Istanbul to pay off his late father's debts, training as a barber before returning to Zara to marry at age eighteen. Hagop and his wife Arake Setigian Gagosian were married in an Armenian church, both belonging to the Armenian Catholic denomination.⁴¹ In 1883, when the Mormon missionary F. F. Hintze arrived in Zara, the Armenian community already belonged to a plurality of religions, including Presbyterian, Disciples of Christ, Seventh Day Adventist, Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox.⁴² Hagop's distant relative, Nishan Krikor Sherinian was one of Hintze's first converts, being baptized into the Mormon Church in 1886. Hagop was converted two years later. It is at this point in Hagop's autobiography that he mentions his involvement with the Armenian nationalists for the first time. While it is unclear how long Hagop had been working with the Hunchak Party, following his conversion he sought to distance himself from Armenian nationalism. Concerned for his safety following death threats from other members of the party, Hagop left his wife and children and made his way to British-controlled Cyprus. In Cyprus, he worked to earn enough money to emigrate to the United States, despite the ban placed on Armenian emigration, hoping to find a place among the Mormons in Utah.⁴³ It was also in Cyprus that Hagop was finally baptized as a member of

and spelling errors on the part of the authors; for the sake of continuity, the first spelling given in the original documents will be used throughout this paper.

40. For examples of others with similar work and migration experiences see David Gutman, "Agents of Mobility: Migrant Smuggling Networks, Transhemispheric Migration, and Time-Space Compression in Ottoman Anatolia, 1888–1908," *InterDisciplines* 3, no. 1 (2012), 48–84 and David Gutman, "The Political Economy of Armenian Migration from the Harput Region to North American in the Hamidian Era, 1885–1908," in *The Ottoman East in the Nineteenth Century: Societies, Identities, and Politics*, ed. Yasar Tolga Cora, Dzovinar Derderian, and Ali Sipahi, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 42–61.

41. MSS 7785, LTPSC; Hagop refers to this church as the "Armenian Orthodox Church" but goes on to say "which was under the Catholic Church." Following the split in 1742 the Armenian Catholic Church joined the larger Catholic Church but the Armenian Orthodox Church remained independent. Therefore both statements cannot be true.

42. MSS 7647, Nishan Krikor Sherinian papers, 20th Century Western & Mormon Manuscripts, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University.

43. "The Cyprus Convention: Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, 4 June 1878–3 February 1879," in *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record Vol 1 European Expansion, 1535–1914*, Ed. and Trans. J. C. Hurewitz, (New Haven: Yale University, 1975), 411–13. For information about Armenian emigration during the Ottoman

the accounts.⁴⁴ While others in his home town were not as lucky, all of Hagop's immediate relatives in Zara survived.⁴⁵

After making stops in Egypt, Paris, and London, Hagop finally arrived in the United States in 1900. Soon after, he was asked to return to the Ottoman Empire. Church leadership had tasked a few Mormon missionaries, including F. F. Hintze and Anthony H. Lund, with purchasing land in the Ottoman Empire where the Armenian Mormons could establish a colony and they insisted that Hagop join them. Despite the dangers posed by returning to the empire due to the tense political situation and his illegal emigration, Hagop agreed.⁴⁶ After stopping at multiple ports, where Hagop was not allowed off the boat for lack of a valid passport, the missionaries finally purchased him viable documentation and they set off for Zara, where he lived until emigrating to the United States with his family and the rest of the Armenian Mormons at Zara in 1910.⁴⁷

Government Perceived Armenian Identity

The relationship between the Armenians and the government during this period was one of mutual aggression. Groups such as the Hunchaks perpetrated acts of terror that could not go unpunished. It is true that not all Armenians, or even a majority, were involved in terrorizing the government, but the nationalists' violence brought suspicion upon the whole population. Hagop describes the following attack, which occurred just before he was set to leave for Cyprus:

Some Armenians held up the governor of [Karahisar] while he was traveling with his wife and secretary. They took him and his secretary out of the coach, and after taking them a little way off, killed them both. This governor had been the cause of the death of many Armenians. All the pleading, begging, and reasoning [of] the Armenians had done no good, so it was decided to get rid of him. . . . This killing happened close to my home town of Zara. Every person was under suspicion. The Governor's men figured that even if one did

44. MSS 129, Arick Sherinian Kezerian: Personal record and autobiography, 20th Century Western & Mormon Manuscripts, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University; Wilson, 30.

45. MSS 129, LTPSC.

46. See footnote 20.

47. MSS 7785, LTPSC. Three Mormon Armenians stayed in Zara because of old age and illness. All three died in the massacres of 1915–17. For more information see MSS 129, LTPSC.

not commit the real crime, he could have been in on the plot; so they watched everyone very closely. The criminals were caught and punished, but still everyone was under suspicion. I would have to be very careful and get my travelers permit checked every place possible if I left now.⁴⁸

Hagop was questioned in multiple cities during his trip and frequently warned by local Armenians that he ought to keep moving as strangers were being arrested.⁴⁹ Hagop found himself closer to the murder of the governor than he bargained for:

[In Govdoon] I met Father Murad, a Priest. He told me that there was a young man there from Zara that was trying to organize the young people against the government and asked if I would talk to him and try to persuade him. I consented and did my best, but to no avail. This young man was one of the gang that had held up the governor. He was recognized by the eye glasses he was wearing. I told him to be careful, but he paid no attention to me. Later, I heard that he was captured and punished. On this account, I had a much harder time when they found out I was from Zara. I was watched closely and they were more strict with my passport.⁵⁰

In Mersin, Hagop “learned that someone had held up the ammunition warehouse at Zatum, killed some soldiers and escaped with much ammunition. Once again I had to get my passport registered and was told that they were arresting all strangers.”⁵¹ Although Hagop had been involved in the Hunchak Party, he had not personally taken part in these attacks. Yet Hagop’s experiences show that he, and every other Armenian, were suspected by the government as a result of the party’s activities.

The events in Serbia and Greece had proved the threat that the Armenian nationalist movement posed to the Ottomans. Compounded by other territorial losses in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia, it was clear to the Ottoman government that further losses were a legitimate threat. For this reason, the

travel ban see: David Gutman, “Migrants, Revolutionaries and Spies: Surveillance, Politics, and Ottoman Identity in the United States,” *Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries*, ed. Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 284–296; Gutman, “The Political Economy of Armenian Migration”; Gutman, “Agents of Mobility.”

48. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

49. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

50. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

51. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

Armenian nationalists would not be tolerated. Hagop's experience is emblematic of the suspicion which resulted. There was no efficient way for the government to distinguish between Armenians who posed no threat and those who did. Because of this, Armenians were arrested, sometimes for no other reason than their ethnicity, and subjected to violence. In explaining why the Mormon missionaries taught almost exclusively Armenians, F. F. Hintze said that "the Turks . . . were willing we should convert any Christian Armenians . . . hoping thereby to sow dissension among the Armenians. They felt that such work would break up Armenian unity and thus make it easier to govern them."⁵² Hagop was categorized as an Armenian by the Ottoman state, because he was born ethnically Armenian. To the government, ethnicity was the only requirement to be considered part of the Armenian nation, and being categorized as an Armenian carried with it the stigma of being a nationalist and therefore anti-Ottoman.

The Entanglement of Religion and Nationalism

While the Ottomans viewed Hagop as a threat because of rising Armenian nationalism, following his conversion to Mormonism, Hagop no longer fit the Hunchaks' requirements for belonging to the Armenian nation. Shortly after converting to Mormonism, Hagop approached the Hunchak party about withdrawing from their ranks and the resulting conversation led to his fleeing the empire:

I had been active in the [Hunchak] Party. This party secretly worked against the Government because the Government had mistreated the Armenians. I went to the chairman of the Party and asked him to release me of my duties on account of my new religion. I could not carry on because I did not believe as I used to. He held a meeting with the other members. They decided they could not release me. If they did they feared I might reveal some of our secrets to the government. Some advised the leader to get rid of me. They figured it was better for one man to die than the whole party lose their lives. The leader was a good friend of mine. He told them he'd never do that, but he could not convince many of the others that that course of action was not best because many were afraid for their own lives. My friend,

52. MSS 2262, LTPSC.

the leader, came to me and advised me to leave the country as soon as possible because he did not know how long he could stop the party from doing something drastic.⁵³

Hagop felt that he could not continue with the Hunchak Party because of his new religion. Historian Selim Deringil explains the significance of conversion during this period and its relation to nationalism: “What makes conversion . . . different in the nineteenth century Ottoman context is that [it overlaps] with the rise of ethnic nationalism and the age of National Revival movements. . . . Conversion [was] seen as particularly dangerous in the nineteenth-century Ottoman empire because [it was] perceived as de-nationalism.” This is true of the way that Hagop viewed his own identity as well as the way that the Hunchaks viewed Hagop’s new identity. The Hunchaks equated Hagop’s conversion, and de-nationalism, with Hagop’s assumption of a more Ottoman identity. Most of them seemed to assume that Hagop would now report on the party’s activities to the government. Though Hagop made no mention of feeling more closely tied to the government following his conversion, he too connected conversion to Mormonism with de-nationalism. While the Hunchaks’ fears of Hagop reporting on them were never realized, Hagop was nonetheless no longer fit to be part of the Armenian nation that they desired a state for. He was in fact seen as a threat to that nation. Although the government considered Hagop an Armenian, and therefore anti-Ottoman, the Hunchaks considered Hagop anti-Armenian-nation and consequently pro-Ottoman.

Yet, Hagop’s separation from the party following his conversion to what the Ottomans considered a Protestant Christian sect is inconsistent based on the groups who tended to support the Hunchaks. According to Armayis Vartoogian, an Armenian writing from the United States: “The Protestants were soon in sympathy with the Hunchak. . . . All [Orthodox] Armenian clergy and the children of the National Church were in antipathy to these rascals. . . . But the Protestants, those converts of the missionaries, liked Orthodoxy to Mormonism, a subset of Protestantism, ought to have made Hagop more likely to sympathize with the Hunchak. This disparity can only be understood by considering the internal conflicts within Protestantism in the United States.

53. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

The Complexities of Protestant Identity

From its genesis, the Mormon Church was controversial in Protestant Christianity. The Church was so unpopular in the United States that an extermination order was issued in Missouri in 1838. The Mormon Prophet Joseph Smith was killed by a mob in 1844, but the Church continued to grow under the leadership of successive prophets. Despite other points of dispute, by the late nineteenth century, the conflict between Protestantism and Mormonism had coalesced on the issue of polygamy, one of the Mormon Church's more controversial practices. Indeed, the United States government demanded that polygamy be made illegal in Utah before it be admitted as a state. This conflict came to a head in the late nineteenth century with the United States seizing Church property in 1887 in order "to punish and prevent the practice of polygamy in the Territories of the United States."⁵⁴ Facing immense pressure, the current president of the Mormon Church, Wilford Woodruff, issued a manifesto in 1890, ending polygamy as a practice within the Church.

Despite the policy change, the damage was done, and the reputation of the Church's members as polygamists stuck. Tucked into a San Francisco newspaper article about railroad construction in the Ottoman Empire is a condemnation of Mormon polygamy: "Might not the Mormon whose residence in America is being made too warm for him, find a new home among neighbors who would not be shocked by his matrimonial propensities? There is plenty of room, and the transfer to the Asiatic soil of Turkey of those citizens of Utah who find that they cannot conform would be a great boon to both countries."⁵⁵ An article in the *Milwaukee Daily Sentinel* decrying polygamy referred to the Mormons as "America's own Turks."⁵⁶

As a result of such prejudices, when the Mormon missionaries arrived in the Ottoman Empire and began teaching among the Armenians, they were not well received by the other Christian missionaries. Hagop Gagosian complained that the Protestant missionaries circulated anti-Mormon propaganda. The polygamous reputation of the Church spread within the empire.

54. 24 Stat. 635 1883V1887; also known as the Edmunds-Tucker Act.

55. Galigani's Messenger, "A Trunk Line in Turkey," *Daily Evening Bulletin*, September 16, 1887. Accessed January 30, 2017.

56. "America's Own Turks," *Milwaukee Daily Sentinel*, December 6, 1879.

This publicity attracted many [people's] attention to our religion. . . . Some were sincere, but others were interested only for personal gain. For example, one man heard that Mormons practiced polygamy. He did not have any children. He wanted to know if he joined the church if he would be allowed to marry his sister-in-law. Of course he was told that the church did not now practice polygamy.⁵⁷

Hagop spent a few nights in jail after a Protestant minister reported him for preaching a religion that was not registered with the government. Hagop was released after discussing Mormonism, and polygamy in particular, with the local governor. Hagop reported that the governor said, "My son, you are honest, and a lot of the things you believe in are similar to ours. Your religion sounds like it is closer to ours than any other I have heard about. I am going to send you home, but do be careful and don't talk about your religion since it is not registered."⁵⁸ Jacob Spori, the first Mormon missionary in the Ottoman Empire complained that although "the Turkish authorities are indifferent about our doctrines . . . the [European preachers] already spread some nonsense about us."⁵⁹ In a letter to the *Deseret News*, a Utah newspaper, the missionary Fred Staufer described a Protestant minister in Merzifon who broke from his sermon in order to harangue the Mormon Church when he saw Mormon missionaries present in the audience. In a report to the church, Staufer noted that "Our enemies, the sectarian churches or rather their ministers have made great efforts to destroy our work."⁶⁰ This complicated the situation of the Armenian Mormons within the empire. The government considered them part of the Armenian Protestant millet, and thus Protestant leaders acted as intermediaries for them with the government. However, because of this anti-Mormon prejudice among Protestants, the Armenian Mormons were either left unrepresented by their

57. Hagop papers.

58. MSS 7785, LTPSC. See also Karen M. Kern "They Are Not Known to Us': The Ottomans, the Mormons, and the Protestants in the Late Ottoman Empire," *American Missionaries and the Middle East: Foundational Encounters* ed. Mehmet Ali Dogan and Heather J Sharkey, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 2011), 122–63.

59. Jacob Spori, "The Mission in Turkey," *Deseret News*, February 25, 1885. Accessed February 28, 2017.

60. Fred Staufer, N.A. *Deseret Weekly News*, July 19, 1890. Accessed February 28, 2017. For more information on the Mormon-Protestant conflict see Secil Karal Akgun, "Mormon Missionaries in the Ottoman Empire" *Turcica* 28 (1996), 347–58.

Protestant administrators, or were actively persecuted by those leaders which the government saw as the head of their community.

This anti-Mormon prejudice within Protestantism, both in the United States and the Ottoman Empire, was embraced by the Hunchaks as well. Thus, when Hagop approached the Mormon Church after convincing another Mormon Armenian of his conversion. During his stay there, word arrived in Cyprus about the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1896. These massacres were in part a result of the increasingly Islamic nature of Ottomanism, exacerbated by suspicion of Armenian nationalism. Estimates place the death toll at up to three hundred thousand, with both Kurds and Turks the primary perpetrators according to eyewitness

Hunchak Party after converting to Mormonism, they did not view him as a Protestant. The conflict between Mormons and Protestants in the United States spilled over into the Ottoman Empire, with Armenian Protestants seeking to distance themselves from Armenian Mormons just as the American Protestants had. To the Hunchaks, Hagop was not converting from an Orthodox sect to a Protestant one; he was instead removing himself from the acceptable sects. He was no longer fit to belong to the Hunchak Party “on account of [his] new religion.”⁶¹ Although classified by the Ottoman government as part of the Armenian Protestant millet, the Protestants rejected Hagop, as he did not fit their qualifications to be considered Protestant.

The Armenians' Place in Mormon Identity

No longer an Ottoman, rejected by both the nationalists and the Protestants, the final categorization left for Hagop was as a Mormon. He certainly considered himself Mormon. In the Hunchak very much.”⁶² There is significant evidence that not only were Protestant Armenians involved in the Hunchak Party, but so were Protestant missionaries. British national Reverend George Knapp was implicit in the Sasun Rebellion and accused by the Ottoman government of inciting “the credulous Armenians to attack the mosques during Friday prayers and to kill the faithful, and to assassinate Mussulman officials and notables

61. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

62. Armayis P. Vartoogian, *Armenia's Ordeal. A Sketch of the Main Features of the History of Armenia; An Inside Account of the Work of American Missionaries Among Armenians and its Ruinous Effect; And A General Review of the Armenian Question* (New York: NA, 1896), 147–8.

whom they meet in lowly places.”⁶³ The government even found evidence that Knapp was involved with inciting revolutionaries to kill Christians “in order that the crime might be attributed to Mussulmans.”⁶⁴ Thus, Hagop’s conversion from Armenian

leaving the Hunchaks, he was conforming with Mormon teachings. Mormon publications in the United States regarding Armenian nationalism made it clear that they saw the two groups as incongruent: “[The Mormon Armenians] have been peaceful, industrious, and loyal; no friends to political intrigue against the sultan.”⁶⁵ A report in the *Deseret Evening News* stated, specifically regarding Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, that “it is one of the principles of the Church to encourage obedience to civil governments as well as to God.”⁶⁶ In a display of religious dedication, when Hagop returned to the Ottoman Empire from the United States, it was because the missionaries asked him to assist in forming an Armenian Mormon colony in the old world:

F. F. Hintze came to me and said that he, Anthony H. Lund, and I were going back to the old country to buy land in Jerusalem on which to colonize the Armenian Mormons. Oh, my! How I did resist. I had just reached the holy land [Utah]; now they wanted me to go back. I intended to send for my family as soon as I could earn enough money. I even had destroyed all of my passports and all of my identification papers so that I would not be tempted to go back. Also, I wanted my family to enjoy this land of the free and plenty. But after much debating, F. F. Hintze convinced me that I should go back with them because if they colonized the Armenian Mormons over there, I would be here alone.⁶⁷

By returning to the empire after emigrating illegally, Hagop put himself at great risk. While the missionaries’ journals say little more on the matter than

63. Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism, and the Ottoman Armenians, 1876–1896*, 115–17. On the Sasun Rebellion see Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, 120–4.

64. Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism, and the Ottoman Armenians, 1876–1896*, 115.

65. London Daily Telegraph, “American Missionaries in Turkey—Why They Get along so Well with the Authorities.” *Daily Evening Bulletin*, February 22, 1879. Accessed February 10, 2017.

66. “A Mission to Palestine,” *Deseret Evening News*, December 29, 1897. Accessed February 10, 2017.

67. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

“Hagop’s passport gave us trouble,” Hagop’s writings are filled with worry about the repercussions his passport troubles caused.⁶⁸ “I told [Hintze] my passport would not be accepted in Turkey,” Hagop said, “but he would not listen to me. When we reached . . . Turkey, they would not let me get out of the ship. . . . We found a man that would give me a passport for a price. Hintze decided it was cheaper than going to jail, so he got one without me appearing.”⁶⁹

Hagop was not the first Armenian to emigrate to Utah and then be asked to return to the Ottoman Empire. Levon Sarkis had been baptized into the Mormon Church in Antep in 1890, emigrated to Utah, and then been called as a missionary to the Ottoman Empire in 1898.⁷⁰ He began the journey with other missionaries destined for the Ottoman Empire but after spending a day visiting family who had recently emigrated, Sarkis changed his mind.⁷¹ Joseph W. Booth, one of Sarkis’ travel companions writes that he was “surprised to receive a letter from Brother Sarkis stating that it was impossible for him to go with us on account of recent events in Turkey.”⁷² Rather than understanding Sarkis’ apprehension, given the recent Hamidian Massacres, Booth wrote a letter chastising Sarkis’ lack of religious commitment.⁷³ Sarkis’ parents, still living in Antep, approached Booth during his stay in the Ottoman Empire and complained that asking their son to return after emigrating had been insensitive. Booth described the incident in his journal: “They seemed to entertain the idea that the Church had mistreated him . . . The Brethren explained to them that the Church had done a great deal for Levon and that in leaving Utah he was well provided for the journey.”⁷⁴ The Church was clearly aware of the precarious situation of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire, less than two years after the Hamidian Massacres, which had forced the evacuation of all

68. MSS 2262, LTPSC; MSS 7785, LTPSC.

69. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

70. *Missionary Department Missionary Registers, 1860–1959*, Vol. 3, p. 78, line 582. Courtesy of the Church History Library, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

71. Joseph W. Booth journal, MSS 155, Joseph W. Booth diaries and poems, 19th Century Western & Mormon Manuscripts, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University. August 10, 1898.

72. MSS 155, LTPSC, August 12, 1898. For studies on Joseph W. Booth’s diaries, see James A. Toronto, “Early Missions to Ottoman Turkey, Syria, and Palestine” In *Out of Obscurity: The LDS Church in the Twentieth Century*, (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2000), 339–62.

73. MSS 155, LTPSC, Aug. 12, 1898.

74. MSS 155, LTPSC, Jan. 6, 1899.

Mormon missionaries between 1895 and 1897.⁷⁵ The Church's insistence that Hagop return despite the legal repercussions he faced having left the Ottoman Empire illegally, as well as general indifference to Sarkis' apprehensions about his safety, show that the Mormon Church was less than sensitive to the Armenians' situation.

Once Hagop, Hintze, and Lund reached Jerusalem, Nishan Krikor Sherinian, Hagop's distant relative, was fetched from Zara to help locate a suitable tract of land on which to settle the Armenian Mormons. The team scoured Syria-Palestine and did in fact find a "1000 acre tract of land which they would buy," located a few miles outside of Jerusalem.⁷⁶ Here, sources differ as to what exactly happened, but the project was scrapped. F. F. Hintze's journal and official Church publications note that the site was too expensive and unsuitable for the project.⁷⁷ The Armenian Mormons describe it differently. Ottoman law forbade foreigners from owning land and the missionaries realized the land must be in the name of a local. Hagop said that "it was decided to buy in the name of [Nishan] Sherinian, but F. F. Hintze wanted to buy it in his name so he could take his three wives there and live like a king, since plural marriage was against the law in Utah. . . . Anyhow, he talked Lund out of buying the ground."⁷⁸ Nishan Krikor Shernian was also perturbed by the proceedings:

We did find some good places at reasonable prices. However, it seems that Brother Hintze convinced brother Lund not to buy, because the Turkish government would not allow the sale of any property to foreigners, except to citizens under their subjection. Brother Hintze did not like the idea of [illegible] any land in an Armenian name, but wanted the land to be deeded in his name in order to rule over the poor Armenian people.⁷⁹

It is true that Hintze was facing persecution back in Utah; his own journals mention that he hoped to bring his family to live in the proposed colony so that the US government would not separate them.⁸⁰ However, the Armenians felt that prejudice robbed them of the opportunity to live in their own colony. The

75. Rao H Lindsay, "A History of the Missionary Activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the Near East, 1884–1929" (MA Thesis, Brigham Young University, 1958), 62–66.

76. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

77. MSS 2262, LTPSC; Lindsay, "A History of the Missionary Activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the Near East, 1884–1929," 203–23.

78. MSS 7785, LTPSC.

79. MSS 7647, LTPSC.

80. MSS 2262, LTPSC.

missionary did not see the Armenians as his equal, despite their shared religion, and refused to let the land be purchased in an Armenian name, even if that Armenian was Mormon.

The rejection of Armenians from the Mormon community can also be seen in the initial propositions for the colony. In 1889, George Q. Cannon, a prominent church leader, explained the need to establish the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire rather than encouraging them to come to Utah:

If we were to bring the people of the Orient to our land . . . the cry which has been raised against polygamy would, it is probable, be much stronger against such a movement, and we would be accused of bringing in polygamous hordes from Turkey . . . to perpetuate our system of marriage and to fasten it upon the United States. It is probable, in view of this, that when the converts in the Orient become sufficiently numerous to make it necessary for them to gather together, a place will have to be selected probably in Palestine itself.⁸¹

This statement was given in 1898, shortly after the Hamidian Massacres (1895–1896) that had resulted in the death of up to three hundred thousand Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.⁸² These massacres brought the already brewing ‘Armenian Question’ to the forefront of international politics, even bringing Gladstone out of retirement in Britain.⁸³ Combined with decade’s worth of missionary reports on the mistreatment of the Armenians, the massacres solidified an image of the Armenians as “Christians in peril” who desperately needed assistance from the western world.⁸⁴ Groups such as the Armenian Relief Committee, founded by former Protestant missionary Frederick Davis Greene, raised funds for their suffering coreligionists.⁸⁵ Articles about the vast numbers of Christian Armenians who “died for their belief” flooded American newspapers.⁸⁶ Bills and resolutions designed to help the Asiatic Christians were

81. George Q Cannon in Lindsay, “A History of the Missionary Activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the Near East, 1884–1929,” 206.

82. Wilson, “In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s,” 30.

83. Selim Deringil, “‘The Armenian Question Is Finally Closed’: Mass Conversions of Armenians in Anatolia during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1897,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51, no. 2 (Apr. 2009), 345.

84. Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, 127.

85. F. D. Greene, *The Armenian Crisis in Turkey*, (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1895).

86. “DIED FOR THEIR BELIEF: The Rev. Dr. John P. Peters on the Armenian Outrages—TWO MONTHS OF SLAUGHTERS Sultan, He Declares, Is Responsible for the Massacres—Efforts of the Brooklyn Committee for Armenian Relief,” *New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1896.

brought before the US Congress, and in 1895 President Grover Cleveland sent US Navy cruisers into Turkish waters at the request of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.⁸⁷ Thus, the fact that Armenians within the Ottoman Empire were Christian, and not polygamous, was no secret to the American people, who were seeking to come to their aid for that very reason. In light of this, George Q. Cannon's argument that the Mormon Church "would be accused of bringing in polygamous hordes from Turkey" should they encourage the converted Armenians to emigrate is ungrounded.⁸⁸

Beyond polygamy, Mormon publications cite heritage as a reason to settle the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire rather than Utah. One missionary noted that the Armenians are descended from Japheth, and therefore ought to remain in Palestine as heirs of the land, to help usher in the gathering of Israel.⁸⁹ Although not a view unique to Mormonism, it nonetheless demonstrates the complexities of developing a communal religious identity.⁹⁰ The Mormon missionaries wanted the Armenians to convert, but they did not necessarily want them to emigrate to Utah. They saw them as culturally different and ethnically designated to remain in the Ottoman Empire's territories, despite their religious conversion.

Cannon and the Mormons were not the only nineteenth-century westerners to speak in orientalist terms about the Ottoman Empire. However, Cannon either failed to realize or intentionally neglected to mention the fact that Armenians occupied a unique place in nineteenth-century thought. Certainly, imperialist aims and an image of Armenians as simple people were factors in

87. Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 1963), 119–33; Wilson, "In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s," 32.

88. George Q Cannon in Lindsay, "A History of the Missionary Activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the Near East, 1884–1929," 206. While the ban on Armenian emigration enforced by the Ottoman Empire may have been a factor in the decision to start a colony rather than encourage migration, no LDS sources mention the ban in relation to the colony.

89. C. U. L., "Among the Armenians," *Deseret News*, July 6, 1899. On the Mormon interest in Palestine see Kern, "They Are Not Known to Us."

90. J. L. Barton, "Anent [*sic*] Armenians," *The Daily Inter Ocean*, June 12, 1892; see also Tolga Cora, "Localizing Missionary Activities: Encounters between Tondrakians, Protestants and Apostolic Armenians in Khnus in the Mid-Nineteenth Century" in *The Ottoman East in the Nineteenth Century: Societies, Identities and Politics*, ed. and trans. Yasar Tolga Cora, Dzovinar Derderian and Ali Sipah (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 109–132.

western interest in Armenia and the Armenians, but as Christians, the Armenians straddled the boundary between civilization and barbarism in the minds of westerners.⁹¹ This is exemplified in the verdict of *United States v. Cartozian*. “Although the Armenian province is within the confines of the Turkish Empire . . . the people thereof have always held themselves aloof from the Turks, the Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be said, on account of their religion.”⁹² To the United States, the religion of the Armenians superseded skin color as indicators of race. The court went on to note that “it may be confidently affirmed that the Armenians are white persons, and moreover that they readily amalgamate with the European and white races.”⁹³ Thus, while the Armenians were not thought of in entirely orientalist terms in the nineteenth century United States, the Mormon Church maintained a sense that the Armenians ought to remain separate. In the minds of church leaders, Hagop Gagosian and the rest of the Armenian Mormons would ideally have stayed in the Ottoman Empire, living in a separate colony administered by the Church in faraway Utah. However, the very prejudice that inspired this plan, also destroyed it with F. F. Hintze refusing to accept the possibility of Armenians owning the land he sought to colonize them on. Although committed to their new faith, Hagop and the Armenian Mormons did not fit with what the Mormons saw as the requirements for fully part of their group.

A Crisis of Identity

While Hagop Gagosian's experiences as a Hunchak who converted to Mormonism may be unique, the issues that he faced post-conversion are representative of the difficulties of forming identity in the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. The empire was reforming both in response to outside pressures, such as the intervention of Russia, Great Britain, and France in the Balkans, as well as internal resistance in the form of nationalism. The equality espoused by the reform decrees of 1839 and 1856 lost its appeal as the Muslim position on the world stage was threatened, meaning the decrees were never fully implemented.

91. Jo Laycock, *Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, ambiguity and intervention* (Manchester: Manchester University, 2009), 28–30.


92. *United States v. Cartozian* in John Tehranian, *Whitewashed: America's Invisible Middle Eastern Minority* (New York: New York University, 2009), 53.

93. *United States v. Cartozian* in Tehranian, 53.

Whereas Christians had long felt Ottoman, there were now many who felt rejected by Ottoman state identity. Millets provided the ideological framework around which nationalism arose within the Ottoman empire. This pitted religious and ethnic communities against the government whether individuals wanted to separate or not, creating a set of individuals categorized by the government as enemies, or potential enemies, of the state because of their millet designation. In the Armenian case this is especially true, as the examples of Greece and Serbia had already proved the threat that nationalism posed to the empire's borders.

Yet, within the seemingly clearly defined millets there were divisions. Although the Mormon situation is not entirely unique, the Armenian Mormons are an illustrative example of misfits within the Armenian Protestant millet. Although categorized and administered by the government as Armenian Protestants, the Mormons were rejected by the Protestants. Furthermore, even though one belonged to a certain religion did not mean that their identity hinged on religion or even that their religion fully accepted them, as the example of Hagop and the Mormons shows. Although threats to imperial control mandated the categorization of individuals and communities in order to administer effectively and retain control of the provinces, the rise of nationalist identities, politicization of religious conversion, and the complexities within Protestantism in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, created a set of individuals who did not fit neatly within any particular group.

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1816 Lutheran Hymnal. WorshipIdeas.com.

Will the Wicked “Be Smitten at Last”?

A Comparative Analysis of the 1981 RLDS and 1985 LDS Hymnals

Zachary Osborne

AFTER JOSEPH SMITH WAS MURDERED IN 1844, THE CHURCH OF Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS church), commonly known as the Mormon Church, experienced a succession crisis which ultimately led to the forming of various branches of the Latter Day Saint movement. Joseph Smith had founded the movement in 1830 as a modern-day biblical prophet and had produced works of scripture such as the Book of Mormon, an account of Israelites on the ancient American continent, and the Doctrine and Covenants, a compilation of revelations from God given to the Church through Joseph Smith. While the LDS Church continued after the death of Joseph Smith under the leadership of church apostles, the succession crisis ultimately led to the formation of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (RLDS church) in 1860 under the leadership of Joseph Smith’s son, Joseph Smith III. Both the LDS and RLDS Churches claimed Joseph Smith as founder, both used the Book of Mormon and the Doctrine and Covenants alongside the Bible, and both eventually fell under the leadership of a First Presidency which consisted of a prophet president and two supporting counselors. Significantly, both produced hymnals as official publications for their respective members for the purpose of worship. The hymnals are a manifestation of the common Latter Day Saint heritage that both churches share and the hymns within these hymnals, both those shared and distinct, demonstrate how common history and theology has been presented by these two respective churches to their congregations. An

examination of these hymnals reveals how the Utah-based LDS Church and Missouri-based RLDS Church (official name changed to the Community of Christ in 2001) have chosen to preserve their distinctive cultural heritage.

While the history of individual hymns and the evolution of LDS and RLDS hymnals as distinctive entities has been carefully studied in the past, this study analyzes and contrasts the *Hymns of the Saints* published by the RLDS Church in 1981 and used until 2013, and the *Hymns of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* published by the LDS Church in 1985 which is still the official hymnal of the LDS Church. Analyzing these two hymnals together is appropriate because the era during which both hymnals were used overlapped by twenty-eight years, from the introduction of the 1985 LDS hymnal to the discontinuation of the 1981 RLDS hymnal in 2013. Furthermore, the significance of these hymnals is that they are the first modern international hymnals of the Latter Day Saint Movement. Both hymnals were compiled by committees with the intent of meeting the needs of modern and international audiences; however, these committees produced significantly different results. This study demonstrates that the LDS hymnal was bound and organized to emphasize LDS culture and tradition. With a hymnody reflective of restoration scriptures, it preserved an early Mormon theological framework in the hymnal text. Conversely, the RLDS hymnal was bound and organized in a manner that emphasized functionality and traditional Christian topics and sought to explain itself as a document. With a hymnody strongly reflective of New Testament scripture, the hymnal altered the hymns' text towards a more positive worldview. Both hymnals modernized and internationalized LDS and RLDS hymnody. However, the LDS hymnal presented LDS tradition to an international audience, while the RLDS hymnal encompassed RLDS tradition in a larger, more inclusive Christian worldview.

Origin of LDS and RLDS Hymnody

Both LDS and RLDS modern hymnody are bonded by three early Mormon hymnals that were published before the death of Joseph Smith. Emma Smith's 1835 hymnal, produced under the direction of a revelation from her prophet husband, established a tradition in the Latter Day Saint movement of writing hymns as well as directly borrowing or adapting Protestant hymns.¹ After

1. Michael Hicks, "Borrowing in Early Mormonism," *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 18, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 132.

the 1835 hymnal, the apostles of the Church in England compiled the 1840 Manchester hymnal, which was soon followed by the 1841 Nauvoo hymnal compiled by Emma Smith. Michael Hicks argued that the LDS hymnal tradition descends from the 1840 Manchester hymnal which incorporated distinctly Mormon themes, such as baptism for the dead, and overtook the more traditional 1841 Nauvoo hymnal in popularity. Hicks speculated that Joseph Smith’s expanding theological teachings made the theologically conservative Nauvoo hymnal compiled by Emma Smith “obsolete.”² Richard Clothier acknowledged Hicks’s arguments regarding the Manchester hymnal in the LDS hymnal tradition, but pointed out that Emma Smith’s theologically conservative Nauvoo “collection was embraced twenty years later as the model for the first hymnal of the [RLDS church].”³

For both churches, hymnals are theologically significant and play a similar role to scriptures. However, decades of theological and cultural developments have created distinctive traditions in LDS and RLDS hymnody. Hicks and Nancy J. Andersen agreed that it is tension between traditional and outside culture that has shaped music in the LDS tradition. Specifically, Andersen argued that when LDS musical identity “conflicted with social, cultural, and political circumstances,” it required hymnals to evolve and be revised over time.⁴ For example, Douglass Campbell extensively examined changes to the text of hymns in the 1985 LDS hymnal and found “increased sensitivity by the church music committee to blacks, Native Americans, and women.”⁵ One member of the LDS committee that compiled the hymnal explained that “we no longer expect all our converts to gather to Utah, we no longer see the world around us as hostile.”⁶ Warrick N. Kear argued that the 1985 hymnal was “pivotal in encapsulating the trends toward de-Protestantisation” while also moving toward a more international audience.⁷ One example of an increased international flare

2. Michael Hicks, *Mormonism and Music: A History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 29–31.

3. Richard Clothier, “Different Drummers: The Diverse Hymnody of the Reorganization,” *Journal of Mormon History* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 118–119.

4. Nancy J. Andersen, “Mormon Hymnody: Kirtland Roots and Evolutionary Branches,” *Journal of Mormon History* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 164.

5. Douglas Campbell, “Changes in LDS Hymns: Implications and Opportunities,” *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 28, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 66.

6. Andersen “Mormon Hymnody,” 161.

7. Warrick N. Kear, “The LDS Sound World and Global Mormonism,” *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 34, no. 3 & 4 (Spring & Summer 2001): 81.

in the 1985 LDS hymnal was the assignment of international folk music such as “German, Finnish, Swedish, Dutch, English, and Irish folk melodies” to pre-existing and new hymns.⁸

The RLDS Church experienced similar cultural pressures, going through a shift in culture and theological understanding during the two decades leading up to the 1981 RLDS hymnal.⁹ As with the LDS Church, the RLDS church is “without a formal creed” and Clothier argued that it has been the hymns that “served to fill” the role of an informal creed for the RLDS Church.¹⁰ Therefore, as the Church’s culture changed, a committee was formed to produce an updated hymnal. The committee that compiled the 1981 RLDS hymnal sought to implement the newly adopted policy of their First Presidency in 1978 which called for “inclusive language” in church publications. For example, “Rise Up, O Men of God” replaces “Men” with “Saints.”¹¹

While the roots of the hymnody for both the LDS and RLDS churches are bound together, Clothier pointed out that over a 140-year period, there have been eight major RLDS hymnals, yet the many studies on LDS hymnals “rarely [have] made reference to hymn collections other than those of the Utah church.”¹² William Leroy Wilkes Jr, one of the few researchers to actively compare LDS and RLDS hymnody, argued that “the close-knit sacred-secular culture of Mormonism in early Utah” promoted “uniformity,” whereas the smaller RLDS church needed to accommodate their culture to survive the mainstream Christian culture which surrounded it, producing “unity which did not demand uniformity.”¹³ However, this study was published in 1957 and predates the 1981 and 1985 hymnals. More recent researchers such as Kear have commented in passing on the differences between LDS and RLDS hymnals. Kear felt similarly to Wilkes and argued that the 1985 hymnal is a product of the “retrenched tradition” of the LDS Church and that the RLDS Church experienced “Protestantisation” during the same time period.¹⁴ It is significant that, while Kear and other researchers who comment in passing may very well be correct, their suppositions are not grounded in an actual analysis of the hymnals to substantiate their claims.

8. Kathleen Lubeck, “The New Hymnbook: The Saints Are Singing!,” *Ensign*, September 1985, 11.

9. Clothier, “Different Drummers,” 138.

10. Clothier, “Different Drummers,” 135.

11. Clothier, “Different Drummers,” 139.

12. Clothier, “Different Drummers,” 118–119.

13. Clothier, “Different Drummers,” 143.

14. Kear, “The LDS Sound,” 81.

Evolution of LDS and RLDS Hymnody

The migration of the LDS Church to the West and the organization of the RLDS Church in Illinois separated the evolution of the hymnody of the Latter Day Saint movement into two branches. The LDS Church had a geographically sprawling membership and several hymnals, such as the 1844 *Little and Gardner's Hymnbook*, that were “published for specific missions or regions.”¹⁵ However, The Manchester Hymnal continued to be used by the majority of the congregations of the LDS Church until 1889 when *Latter-Day Saints' Psalmody* was published. Of the 330 hymns in the new hymnal, 70 percent were by LDS composers, making it the first truly distinct LDS hymnal.¹⁶ This trend continued when *Latter-day Saint Hymns* was published in 1927 where, of the 419 hymns, 74 percent were LDS in origin which further reduced the number of protestant hymns.¹⁷ Nevertheless, several protestant hymns remained popular and in the 1948 publication of *Hymns: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints*, the number of LDS hymns was reduced to 54 percent with a “substantial” number of protestant favorites returning.¹⁸ These changes are reflective of the cultural negotiation between LDS tradition and mainstream Christianity, a negotiation which would become more important in the 1950s when President David O. McKay began to emphasize missionary work throughout the world.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the LDS Church began to experience tremendous growth. However, missionaries often carried “cultural baggage” when they failed to make distinctions between their faith and their culture. Furthermore, the LDS Church’s stance on prohibiting blacks to receive priesthood and “exhortations against Communism” limited the initial effectiveness of this work, demonstrating the conservative nature of LDS tradition.¹⁹ Despite this, the church continued to grow and in 1973, President Harold B Lee declared that “no longer might this church be thought of as the ‘Utah Church,’ or as an ‘American church,’” because it had become international in nature. From 1950 to 1990, membership grew from over one million to over seven million and in about the same time frame, the proportion of membership outside

15. Andersen “Mormon Hymnody,” 155.

16. Andersen “Mormon Hymnody,” 156.

17. Andersen “Mormon Hymnody,” 157.

18. Andersen “Mormon Hymnody,” 159.

19. James B. Allen, “On Becoming a Universal Church: Some Historical Perspectives,” *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 25, no. 1 (March 1992): 14.

of North America increased from 7.7 percent to 40.5 percent.²⁰ The RLDS church would experience similar worldwide growth during the mid-twentieth century on a much smaller scale, as they would never grow past a quarter of a million members.²¹

After the RLDS church was organized in 1860, Emma Smith, who did not go west with the LDS Church, was tasked again to compile a new hymnal for the RLDS Church. The resulting work, *The Latter Day Saints Selection of Hymns*, was published in 1861 and closely modeled her previous hymnals.²² It would be Mark Forscutt, an LDS convert to the RLDS Church, whose influence would lead to a drastic change in RLDS hymnody.²³ Under Forscutt's leadership a massive 792-paged work with 1,120 hymns, *The Saints' Harp*, was published and later republished as *Saints' Harmony* with tunes included alongside the hymnal texts. *Saints' Harmony* was the "the largest collection of hymnody in the history of all Latter-day Saintism." However, the ambitious work proved too large for congregations to gain a functional familiarity with.²⁴ It was "cumbersome," "expensive," and "unrealistic to expect that ordinary congregations could effectively learn so many unfamiliar tunes."²⁵ Furthermore, while the hymnal included a significant number of RLDS hymns, the majority were borrowed. Eventually, a slim volume of 442 hymns was produced under the same name in 1933.²⁶ By 1950, the RLDS Church was looking to elevate the "musical and theological standards" and began to become more selective, producing *The Hymnal* in 1956.²⁷ Roger D. Launius argued that it was during this period that the membership of the RLDS Church would begin to culturally shift from the belief that the "Reorganized Church was the only true church to one asserting that the Reorganization was only one true church among many."²⁸

During the 1950s and 1960s a greater number of RLDS administration and leadership were receiving graduate degrees, often in theology, and RLDS

20. Allen, "On Becoming a Universal Church," 15.

21. "A Worldwide Church," Community of Christ, accessed August 11, 2017, <https://www.cofchrist.org/a-worldwide-church>.

22. Clothier, "Different Drummers," 119.

23. Clothier, "Different Drummers," 121.

24. Clothier, "Different Drummers," 123–124.

25. Clothier, "Different Drummers," 127.

26. Clothier, "Different Drummers," 131.

27. Clothier, "Different Drummers," 134.

28. Roger D. Launius, "Coming of Age? The Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in the 1960s," *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 28, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 39.

materials began to become more “liberal in theological orientation and overall perspective.”²⁹ During this time of reformation, traditions were overturned and there were efforts to “[demythologize] church history, theology, and assorted traditions” resulting in the breakdown of the “traditional ideological consensus.”³⁰ This change was parallel to the post-World War II prosperity in the United States that in turn allowed for the increase of missionary work. The RLDS Church opened twelve missions in “non-English speaking countries, more than doubling the number of those nations in which the church was operating.”³¹ As a consequence, they found that their traditional methods of missionary work such as focusing on Joseph Smith and the Restoration proved ineffective, and they began to focus on emphasizing traditional Christian topics instead.³² Between 1950 and 1980, RLDS membership within North America grew from 122,909 to 171,467 and outside of North America more than doubling from 9,058 to 20,230. The higher growth rate outside of North America compared to inside of it is understated because RLDS membership numbers were inflated inside North America, as thousands of disaffected traditionalists stopped attending meetings due to changes in RLDS Church culture. These alienated members would still be included in general membership totals. During the second half of the twentieth century it became clear that the future potential of the RLDS Church was international.³³

Appearance and Organization

Before examining the content of the hymns, it is important to investigate how the heritage of the hymnals has been preserved through their respective appearance and organization. The title of the 1985 LDS hymnal is “*HYMNS*” and is embossed in a golden color. Underneath the title is an embossed image of the LDS tabernacle organ. The title of the 1981 RLDS hymnal is “*Hymns of the Saints*” and is also embossed in a gold color. There is an important difference between the presentation styles of the hymnals. “*Hymns of the Saints*” is a semi-generic title and, while it does demonstrate the possessive cultural connection

29. Launius, “Coming of Age,” 39.

30. Launius, “Coming of Age,” 41, 45.

31. Roger D. Launius, “The Reorganized Church, the Decade of Decision, and the Abilene Paradox,” *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 31, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 48.

32. Launius, “Coming of Age,” 47.

33. Launius, “The Reorganized Church,” 52–53.

between the RLDS church and its Hymns, it is also a title that could be applied to hymnals of various Christian traditions, saints being a general term referring to the followers of Christ in the New Testament. In comparison, "*HYMNS*" may appear as generic a title as possible, its bold presence in all capitals with no explanation implies the expectation of recognition. In other words, those seeing the hymnal are expected to recognize it as their own. This interpretation is made more likely with the presence of the embossed cultural symbol of the tabernacle organ placed directly under "*HYMNS*." The Salt Lake City Mormon Tabernacle organ is a distinctive part of LDS musical tradition and is therefore recognizable as a LDS cultural symbol. Those who recognize the symbol would either be LDS or be aware of the symbol through LDS cultural products such as the Mormon Tabernacle Choir. The presence of "*HYMNS*" above the Mormon Tabernacle is tantamount to explicitly saying "Hymns of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" or simply "Mormon Hymns." While the RLDS church is not lacking RLDS-specific musical symbols, such as the renowned Auditorium Organ, these symbols are absent from the RLDS hymnal.

What is evident from the covers and the opening pages of both hymnals is that the LDS hymnal presents itself as a distinctive cultural product with an emphasis on LDS tradition. In contrast, there was great care in the production of the RLDS hymnal to explain the process and decision making behind creating a hymnal less culturally distinct and more functional for a wider audience. The RLDS hymnal does not refer to its distinctive historical past. The hands and minds behind the production, the committee and those listed in the "Acknowledgments," are a clear presence within the RLDS hymnal. However, the only felt presence within the LDS hymnal is the comparatively brief "First Presidency Preface" with no reference to any committee nor the names of the First Presidency. The RLDS hymnal has six pages of explanatory text with 37 individuals named, while the LDS hymnal has two pages with two individuals named, specifically Emma and Joseph Smith. This exacerbates the difference between the tones the hymnals present. The LDS hymnal is written in a prophetic tone, is presented with the explicit imprimatur of the LDS Prophet without the need for detailed explanation, and is intended for an international Church wrapped in LDS historical tradition. The RLDS hymnal, while endorsed by the RLDS prophet, seeks to explain the compilation of the hymnal not as a piece of tradition but as text created by a modern committee.

The significant difference presented in the organization of the hymns, beyond the more functional divisions presented in the RLDS hymnal, is in how the LDS hymnal begins and ends compared to the RLDS hymnal. The opening of the

LDS hymnal is categorized as “Restoration.” This gives a prominent position to hymns that are either authored by Latter Day Saint movement authors about the beginning of the movement or are hymns thematically similar enough to be repurposed as such. This contrasts thematically with the RLDS hymnal, as the vast majority of the RLDS sections do not appear to be distinctively referring to the Latter Day Saint movement. The RLDS hymnal opening section is “Gathering for Worship.” The closest in theme within the RLDS hymnal are the subcategories of “Revelation” and “Zion and the Kingdom,” which are placed midway through section three of the RLDS Hymnal. The LDS hymnal also includes a category, albeit one containing just four hymns, under the label of “Patriotic” for the final section in the hymnal, while the final section in the RLDS hymnal is “Benediction and Sending Forth.”³⁴ While both the LDS and RLDS hymnals were produced with an eye towards reflecting their global presence, the LDS hymnal contains the distinctly United States-centered “America the Beautiful,” “My Country, ’Tis of Thee,” and “The Star-Spangled Banner,” as well as the British Commonwealth-centered “God Save the King.”³⁵ While on a functional level, it is logical to assume that the majority of English-speaking members would live in a country where one of these hymns would be applicable, their presence gives a slight political tone to the hymnal when compared to the more globally oriented RLDS Hymnal. Finally, the LDS hymnal begins and ends on cultural thematic sections, while the RLDS hymnal functionally begins and ends with sections intended for the starting and closing of religious meetings.

Companion Works

The LDS and RLDS hymnals were both supported by companion works designed to increase appreciation of the hymnals and are significant in understanding how the hymnals were intended to be interpreted. The 1981 RLDS

34. It is important to note that translations, such as the Spanish, German, and Korean versions, of the LDS hymnal do not include a “Patriotic” section. For examples, see The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Himnos De La Iglesia De Jesucristo De Los Santos De Los Ultimos Dias* (Salt Lake City, UT: Deseret Book, 1992); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Gesangbuch Kirche Jesu Christi der Heiligen der Letzten Tage* (Salt Lake City, UT: Deseret Book, 1996); and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Chansongka Yjesu Krisido Sungdo Kuoway* (Salt Lake City, UT: Deseret Book, 2002).

35. LDS Church, *Hymns of the Church*, Hymn 338–341.

hymnal's "Preface" directs readers to *Hymns in Worship: A Guide to Hymns of the Saints*, a 224-page work by Roger A. Revell who belonged to the RLDS committee which compiled the hymnal. *Hymns in Worship* begins with a "Forward" signed by the RLDS First Presidency which states that the goal of the book was to help readers become "comfortable" with the new hymnal and "understand" its role in Church worship. *Hymns in Worship* provided an overview of the nature and history of hymns in Christian worship as well as instructions on how to best use the hymnal for worship.³⁶ The book was also functional as a personal or group study aid as each section ends with study questions to contemplate, such as: "Look up some of the hymns associated with the authors and composers mentioned in this chapter. Discuss the differences that you observe between hymns from different time periods."³⁷ The content of *Hymns in Worship* contrasts greatly with its LDS parallel.

Our Latter-Day Hymns: The Stories and the Messages authored by Karen Lynn Davidson as a "companion to the 1985 hymnal," is a much larger 486-page work.³⁸ Unlike *Hymns in Worship*, readers are not directly referred to *Our Latter-day Hymns* from the LDS hymnal, nor is there a forward or preface by the LDS First Presidency. While the softcover *Hymns in Worship* does not resemble the RLDS Hymnal except for its burgundy color and golden type on the front cover, the hardback *Our Latter-day Hymns* is tan, but with the same gold border and title, along with the same embossed symbol of the tabernacle. *Our Latter-Day Hymns* is formatted similar to an encyclopedia, with entries for each hymn in the hymnal and the various authors and composers. As well as providing historical background, *Our Latter-Day Hymns* provides an analysis of how the LDS hymnal is different from previous hymnals and the type of hymns it contains. It is significant to recognize that both of these works reveal how the hymnals were expected to be interpreted and used in their historical context.

While *Hymns in Worship* focuses on the broader historical context and variety of hymns, *Our Latter-day Hymns* focuses more on understanding hymns as part of distinctive LDS history. The title *Hymns in Worship: A Guide to Hymns of the Saints* demonstrates the main purpose of the companion work was to be a guide in using the hymnal, thus increasing the functionality for worship. *Our Latter-Day Hymns: The Stories and the Messages* has a title that focuses less

36. Roger A. Revell, *Hymns in Worship: A Guide to Hymns of the Saints* (Independence, MO: Herald Publishing House, 1981), 7.

37. Revell, *Hymns in Worship*, 37.

38. Davidson, *Our Latter-Day Hymns*, 4.

on functionality and worship and more on distinctive LDS heritage, with the possessive “our” being prominent. Tellingly, while *Hymns in Worship* discusses the broader historical context of hymns from biblical times, the brief historical overview in *Our Latter-Day Hymns* begins with the Latter Day Saint movement.

While it could be argued that *Hymns in Worship* and *Our Latter-Day Hymns* serve different functions and therefore should not be interpreted as playing the same support role for the hymnals, that would ignore the fact that the difference in presentation of the LDS and RLDS hymnals by extent would call for different supporting companion works. While *Hymns in Worship* is an official companion work and *Our Latter-Day Hymns* lacks such an explicit position, *Our Latter-Day hymns*’ design is highly suggestive as belonging alongside the LDS hymnal and it was published by the LDS-church-owned Deseret Book. Therefore, the significance is that these companion works further demonstrate that the 1981 RLDS hymnal was directive outward and to be culturally inclusive, while the 1985 LDS hymnal work focused on refining its distinctive heritage.

Scripture References

Both the LDS and RLDS churches use biblical scripture along with restoration scripture, the Book of Mormon, and Doctrine and Covenants. However, the LDS and RLDS versions of the Doctrine and Covenants are different as various revelations from both LDS and RLDS prophets over time have been added to their respective Doctrine and Covenants. Furthermore, the LDS Church has a compilation of various other prophetic documents from Joseph Smith called the Pearl of Great Price that the RLDS Church does not use, as it was compiled by the LDS Church after the death of Joseph Smith. As the scriptures pertain to the hymns, both the LDS and RLDS hymnals generally include two scripture references per hymn, which are intended to reflect the textual meaning. Michael F. Moody, chairman of the LDS Committee, explained that scriptural references that were attached to each hymn were selected “for members to use as a starting point to get into the scriptural relationship of each text.”³⁹ Likewise, Revell explained that “significant efforts” were made to provide references “which have obvious allusions and relationships to the hymn texts” so that the references supported and did not interpret the meaning of the hymns. Revell

39. Lubeck, “The New Hymnbook,” 8.

also explained that there was no attempt to represent the various books of scriptures equally in the references.⁴⁰ While it is not clear that the LDS committee did not try to equally represent each book of scripture, it is clear that both the LDS and RLDS committee felt that the scriptural references reflected the meaning of the text.

Table 1

LDS Hymnal Scriptural References		RLDS Hymnal Scriptural References	
Old Testament	22.5%	Old Testament	16%
New Testament	22.1%	New Testament	40.9%
Book of Mormon	23.1%	Book of Mormon	20.9%
Doctrine and Covenants	29.7%	Doctrine and Covenants	22.2%
Pearl of Great Price	3.5%	N/A	N/A
Bible Compared to Restoration Scriptures			
Bible	44.6%	Bible	56.9%
Restoration	56.3%	Restoration	43.9%

As can be seen in Table 1, the 1985 LDS hymnal references the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Book of Mormon at a similar rate. However, in the 1981 RLDS hymnal the New Testament is prominently referenced, especially when compared to the Old Testament. In the LDS hymnal, The Doctrine and Covenants is the outlier as it is referred to 6.6 percent more than the Book of Mormon, but in the 1981 RLDS hymnal the New Testament is referred to 18.7 percent more than the Doctrine and Covenants. Furthermore, when biblical scripture is compared to distinctive restoration scripture in the LDS hymnal, restoration scriptures are referred to 11.7 percent more. This stands in stark contrast with the RLDS hymnal which references biblical scripture by 13 percent more than restoration scripture.

The significance represented in this data is that not only is the RLDS hymnal more likely to refer to biblical scripture, but it is more likely to do so from the New Testament. The New Testament is the core scripture that unites all of Christianity and its dominance in the RLDS hymnal lends credence to the argument

40. Revell, *Hymns in Worship*, 92.

that the RLDS hymnal is substantially more universal in orientation than the LDS hymnal. The LDS hymnal is clearly drawing upon its distinctive theological tradition, which it shares with the RLDS hymnal, by using restoration scripture as its predominant source. It should also be noted that despite the heavy leaning towards the New Testament, the RLDS hymnal still utilizes the Doctrine and Covenants and Book of Mormon for a significant number of references. Despite these differences, there are significant similarities which reflect a common heritage between the hymnals. When specifically looking at the use of the Old Testament in both hymnals, Isaiah is second only to Psalms in frequency of appearance. The dominance of Psalms makes thematic sense as Psalms is a musical document, but the emphasis on Isaiah is important in both traditions as Latter Day Saint movement theology and the Book of Mormon heavily draw upon Isaiah.

It could be argued that this data is inconsequential as it does not consider the actual content of the scriptures referenced, that conclusion would ignore the distinctive nature of restoration scripture when compared to biblical scripture. While there is a similarity between biblical and restoration scripture, as both the Book of Mormon and Doctrine and Covenants use and interpret biblical scripture such as Isaiah, the use and interpretation of biblical scripture is distinct and not interchangeable with biblical scripture itself. If there were no statistically significant differences between the LDS and RLDS hymnals in their references, then this data would not be noteworthy. There is a significant difference, however, and to ignore the differences would also ignore the fact that both the LDS and RLDS committees explicitly chose scriptures that best reflected the text of the hymns. Therefore, it is legitimate to use data drawn from the references to make limited inferences regarding hymn content.

Common Hymns, Alterations, and Presentation

Beyond the organizations and presentation of the hymns within the hymnals, it is the content that is naturally the most substantial feature because the text of the hymns directs the focus of worship. There is a combined total of about 842 hymns from both the LDS and RLDS hymnals, though it should be noted that some hymn titles are duplicated within each hymnal with alternative arrangements. Despite the common roots of both LDS and RLDS hymnody, there are only 45 hymns held in common between the two hymnals from 36 common authors. This is far fewer than the 90 hymns published in Emma Smith's 1835

hymnal, which is the foundation of LDS and RLDS hymnody. Additionally, the vast majority of the 45 hymns are not part of the original 90 hymns. Of the Mormon hymns written before the death of Joseph Smith, only six are held in common between the hymnals from three Mormon authors. There is only a single post-Joseph LDS hymn in the RLDS hymnal and there are no RLDS hymns in the LDS hymnal despite numerous hymns written by the family of Joseph Smith for RLDS hymnody, which thematically and theologically would have been appropriate for the 1985 LDS hymnal. The hymnody of both the LDS and RLDS churches has evolved over time to meet the spiritual needs of their members. While an in-depth analysis of all 842 hymns is well beyond the scope of this study, some conclusions can be drawn by analyzing a few of the hymns held in common, the presence of which demonstrates a common heritage.

The LDS and RLDS hymnals cannot simply be compared by the hymn titles that are included, as both hymnals alter the presentation of the hymns in a variety of ways. The hymn text can be altered by carefully selecting which verses from the original to retain. Once the hymn verses are chosen, the order of the verses can be altered. Additionally, a contemporary verse of modern authorship can be added to alter the meaning or the text of the hymn itself can simply be altered with the same result. The LDS and RLDS hymnals both contain instances of each of these practices. It should be noted that while the accompanying musical arrangement can be altered to change the mood of a hymn and thus potentially its interpretation, a discussion of the hymn music is beyond the scope of this study.

Of all these changes, text alterations are the easiest to track because altered hymns are generally marked as such in both hymnals. However, this can under represent the actual alterations as the version of a hymn chosen might be a version that was previously altered from its original state and not altered by the committee. Additionally, it is unclear whether smaller alterations in text are always acknowledged. Despite these issues, the LDS and RLDS hymnals contrast greatly when alterations are counted. In the RLDS hymnal, 32 percent of the hymns are labeled as altered, while in the LDS hymnal hymns only 4 percent are labeled as altered. One plausible interpretation of this significant difference is that the inclusion of a wider variety of Christian hymns in the larger RLDS hymnal necessitated more extensive alterations in order to present the hymns in concordance with RLDS theological understanding. Likewise, it is plausible that the LDS committee was more selective in borrowing only those hymns from mainstream Christianity that were already in tune with LDS

theological understanding. It could also be argued that without taking into account a closer examination of the various alterations, the general data above is not reliable in and of itself. Nevertheless, the above explanations are plausible and are supported by the fact that in the evolution of LDS and RLDS hymnody, the appearance and organization of the hymnals, the campion works, and the scripture references chosen, all point to the LDS Church’s entrenchment in tradition and the RLDS Church’s more inclusive worldview. Furthermore, as discussed below, specific hymns were thematically altered to serve the needs of the respective churches.

One of the signature hymns of the Latter Day Saint movement, hymn 2 in the LDS hymnal called “The Spirit of God” which corresponds to hymn 33 in the RLDS hymnal, “The Spirit of God Like a Fire is Burning” was written by William Phelps and originated in Emma Smith’s 1835 hymnal. The LDS version contains the first three verses and the sixth verse of the original hymn, while the RLDS version only contains the first three verses.⁴¹ The result is that the LDS version thematically ends on the second coming of Christ and the beginning of the millennium, while the RLDS version thematically ends on the gathering of the saints in “solemn assemblies” and the blessings that come from sharing the gospel. Both hymns omit the fourth verse and fifth verse from the original. As the omitted fourth verse includes the line “we’ll wash, and be wash’d and with oil be anointed withal not omitting the washing of feet,” it is possible that allusions to LDS Temple worship were not seen as appropriate to include in the LDS hymnal and in the RLDS hymnal, they would have been theologically out of tune. The omitted fifth verse, about “Old Israel” being led to freedom by “Moses, and Aaron, and Joshua,” is perhaps omitted to make a more concise hymn and possibly because it was not seen as especially pertinent to worshipers in the twentieth century.⁴²

Another common hymn, written before the death of Joseph Smith, is presented as hymn 17, “Awake, Ye Saints of God, Awake!” in the LDS hymnal and hymn 140, “Awake! Ye Saints of God, Awake,” in the RLDS hymnal. Neither the LDS or RLDS hymnal label this Eliza R Snow hymn as altered, however both present it in a dramatically different way. The punctuation placement is different in both hymns when compared to the original hymn published in Emma Smith’s 1841 Nauvoo hymnal, but the RLDS hymnal punctuation is closer to the original. The LDS hymnal alters “fowler’s snare” to “tempter’s

41. Davidson, *Our Latter-Day Hymns*, 31.

42. LDS Church, *Hymns of the Church*, 2; and RLDS Church, *Hymns of the Saints*, 33.

snare.”⁴³ The most dramatic changes, though, are in the verse selection. The original hymn had six verses, while both the LDS and RLDS versions have only four verses.⁴⁴ Both hymnals begin and end on the same verse but made different selections for the middle verses. One of the middle verses in the LDS hymnal did not even come from the original version of the hymn but came from the only stanza in Eliza R. Snows original poem that was not adapted into verse. The RLDS version centers on the concept that God is aware of the widow, orphan, and those murdered in persecution, that he will protect his people, and they will eventually be united with him.⁴⁵ The LDS version centers on encouraging saints to pray and have faith in God that he will preserve them from their enemies for “his vengeance will not slumber long.”⁴⁶ The RLDS version omits the verse containing “his vengeance will not slumber long” and the LDS version omits the verse about the persecution of the early Mormons. The result is an RLDS hymn more about enduring persecution and an LDS hymn with a greater emphasis on prayer and faith in God to overcome hostile forces.

The preserving of the early Mormon hostility towards the outside world in the LDS hymnody and the alterations of this hostility towards positivity in the RLDS hymnody is also apparent in “Come, O Thou Kings of Kings,” hymn 59 in the LDS hymnal, and “Come, Thou, O Kings of Kings,” hymn 206 in the RLDS hymnal by Parley P. Pratt. The RLDS version omits the original second verse that contained the line calling Christ to “come, make an end of sin, and cleanse the earth by fire.” Furthermore, in the RLDS hymnal the phrase “all the chosen race” was changed to “saints of every race” in the third verse. Finally, the RLDS version also adjusted the phrase “the heathen nations bow the knee” to “the thankful nations bow the knee” in the third verse. The result of these changes is that the RLDS version emphasizes the global presence of saints among different ethnicities and it is righteous “thankful nations” bowing before the coming Christ and praising him. This contrasts greatly with the original version, preserved in the LDS hymnal, which emphasizes the elect nature of the saints who are among the “heathen nations,” nations that will finally recognize and praise Christ when he returns. Overall, the original in the LDS hymnal is about the saints urging Christ to come and save them from the wicked nations they dwell in, ushering in a new time of paradise, while in the RLDS altered

43. LDS Church, *Hymns of the Church*, 140.

44. Davidson, *Our Latter-Day Hymns*, 45.

45. RLDS Church, *Hymns of the Saints*, 17.

46. LDS Church, *Hymns of the Church*, 19.

version, it is about the saints eagerly awaiting the joy that the coming of Christ will bring.⁴⁷

A similar direct shift is seen in Fowler William’s hymn “We Thank Thee O God for a Prophet,” which is significant because this is the only strictly post-Joseph LDS hymn to appear in the RLDS hymnal. The hymn, 19 in the LDS hymnal and 307 in the RLDS hymnal, is a prime example of the RLDS hymnal’s content being altered to have a wider and more positive text. In both hymnals, the hymn is about thanking God for the blessings associated with the restored gospel, the protection God provides, and the positive influence of God in the life of the saints. However, two aspects of the LDS hymn are removed from the RLDS hymn. The second verse in the LDS hymn, after describing the confidence the saints have in God’s protection, ends “the wicked who fight against Zion will surely be smitten at last” while the same verse in the RLDS hymnal ends with the far more positive “the saints who will labor for Zion will surely be blessed at last. Amen.” Furthermore, the RLDS hymnal removes the third verse entirely, which ends “thus on to eternal perfection the honest and faithful will go, while they who reject this glad message shall never such happiness know.”⁴⁸ These alterations removed feelings of hostility towards the outside world and lessened the sense of persecution that is contained in the original hymn.

The examples of these four hymns demonstrate how the presentation of a hymn can drastically alter its content, both directly and indirectly. In Snow’s hymn, God’s “vengeance” is assured, while in Pratt’s hymn the earth will be cleansed in “fire” and the elect nature of the Saints reinforced, and in Fowler’s hymn the Saints are assured that the “wicked” will indeed be “smitten.” All of these instances of early Mormon hostility and opposition to the outside world are preserved in the LDS hymnal and are changed in or excluded from the RLDS hymnal in order to instead thematically focus on the blessings received from the gospel. While the changes in Phelps’s hymn do not appear to have been for these reasons, it is still an example of changing hymn text in order to render thematic changes. Significantly, 27 more hymns by William Phelps, Eliza R. Snow, and Parley P. Pratt are included in the LDS hymnal than in the RLDS hymnal. Furthermore, 9 hymns by William Phelps that are among these 27 hymns were in Emma Smith’s first hymnal. These exclusions, despite the larger size of the RLDS hymnal, support the notion that the RLDS hymnal

47. LDS Church, *Hymns of the Church*, 59; RLDS Church, *Hymns of the Saints*, 206.

48. RLDS Church, *Hymns of the Saints*, 307.

is further removed from its early Mormon roots when compared to the LDS hymnal.

The LDS and RLDS hymnals were not compiled in a historical vacuum. Why certain hymns or verses are not present or have been altered will have motives embedded in the historical narrative. For example, past RLDS hymnals included the LDS hymn "Come, Come, Ye Saints" in a slightly altered state, but was removed by vote during the 1958 World Conference due to the desire to create a greater distinction between the RLDS and LDS churches.⁴⁹ Therefore, the motives behind hymnal text differences is not apparent by a comparative analysis alone. This does not mean that a comparative look at differences in presentation is without significant value. Indeed, it is evident that though both the 1981 RLDS and 1985 LDS hymnals alter the presentation of hymns, the LDS hymnal is more likely to preserve text in conflict with the outside world.

Conclusion

It is not reasonable to take cultural observations about the differences between the LDS and RLDS church and extrapolate conclusions to include the LDS and RLDS hymnals without first demonstrating differences between the hymnody. However, it is useful to demonstrate substantial differences between the 1981 RLDS and 1985 LDS hymnals and then place those differences in their wider cultural context. A comparative examination of the hymnals has verified differences in the cultural preservation methods chosen by the LDS and RLDS committees in charge of the compilation of these hymnals. The differences in these hymnals is perhaps reflective of the overall different cultural and historical differences since the death of Joseph Smith. For example, cultural differences would naturally arise over time through the differences in LDS and RLDS church size, geographic placement, and cultural tension with the outside world such as that faced by the LDS church during the nineteenth century for practicing polygamy. While unable to draw strong overall conclusions about the LDS and RLDS churches in general solely based on their hymnals, there are similarities and differences demonstrated by their respective hymnals worth studying.

49. Clothier, "Different Drummers," 134.

There are substantial differences between the LDS hymnal and the RLDS hymnal in how they present their common Latter Day Saint heritage. The LDS hymnal and its companion work emphasized the distinct LDS tradition with hymns strongly supported by restoration texts and preserved the early Mormon worldview of persecution from the hostile outside world. This is contrasted by the RLDS hymnal which, along with its companion work, sought to explain itself as an inclusive document compiled by a qualified committee for an international audience. It heavily reflected New Testament scripture and thematically focused on the blessings received through the gospel. The significance behind the differences is that both the LDS and RLDS committees had the intent of creating hymnals for a modern and international audience while preserving their distinctive differences. The end results demonstrate how far culturally the LDS and RLDS churches have separated from each other, at least in the area where hymnody is concerned. Lynn, an LDS member who reviewed the RLDS hymnal upon its release praised the hymnal while lamenting that “the gain in universality and acceptance” came at the cost of “historical and doctrinal uniqueness.”⁵⁰ The LDS Church produced a hymnal that preserved its tradition but at the cost of a more inclusive hymnody. As the RLDS church, now the Community of Christ, recently published their new hymnal in 2013, the LDS church may choose to soon retire the 1985 hymnal as well after 32 years of use. When a new LDS hymnal is compiled, the balance between tradition and inclusion will have to be renegotiated, and the question asked: Have the wicked who fight against Zion, and the need to hold the outside world in conflict, been “smitten at last”?

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50. Karen Lynn, “The 1981 RLDS Hymnal: Songs More Brightly Sung,” *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 16, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 38.



Pioneer Woman Statue, Ponca City, Oklahoma. Wikimedia Commons.

Divided by Distance, United in Purpose

A Comparative Examination of Mormon Women after the Manifesto, 1890–1904

Natalie Larsen

ANNOUNCING AN END TO THE TEACHING OF POLYGAMY IN SEPTEMBER 1890, LDS Church President Wilford Woodruff heralded the dissolution of the peculiar marital practice that had demarcated the “Mormon problem” for over half a century.¹ “The Manifesto,” as Woodruff’s declaration came to be called, announced the intention of the LDS Church to submit to US law by ceasing to solemnize new polygamous marriages.² However, this declaration did not mention what would become of polygamous wives who had already entered into such arrangements or the families created thereby. Between 1870 and 1890, the percentage of adult Mormons living in a polygamous household had declined sharply to about fifteen percent, though many members of the Church found a source of common identity because of this denominationally differentiating practice.³

1. C.P. Lyford, *The Mormon Problem: An Appeal to the American People* (New York: Phillips & Hunt, 1886), 4–5. Here, it should be noted that “Mormon” is a colloquial term for a Latter-day Saint (LDS), and for our purposes will be used interchangeably.

2. Wilford Woodruff, “Official Declaration,” *Deseret Evening News*, September 25, 1890, Utah Digital Newspapers <https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/details?id=1547736>.

3. Lowell C. Bennion, “Plural Marriage, 1841–1904,” in *Mapping Mormonism: An Atlas of Latter-day Saint History* ed. Brandon S. Plewe (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2013), 122–25.

After reading the Manifesto, prominent Mormon suffragist Emmeline B. Wells privately mused, “There are some who will be very much tried over the affair; but we must wait and see what the Lord has in store for us—we do not always know what is for our best good here & hereafter.”⁴ In later entries, Wells made it clear that “we” referred specifically to the women of the Church. Prior to the Manifesto, Mormon women had distinguished themselves by their intense involvement in the public sphere to defend their names and religion. Eliza R. Snow stated that under polygamy, Mormon women “occupied a more important position than was occupied by any other woman on earth.”⁵ With the end of polygamy in the United States, the new role of Mormon women became less certain.

Objects of gross ridicule and punitive federal harassment, many Mormon women in the decade prior to the Manifesto lived in fear and hiding because of their respective status as a “plural wife” or as criminals for merely accepting the practice as true.⁶ Condemned by contemporary commentators as “credulous and ignorant people . . . from the lowest classes in the Old World,” Mormon women were accused of turning Utah into “A National Brothel.”⁷ To denounce such scurrilous charges, the Relief Society, the official women’s organization of the LDS Church, arranged “indignation meetings” in which thousands of women converged to publicly proclaim their dedication to polygamy. One such meeting of 4,500 women at the Salt Lake Tabernacle in 1886 was held to protest the proposed disenfranchisement of women in the Utah Territory.⁸

These large public displays of political involvement were also coupled with small private acts of civil disobedience. Between 1882 and 1890, federal officials

4. Emmeline B. Wells, diary, September 29, 1890, MSS 510 box 1 folder 13, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University.

5. Eliza R. Snow in Carol Cornwall Madsen, “Mormon Women and the Struggle for Definition,” *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 19, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 47.

6. The 1882 Edmunds Act said that if a person “believes it right for a man to have more than one living and undivorced [*sic*] wife at the same time,” he or she could be prosecuted for “bigamy, polygamy, or unlawful cohabitation under any statute of the United States” and would be subject to prosecution.

7. Lyford, *The Mormon Problem*, 139.

8. Mary Isabella Hales Horne, Sarah M. Kimball, and R.B. Pratt, *Mormon Women’s Protest: An Appeal for Freedom and Equal Rights* (Salt Lake City: Deseret News Co.), 1886. Eliza R. Snow Smith: “Although absent in body, I am one with you in faith and spirit and a hearty approval of this movement whereby to give free expression to your sense of the injustice heaped upon us.” 67. Eventually, the women failed to keep their suffrage, which was stripped from them in 1887 by the US Congress.

imprisoned thousands of Mormon men and women on charges of bigamy, and by fracturing countless families they made it difficult for the remaining spouse to care for children or provide economic reprieve. To escape such conditions and live peaceably together as families, nearly 4,000 people fled to northern Mexico between 1885 and 1900. A comparison of the core population in Utah and the outlying periphery in Mexico lends itself to an examination of the broad trends concerning the social, economic, and political roles of women in their separate but parallel development after the Manifesto. Taken in whole, this juxtaposition reveals that within the limitations of nineteenth century gender expectations, Mormon women acted cohesively to protect the privileges ceded to them before the Manifesto. The franchise, expanded freedom to pursue vocational opportunities, and social cohesion were a few of the most prominent privileges afforded to Mormon women before their non-Mormon counterparts.

Since 1938, many amateur historians and genealogists have attempted to document life in the Mexican colonies, but few professional historians have done so. In the study of Mormon women after the Manifesto, there is a divergent quantity and quality in the historiography dealing with women in Utah versus women in other regions of the Church.⁹ Social historian, Janet Bennion argues that after the Manifesto, Mormons in the colonies paid little heed to the changes in Church policy.¹⁰ In Bennion's estimation, defiance to the Manifesto was demonstrated by an increased zealotry to "bear as many children as possible" in addition to all of the other responsibilities of a frontier woman.¹¹ Her view is that women in the colonies were victims of an oppressive patriarchy, but this thesis has received little academic scrutiny. Few Mormon women in the colonies at that time would have perceived their position as worse than their male counterparts. Instead, they carefully positioned themselves to new stations in the public sphere as they reassessed the needs and requirements of the new social system outside of their native country.

Without responding directly to Bennion, George Ryskamp's study of transnational immigrant identity demonstrated that women in the colonies avoided political and bureaucratic situations in the event that "Mexican officials should decide to prosecute polygamists."¹² In Mexico, Mormon men behaved according

9. Annie Richardson Johnson, *Heartbeats of Colonia Díaz* (Salt Lake City: Publishers Press, 1972).

10. Janet Bennion, *Desert Patriarchy: Mormon and Mennonite Communities in the Chihuahu Valley* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004).

11. Bennion, *Desert Patriarchy*, 48–49.

12. George Ryskamp, "Mormon Colonists in the Mexican Civil Registration: A Case Study in Transnational Immigrant Identity," in *Just South of Zion: The Mormons in Mexico*

to the customs of the region, thereby shedding the slightly more egalitarian customs of the United States. As Mexican women were already excluded by civil law from voting and direct political involvement, the patriarchal oppression discussed by Bennion cannot be considered a feature exclusive of the Mormon colonies but rather a result of conformance to the procedures entrenched in the Mexican identity sought by the colonists, men and women alike.

While the historiographical literature on women's life in the Mexican colonies is limited, the subject of Mormon women in Utah is a more diverse and vigorous field of study. Both groups provided important comparisons and contrasts in the aftermath of the Manifesto. Prominent Mormon women's historian Carol Cornwall Madsen, argued that Utah women continued to assert themselves in the public sphere after the Manifesto. Both before and after the Manifesto, the Relief Society represented "a vehicle by which their voices could be heard, their capabilities utilized, their contributions valued."¹³ In other words, their political involvement did not disappear, but was transformed into increased religious involvement. Whereas Madsen focused on the efforts of women in religious life, Maureen Ursenbach Beecher emphasized the historical agency of Mormon women outside of the Relief Society.¹⁴ Instead, she argued that even after 1890 "in the more or less controlled environment of Mormon Utah, women were decades ahead of their sisters in the American East in terms of economic and professional opportunity."¹⁵ In contrast to Madsen's glowing evaluation of women's spunk and religiosity, Beecher emphasized that Utah women were products of their era, not necessarily the modern twenty-first century feminists that many imagine them to be. Beecher noted, "What is overlooked is that those acts of spunky initiative were most probably taken on unwillingly," a result of the economic difficulties associated with depolygonization and the rural nature of Utah.¹⁶ Though conflicting in certain minutiae, both confirm that women did not simply disappear from the public sphere after the Manifesto; they instead altered their position according to necessity's dictates.

and its Borderlands, ed. Jason H. Dormady and Jared M. Tamez (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), 45.

13. Madsen, "Struggle for Definition," 43.

14. Maureen Ursenbach Beecher, "Women's Work on the Mormon Frontier," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 49 no. 3 (Summer 1981): 276–290.

15. Beecher, "Women's Work," 277.

16. Beecher, "Women's Work," 278.

As the unequal nature of the historiography of Utah and Mexico demonstrates, there are significant gaps in scholarly understanding about Mormon women's experiences after the Manifesto. One non-LDS scholar noted, "Neither women's historians nor American religious historians have seemed interested in including Mormon women in their narratives," an omission that is guilty of "implicitly suggesting that they should not be considered as serious historical actors."¹⁷ However, an examination of evidence validates the vitality of Mormon women in the public sphere throughout the core of population and in the periphery between 1890 and 1910. As Mormon women navigated the effects of the Manifesto on their respective communities, they generally worked together to protect the privileges of the franchise, vocational opportunities, and unity as a bloc attained by women during the height of polygamy.

Diaspora and Declaration

Though Mormon women enjoyed certain privileges as consequences of polygamy, the difficulties were unmistakable. As the federal prosecution of polygamists escalated in the final years before the Manifesto, life became unbearable and even dangerous for Latter-day Saint women. Because physicians were required to report polygamous situations to federal marshals, one plural wife described having to bear children in secret without the help of a midwife. "Never a doctor or a nurse did I have for my ten children," she recalled. Underscoring the difficulty of her situation living in Utah, "It was a miracle that I lived and that the children lived . . . I couldn't live like a normal human being. I had to hide in the granary out there all day long and when my baby cried I had to feed it and try to cover its head."¹⁸ Such experiences became common throughout the polygamous populations of the Utah territory. Despite all political instruments employed to stop the punitive measures, federal marshals could not be held at bay, and they continued to harass Mormon families throughout the western United States.

Despite fears of imprisonment and even death, many—though not all—Mormon women continued to willingly support the practice of polygamy. Eunice Harris illustrated that predicament: "My husband and I both believed

17. Catharine A. Brekus, "Mormon Women and the Problem of Historical Agency," *Journal of American History* 37, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 58–57.

18. Kimball Young, *Isn't One Wife Enough?* (New York: Holt & Co., 1954), 390.

this principle and both desired to practice. . . . We both felt within our very souls that the time had come when it was our duty to obey that principle not mattering what results might follow.”¹⁹ In the spirit of civil disobedience, Eunice claimed that she was the instigator of her husband’s first plural marriage. Nearly five decades after the fact, she insisted that it was not only her idea, but it was based on her desire to live a commandment of the LDS Church, saying, “I want to bear testimony to my children, my grandchildren, . . . that I know to the very depths of my being that this order of marriage [a euphemism for polygamy] is true and that it was revealed from God, and I thank my Heavenly Father for this testimony.”²⁰ In light of this serene assurance of moral correctness, women like Eunice continued to defiantly support the principle of polygamy, regardless of federal law.

Meanwhile, Mexico continued to be seen as a viable alternative for polygamous wives who were tired of living in fear in the United States. In Utah, Eunice and Dennis Harris were constantly kept apart by federal marshals who were scouring the small towns looking for husbands in hiding. Eunice also lived in constant fear that she would be arrested and her three young children left to fend for themselves.²¹ Aware of the consequences, she wrote that there were only two courses they could take: “One was to go to Mexico where all of the family could go, or go to Canada where a man could take only one wife.” Emphasizing that it was ultimately the wives’ choice, Eunice explained that they “chose Mexico where we could all go and live in peace, the principle which we had entered at so great a sacrifice together.”²² While other accounts do not emphasize so strongly the opinion of other women regarding Mexico, the case of Eunice and the second wife, Annie, suggest that at least some Mormon women preferred foreign colonization to separation from their husbands. When relatives tried to dissuade Eunice, “I told them that the inconvenience and privations of a new country, no matter how hard they were, would not be half the hardships to me that life without the companionship of my husband would be.”²³

19. Eunice Stewart Harris, “*Autobiographical Sketch*” of *Eunice Stewart Harris (wife of Dennison Emer Harris)*, 1932. L Tom Perry Special Collections, Brigham Young University, Provo UT. 21.

20. Harris, “*Autobiographical Sketch*,” 22.

21. Harris, “*Autobiographical Sketch*,” 23.

22. Harris, “*Autobiographical Sketch*,” 26.

23. Harris, “*Autobiographical Sketch*,” 27.

Women in Utah

Notwithstanding the determination of their pioneering sisters, most Mormon women in Utah stayed put after the Manifesto. However, they found themselves in a strange moment of flux with regards to the Church's doctrinal expectations and the social expectations that they had set up for themselves. Whereas the ideal Mormon woman prior to the Manifesto was expected to be a bold advocate for her sex (through women's organizations and suffrage activism), the post-Manifesto woman in Utah was taught to be more like her contemporary Protestant counterparts.²⁴ Church leaders—men and women alike—vigorously reasserted the importance of female docility, meekness, and acquiescence to her husband's authority in the home.²⁵ Church magazines encouraged young Mormon women “to focus their ambitions on finding and marrying a suitable Mormon mate, having children, and setting up housekeeping,” unlike their mothers who “directly engaged in political movements such as suffrage and had the approval of Church leaders to pursue professions such as medical training, telegraphy, and publishing.”²⁶ Within the boundaries of acceptable behavior, Mormon women resisted changes to their unique advantages. After so long a battle for suffrage and self-determination, Mormon women would have struggled to reverse the tradition of female activism.

Where Mormon women had previously asserted their collective voice to champion their own causes, following the Manifesto they instead channeled that energy into protecting male virtue. In theory, plural marriage made it possible for every woman to have a husband and gave a man several choices in satiating his appetites. In this way, “polygamy took care of various potential social problems and forestalled prostitution.”²⁷ Without the safeguard that polygamy offered against the temptations of vice, women appointed themselves to fulfill that obligation in the home before seeking outside fulfillment. At Brigham

24. Amy Hoyt and Sara M. Patterson, “Mormon Masculinity: Changing Gender Expectations in the Era of Transition from Polygamy to Monogamy, 1890–1920,” *Gender & History* 23, no. 1 (April 2011): 72–91.

25. Natalie Kaye Rose, “Courtship, Marriage, and Romantic Monogamy: Young Mormon Women's Diaries at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” *Journal of Mormon History* 42, no. 1 (January 2016):166–198.

26. Kaye, “Courtship, Marriage, and Romantic Monogamy,” 180.

27. Christa Marie Sophie Ranglack Nelson, “Mormon Polygamy in Mexico,” (Master's Thesis, University of Utah, 1983), 10.

Young Academy's commencement exercise in May 1891, Julia Farnsworth admonished the young graduates (about half of whom were women), to watch the men of the Church. She exclaimed, "In school as at home in religious, social, and civil society, girls hold an equal position with their brothers in maintaining order and discipline." She defined those parameters as, "to a greater degree, the character, the status of good breeding, intellectual culture and refined dignity, the moral purity and high standard of society" all of which "depends more largely on us, than our stronger brothers."²⁸ This focus on moral rather than civic virtue suggests that Mormon women were concerned about the spiritual welfare of their brethren given the fact that the number of federal marshals continued to dissipate after the Manifesto. Physical security guaranteed, women became the self-appointed protectors of social morality.

While most Mormon women did defend morality and used their voices for smaller causes, a small but powerful group of women continued to advocate for women's causes on a larger stage. As a bloc, women took advantage of the changes to expand their own political power. Utah women had been disenfranchised in 1887 for their continued support of polygamy, so their power at the ballot box was eradicated until 1896. Therefore, women had to resort to other methods of exercising their political will. The Relief Society continued to sponsor "indignation meetings" which worried many proponents of Utah statehood. Abraham H. Cannon recorded the minutes of a fascinating meeting during which the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles discussed the women's political activities at length. Upon discovering that a rogue ecclesiastical leader in Logan, Angus M. Cannon (Abraham H. Cannon's uncle) had barred politically active women from holding any calling in the Church, the apostles each voiced their own opinion on the matter. Some of them claimed that women should not be involved in politics anyway, others said that the sisters could not stop now. President Woodruff made the final decision. Though he "regretted the course the sisters had taken," he decided that it would better not to stop them. It was "therefore decided to give freedom to the men and women of the Church to finish this campaign [for statehood] as they think best, and yet the general counsel is that the leading men take no very active part in the political arena."²⁹ Given the consternation that the women caused the leading body of

28. Julia A. Farnsworth, "Woman as Wife, Mother, and Friend," *The Woman's Exponent* (Salt Lake City), June 15, 1891.

29. Abraham H. Cannon, July 30, 1895 in *Candid Insights*, 704.

the Church, it is clear that the women's political efforts were successful in calling attention to their cause.

In 1896 when statehood was finally approved and women once again enfranchised, they used their political clout at the ballot box to promote each other. The aforementioned Angus M. Cannon exemplified the women's power to endorse their own sex. Cannon's wife, Martha Hughes Cannon, was able to not only open her own medical practice after the Manifesto, but also became politically involved. Appearing before a congressional committee in Washington D.C. in 1893, she advocated for women's suffrage in Utah by citing examples of their political achievements prior to 1887. For this, she was "considered one of the brightest exponents of women's causes in the United States."³⁰ In 1896, she was elected to the Utah State Senate as a Democrat, defeating her own husband, who ran as a Republican. Martha became the first woman ever elected to a state senate. Her incredible victory was made possible by overwhelming support from other women who promoted their own sex. That same year moreover the powerful female bloc elected Sarah A. Anderson of Ogden and Eurithe LeBarthe of Salt Lake City to the state House of Representatives in addition to "other women who won races for county treasurer, auditor, and other offices."³¹ While women did not suddenly have parity with the number of men in elective office, Martha Cannon's achievement continues to inspire not just Mormon women, but Utahns of many persuasions.³² Her ascension to high elected office is just one evidence that once permanent suffrage was enshrined in the state constitution, Mormon women in Utah not only sought but won representation. With the power of their elected positions, women upheld each other's interests in a political world dominated by men.³³

30. Constance L. Lieber, "The Goose Hangs High': Excerpts from the Letters of Martha Hughes Cannon," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (Winter 1980), 49.

31. Doris Weatherford, *Women's Almanac* (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 296.

32. Taylor Stevens, "Senate approves replacing Utah's D.C. statue of TV inventor Philo T. Farnsworth with Martha Hughes Cannon," *Salt Lake Tribune*, 29 January 2018. Accessed 14 March 2018, <https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/01/29/bill-to-replace-utah-statue-of-tv-inventor-philo-farnsworth-with-martha-hughes-cannon-passes-senate/>.

33. Colorado had elected two women to the state house of representatives in 1894, but they were quickly voted back out of office. The next time a state outside of Utah elected a woman to the legislature was in 1913.

Women in Mexico

This mutual support was also necessary among the Latter-day Saint women who eventually went to Mexico to practice polygamy. These women descended from a long line of pioneers accustomed to picking up and moving on when the necessity demanded or the opportunity presented itself. Janet Bennion, one of the few scholars to discuss women in the Mexican colonies, has asserted that those who ended up in the colonies were not only unprogressive, but they also blindly followed the Mormon patriarchy.³⁴ Though they were enthusiastic about their religion, the colonizing women were not ignorant. Indeed, each woman was an individual, complete with a distinct background, motivations, and talents that were useful in her new home country. As one example, Eunice Harris was a teacher and graduate from Brigham Young Academy.³⁵ Her husband's plural wife, Annie Wride, was also college educated. Catharine Cottam Romney, another colonist, was taught at home, but was an active proponent of education in addition to traditional homemaking skills.³⁶ While the population of women in the colonies was probably no higher than 2,000, the need to survive fomented unity among these women. In the foreign conditions of their new country, Mormon women employed their unique talents and education to work towards a preservation of their robust roles in both public and private life.

Unlike most of their counterparts in Utah, women in Mexico continued to participate in polygamy for more than a decade after the Manifesto. In his study of the vital records of the Mormon colonizers, George Ryskamp estimated that "at least 37 percent of the women mentioned as mothers practiced polygamy. . . [This] statistic. . . is a higher rate than reported in any area in Utah at practically any time."³⁷ Many Latter-day Saints outside of Utah disregarded the Manifesto because they believed it only applied in the United States. This attitude is consistent with the pattern of new and continuing plural marriage documented by many of the colonists themselves. Colonist, Orson Pratt Brown was asked to "not introduce Mormon girls to outsiders" because leaders feared the women would "not be inclined toward polygamy."³⁸ Though the motivations for each

34. Bennion, *Desert Patriarchy*, 7.

35. Harris, "Autobiographical Sketch," 14.

36. Catharine Cottam Romney, *Letters of Catharine Romney*, ed. Jennifer Moulton Hansen (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992).

37. Ryskamp, "Mexican Civil Registration," 45.

38. Orson Pratt Brown, interview by Silvestre Gustavo Brown, 1932, folder 1, page 35, "Bishop Transcript" James O. Klein Brown Collection, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University.

woman was different, the continuation of the practice sustained the tradition that had given women so many advantages: suffrage, educational opportunities, professional development, and kinship with other women. The perpetuation of polygamy in Mexico even after the Manifesto was one way Mormon women held on to the gains of the past without inviting the arrival of an alien future.

Notwithstanding the secretive nature of polygamy in Mexico, most Mormon women were not opposed to the practice. This did not mean, however, that women who defended the principle in theory were necessarily thrilled to support it in practice. The case of Orson Brown's wife Mattie illustrates the difficulty for the first wife to accept another wife into the household. In early 1896, Orson was attempting to court Jane Galbraith, but Mattie was not pleased. When Jane exclaimed her love for Orson, he went home and told his wife what she said, to which Mattie replied, "Yes, that damn thief wants to steal my husband, let her get a husband on her own!"³⁹ By that point, Orson had already been told that the Church would not solemnize any more plural marriages. However, Brown had been promised some years before that God would provide him with a second wife, so he continued undeterred. In Orson's autobiography, he recorded a miraculous vision given to Martha in which an angel commanded her to accept the practice.⁴⁰ However, this claim seems to be a later fabrication by Orson himself.

Orson married Jane on March 28, 1896. On that same day, Catherine Romney wrote that Mattie's sons, Roy and Clyde, were sick with diphtheria while Mattie herself "was taken very sick for about twelve days" and it "seemed doubtful which way she would turn [between life and death]."⁴¹ Fearful of what Mattie would say under the circumstances, Orson had been away for several weeks in order to consummate his clandestine marriage to Jane.⁴² With the undercurrent of such intense personal complexity among the women, the unique dynamics created by the continuation of polygamy in Mexico provides an important backdrop to examining the contributions of women within the public sphere.

The social sphere of the Mormon colonies in Mexico was distinctively marked by female involvement. Nearly ten years after the establishment of the first colonies, Mormon Apostle, George Teasdale reported that members of

39. OBP, "Bishop Transcript" folder 1, p. 35.

40. OBP, "Bishop Transcript" folder 1, pp. 36–37.

41. Catharine Cottam Romney to Thomas C. Romney, March 28, 1896, *Letters*, 229.

42. Orson Brown went on to marry 5 wives total, for which he was excommunicated by the LDS Church in 1917.

the Church had developed a perfect Mormon community. He stated, "With scarcely an exception the people observe the Word of Wisdom, and not a single case of forced marriage has occurred. One great cause of this purity is that the people have refrained from round dancing, and have not used spirituous liquors."⁴³ Like in Utah, the women in Mexico were expected to be guardians of virtue. But, as Elder Teasdale briefly alluded to, the physical purity of men was still guarded by the existence of polygamy as a preventative measure against vice. Whether polygamy actually worked that way is inconsequential: Teasdale and other men believed that the continuation of polygamy kept the colonists morally pure. Unwilling to run the risk of appearing to be in favor of immorality, many women accepted the continuing role of polygamy in their community. The small population of women made it even more difficult to voice dissent precisely because of their geographic isolation and need for local unity.

However, the women colonists did informally discuss communal affairs in a casual atmosphere markedly different from official women's organizations in Utah. Eunice Harris recorded that plural wives got along very well in the colonies because cooperation was necessary to their overall success and survival. When Annie Wride gave birth to her first child, Eunice recounted that "we named him Barry Wride, in honor of his grandfather."⁴⁴ In the colonies, kinship became the most powerful tool for social progress and individual advancement. Eunice's patriarchal blessing received in Colonia Diaz stated, "Thou shalt become a woman of renown among thy sex for the wisdom and good counsel with which thou shalt be filled . . . Thou shalt become a queen in heaven and reign in connection with thy husband in celestial glory."⁴⁵ In such a small community of believers, the promise of wisdom translated to a significant assurance of social power, allowing Eunice to provide counsel and aid at crucial moments in the community. Since grief was so common an ailment in the colonies, women were relied upon to be the means whereby sorrow was overcome; women kept the community going after tragedy struck. When colonist David Stout lost his fourth child in one year, he wrote that "Sisters Jackson, Elizabeth Galbraith, Charletta Johnson, and Elmer Johnson's 2 wives made the clothes . . . Sisters Adams and Delmar Adams dressed the lovely little body. . . . Mary Jane

43. As quoted in Abraham H. Cannon, April 2, 1895, in *Candid Insights*, 624. The "Word of Wisdom" prohibited members from drinking tea, coffee, alcohol or consuming tobacco in any form.

44. Harris, "Autobiographical Sketch," 29. Underline is original.

45. Harris, "Autobiographical Sketch," 28.

accompanied the little body . . . and Sister Little spoke on the general features of salvation.”⁴⁶ More of Stout’s entries reflect the preeminent role of women in the colonies’ dark moments as they provided more than just comfort in times of affliction.

Within circles comprised exclusively of women, there also existed the need for the women to counsel and strengthen each other, an action historian Laurel Thatcher Ulrich has called “huddling together.”⁴⁷ As opposed to idle gossip, “huddling together” denotes strategic planning and discussion of events, people, and actions to be taken. Shortly after the marriage of Orson Brown to Jane Galbraith, Catharine Romney wrote to her son, “Orson is not back yet,” but suspecting that he had acquired a new wife, Catherine spent much of her day counseling the still-bedridden Mattie.⁴⁸ The resulting letter from Mattie to Jane contained the counsel Catharine shared with her dear friend. The brief letter said, “My husband has spoken to me about you joining our family and I assure you that you’ll be made perfectly welcome to be a member of our family.”⁴⁹ This exchange highlights the conciliatory roles women assumed.⁵⁰ Any hostilities between community members would weaken the project of unity so desired by colonists who had originally fled to Mexico to avoid conflict. The historical record probably does not contain details of the interpersonal drama that certainly occurred between women in the colonies, but the story of Catharine Romney and Jane Galbraith illustrates important elements.

For women in the colonies, the Relief Society and the local schools provided the most clear route to exercising social influence. In daily life, women were expected to constantly occupy themselves with useful employment, so formal organization outside of the home or business offered respite from menial tasks. Relief Society callings presented women the opportunity to become influential in the religious life of the various communities. In June 1903, the Relief Society president, Sister Eyring, and Eunice Harris, traveled together to visit all of the

46. David Fisk Stout, April 10 and 11, 1902 in “The Diaries of David Fisk Stout,” ed. Byron David Stout, Merle Viola Stout Budd, and Joseph David Stout (unpublished book: 1995), 259.

47. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, “‘Huddling Together’: Rethinking the Position of Women in Early Mormonism” (lecture, Brigham Young University, March 14, 2017).

48. Catharine Cottam Romney to Thomas C. Romney, April 17, 1896, *Letters*, 231.

49. OPB “Bishop Transcript,” folder 1, p. 37.

50. Divorce was also an acceptable option in polygamous communities, including those of the Mexican colonies. Separation and divorce provided an easy way out for women no longer comfortable with the system. Mattie, however, did not choose that path.

colonies in the Juarez Stake. Sister Eyring addressed not only the sisters in these meetings but the men as well.⁵¹ Because women were excluded from Mexican political life, the Relief Society afforded women the chance to speak their minds about important issues of the day in front of a larger general audience. David Stout was impacted enough by one woman's talk to merit its inclusion in his log of daily activities. "Sister Louise Haws lectured on the Book of Mormon and Sis. Martha Cox spoke on 'Sowing Wild Oats,' a powerful testimony to the efficacy of keeping the Word of Wisdom and personal purity."⁵² With the power to speak authoritatively in front of men, women chose to represent topics of interest to both sexes, just as their female forebears had done prior to the Manifesto.

In a secular sense, the schools became the other outlet for broad social authority. Women directed school affairs, particularly the Juarez Academy, in order to render a service to the community. Women constituted about half of the teaching force of the schools, and soon girls were graduating from the Academy at a faster rate than boys. Eunice and Annie Harris both taught at the school while their husband Dennis was the principle. In addition to teaching, women were in charge of student activities. Eunice recalled, "I was very busy those days. The activities of the Academy were very interesting and I attended as many of them as possible. We had a lot of social functions in those days."⁵³ Adding that this increased her responsibilities in the Relief Society and household duties, she constantly planned how to best accomplish what was expected of her as a Mormon woman in Mexico.

Though established for religious purposes, the survival of the colonies depended upon women's efforts to keep them economically viable. Unlike women in Utah, however, the colonist women usually had the support of a nearby husband. Three of David Stout's wives, Henrietta, Julia, and Sarah Lucretia (Sadie), lived in the same house while Mary Jane, another wife, lived with and cared for blind young woman named Cecilia Acord.⁵⁴ The support system created by these spouses and friends was especially important considering the circumstances under which they arrived to Mexico. Far away from established Mexican towns, the railroad, and supply stations, life was bleak for the first settlers. Eunice Harris commented that, "After our long separation I was so happy to be reunited with my husband I did not notice that our floors

51. Harris, "Autobiographical Sketch," 42–43.

52. Stout, February 9, 1902 in *Diaries*, 255.

53. Harris, "Autobiographical Sketch," 42.

54. Stout, February 22, 1902 in *Diaries*, 256.

were bare, that our furnishings were so meager, or that our woodwork was without paint. There was a dearth of these conveniences in most of the homes in Colonia Díaz.”⁵⁵ If it was painful enough for her to put it in her autobiography forty years later, the situation must have indeed been serious. While the men battled drought and floods in attempts to grow a profitable crop, women were expected to build a paradise out of nothing.

Nevertheless, the economic hardships of the colonists worked to the advantage of academically-inclined women, who helped each other to pursue vocations inaccessible to many monogamous women. Though nearly all wives in the colonies had many children to look after, sister wives aided each other by providing child care while one wife would leave the home and pursue a profession. Plural wives often traded time between being active in the public sphere and being housekeepers. Orson Brown’s second wife, Jane Galbraith, was able to attend medical school in the United States while Mattie and the third wife, Bessie, took care of Jane’s children.⁵⁶ A similar phenomenon was at work in the Harris family as well. At the beginning of the school year of 1890, Dennis Harris opened the first school in Colonia Díaz. Annie became a teacher and assistant principal while Eunice kept the home. The following year, the women traded places: “At the beginning of the school year I again became assistant teacher. Annie kept the home.”⁵⁷ The cooperation between women allowed for not only greater opportunity for education but also for the prospect of professional advancement. For wives who ultimately decided to leave polygamous situations in later years, they had valuable experience that differentiated them from other female applicants who did not have the luxury of supportive sister wives.

Though women were privileged to have professional opportunity in the colonies, Mexican civil law and the conservative nature of the small towns did not encourage political engagement, so unlike women in Utah they participated little in affairs of state importance. The president of the Juarez Stake, Anthony W. Ivins, was actually pleased that so little political discourse occurred between colonists and the Mexican government. Ivins reported to the general LDS Church membership that, “the few Saints who are there (they now number thirty-seven hundred souls) have accomplished a great work. . . . We keep entirely out of politics; we mind our own business, and are left in peace—thank

55. Harris, “Autobiographical Sketch,” 29. And obviously, she did notice all of that or it wouldn’t be in here.

56. OPB, “Historical Transcripts,” folder 2, p. 41.

57. Harris, “Autobiographical Sketch,” 31, 34.

heaven for that!”⁵⁸ As a general rule, women tried to stay out of sight when it came to Mexican politics. Upon arriving, many of the polygamous wives were afraid of being discovered by the local authorities, for fear that persecution would begin again: “We women remained under cover while they were investigating our condition.”⁵⁹ Despite the dearth of female political activity outside of the colonies, women still found ways to be civically engaged and continue to defend the civic privileges gained before the Manifesto.

Mormon women took advantage of the unique political situation of the colonies in order to be participants in society. Unlike their sisters in Utah prior to statehood, the colonist women retained their right to participate in community decisions. As already mentioned, women took special interest in the school system and found a political voice by advocating for education. In the spring of 1895, Henry Eyring began campaigning for an income tax to pay for the school. After Eunice voted in favor of the successful measure, she reflected, “We did not have much money in Mexico, but we did have a progressive people and good schools; those are the most essential things in a community that is swarming with growing children.”⁶⁰ In the interest of her children and her profession, Eunice felt free to use the democratic system established in the colonies to represent her interests.

Conclusion

In 1904, LDS Church president Joseph F. Smith issued what is now known as the Second Manifesto as an addendum to Wilford Woodruff’s 1890 version. The Second Manifesto absolutely prohibited any new plural marriage—without regard to international borders. Any Church member who attempted to ignore the new doctrine would “be deemed in transgression against the Church and [would] be liable to be dealt with according to the rules and regulations thereof and excommunicated therefrom.”⁶¹ In Utah, the Second Manifesto did not usher in its own set of consequences, but in Mexico, the effects were visible.

58. Anthony W. Ivins, “Report on the Juarez Stake,” *General Conference Report of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* (Salt Lake City: Deseret News, 1904):53–56.

59. Harris, “Autobiographical Sketch,” 33.

60. Harris, “Autobiographical Sketch,” 37.

61. Joseph F. Smith, “Official Declaration,” *Deseret Evening News*, April 6, 1904, Utah Digital Newspapers <https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/details?id=2490677>.

Ryskamp summarily stated, “Recognizing the challenge for the identity of the Mexican colonists, President Smith went immediately to Mexico to explain the change.”⁶² For women, the Second Manifesto presented a radical departure from the lives they had been leading, along with a half century of their religious history.

Eunice Harris’ family decided to split up in light of the Second Manifesto; Annie was sent to Provo while Eunice and Dennis attempted to begin again in Canada. The toll this separation had on Eunice was nearly debilitating. Reflecting thirty years later, she wrote,

In Mexico some of my dearest and most treasured friendships were formed—friendships which to me are sacred, and which I hope will lapse over into the future life and be eternal. Such true, noble women as Margaret Cannon, Dora and Victoria Pratt, Maggie and Gladys Bentley, Elizabeth Ivins, Hannah, Catherine, and Annie Romney, Mary B. Eyring, Olive and Rhoda Stowell, Theresa Call, Elizabeth Walser, and many other were among my close friends. They are certainly among the finest and truest of earth’s noble women.⁶³

The treasured friendships established in the Mexican colonies are a testament to the vitality of the feminine bonds that strengthened and fortified the enterprising sisters who had embarked to preserve their families and their social stations. The few hundred families who remained in Mexico did so on borrowed time. In 1912, the events of the Mexican Revolution drove them out and back to the United States. Given that few of the colonists returned to Mexico, the history of the Mormon women on both sides of the border once again synced after the Exodus.

Following the Manifesto, the core population of Utah and the periphery of the Mexican colonies, Mormon women acted in conjunction to protect the gains of their polygamist past while moving into an unfamiliar future. The comparison of the two reveals the broad trends of two united sisterhoods. Although they went about achieving their purposes in different ways, women in both locations defended their role in late nineteenth century Mormon culture. Suffrage was protected in Utah by women who raised their own sex to elected office. Votes in Mexico were freely cast in local community decisions. Professional opportunities were supported by sister wives in Mexico. As a bloc,

62. Ryskamp, “Mexican Civil Registration,” 50.

63. Harris, “Autobiographical Sketch,” 47.

Mormon women worked together to defend their collective interests and their collective voice.

Despite the two momentous decades in Mexico, the women who established and maintained the colonies have not yet received the accolades due to them. Academic study of their lives and contributions to both public and private spheres is needed in order to more fully understand the influence of those women beyond the immediate impact of their lives and work. However, their examples of unity and courage in the face of an unfamiliar future remains a heritage that cannot easily be ignored. As they worked together to protect each other, they built a legacy upon which future research will undoubtedly continue to build.

Natalie Larsen is a senior, originally from Fort Collins, Colorado. When she isn't in the library looking for sweet primary source material, Natalie can be found with her husband Brigham—whom she actually did meet in the library. She claims him as “the best thing I ever checked out at the HBLL.” Natalie served an LDS mission in Querétaro, Mexico, where she learned to love the Mexican people, Spanish, tacos and, most of all, teaching. What she experienced on her mission inspired her to study History Teaching and minor in Spanish.



Joseph Stalin with daughter Svetlana, 1935. Wikimedia Commons.

Sex and the Soviets

Depictions of Rape in Soviet Cinema and Literature

Susannah Morrison

IN 1924, SOVIET FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGIST ARON ZALKIND PUBLISHED the “Twelve Commandments of Revolutionary Sex,” attempting to articulate sexual norms within the bounds of Bolshevik ideology.¹ Monogamy and sexual restraint was expected; the sexual act itself was to be prized as the “culmination of a deep and comprehensive sympathy and attachment,” the “final link in a chain of deep and complex experiences binding the lovers together.” Although Zalkind did not directly address the subject of rape, its taboo is implicit. Obliquely condemning “sexual conquest” and “sexual perversions” as damaging to “revolutionary-proletarian class objectives,” Zalkind situated sex firmly within the context of monogamous and egalitarian marriage. There could be no ideological sanction for sex outside marriage—including and especially non-consensual sex.

Although well-known and influential in its time, the dictates of “Twelve Commandments of Revolutionary Sex” failed to entirely take root. As a crime, rape existed in the Soviet Union largely on similar terms as in the West,

1. Aron Zalkind, *The Twelve Commandments of Revolutionary Sex*, trans. James von Geldern (Moscow: The Sverdlov Communist University Press, 1924).

accounting for roughly 1.7% of all criminal convictions in 1966.² The same year, 85% of all rapes tried by the courts were classified as aggravated rapes, the severity of the crime exacerbated by additional acts of violence, the age of the victim, or the existence of a familial relationship between the rapist and victim.³ Despite the Soviet ideological commitment to gender equality, similar taboos and double-standards to those in the West existed in the regime's official treatment of rape; women who were drunk at the time of the attack, or who had a prior sexual history, were widely considered less sympathetic victims than their sober or virginal counterparts.⁴ However, even as the Stalinist culture of "excessive modesty" censored open public discussion of this widespread problem, rape continued to feature prominently in Soviet film and literary output.⁵ Even so, scholarly examinations of depictions of rape in Soviet culture have traditionally been limited primarily to film studies, neglecting literary analysis altogether. Furthermore, the prevailing school of historiography examines these cinematic portrayals of rape in isolation, outside the framework of the broader Soviet cultural context.⁶

However, when examining instances of rape in Soviet cinema and literature on a comparative and chronological basis, a general pattern emerges. Over time, these portrayals shifted from male-driven narratives which framed rape primarily as an attack on masculinity, to female-driven narratives which treated it as a crime against the victim. For purposes of this study, I have chosen to examine three acclaimed pieces of Soviet culture: Mikhail Sholokov's epic novel *And Quiet Flows the Don*, the 1943 wartime propaganda classic *She Defends the Motherland*, and the 1957 critically-acclaimed masterpiece *The Cranes are Flying*. Each of these works were, in their own time, hailed as hallmarks of Soviet cultural achievement—and, therefore, provide a distinctive and insightful glimpse into Soviet perspectives on rape, as manifested in the output of the centralized and intensely-scrutinized cultural establishment. Early portrayals of rape, such as in

2. A.A. Gertsenzon, *Ugolovnoye pravi i sotsiologiya* (Moscow: 1970), 17, in Valery Chalidze, *Criminal Russia: Crime in the Soviet Union*, trans. P.S. Falla (New York: Random House, 1977), 133.

3. Chalidze, *Criminal Russia*, 138.

4. Chalidze, *Criminal Russia*, 134–136.

5. Mikhail Stern and August Stern, *Sex in the Soviet Union* (London: W.H. Allen, 1981), 68.

6. Denise J. Youngblood, *Russian War Films: On the Cinema Front, 1914–2005* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007); Birgit Beumers, ed., *A Companion to Russian Cinema* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2016).

And Quiet Flows the Don, treated the act as a natural behaviour of non-socialist masculinity. The ideological angle of rape was further advanced in the context of the Great Patriotic War, when *She Defends the Motherland* used one woman's rape as the symbolic violation of the nation. By contrast, however, in the post-World War II period, the critically-acclaimed 1957 film *The Cranes are Flying* represented a significant shift in culture, offering a more nuanced, humanized, and sympathetic perspective on rape, particularly in comparison to earlier cultural products.

***And Quiet Flows the Don:* Pre-World War II Perspectives**

Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sholokov's *And Quiet Flows the Don* is widely considered a literary masterpiece, both within the Soviet Union and abroad. Published in installments throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the novel was awarded the Stalin Prize in 1941, the country's highest state honor to recognize works which significantly advanced the Soviet Union or the cause of socialism. Following the work's translation into English in 1934, Sholokov himself won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1965. Despite the novel's popularity outside the Soviet Union, the level of official praise and sanction given to the novel from the highest echelons of the Soviet establishment indicate that it may be regarded a generally representative cultural product.

First published in the conservative magazine *Oktyabr*, the novel explores the lives of Cossacks on the Don during World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the Russian Civil War. The main character, Grigori Melekhov, is a Cossack embroiled in a tragic love affair with Aksinia Astakhova, the wife of a family friend. Grigori and Aksinia's romance—and its painful consequences—dominates the plot of the novel, interwoven with the broader narrative of Russia in upheaval. As a universal shorthand signifying absolute moral corruption and societal chaos, rape is an ever-present threat throughout the novel.

One of Sholokov's main ideological goals was the discrediting of the Don Cossacks, who had fought heavily in the counterrevolutionary White Army during the Civil War. This agenda is demonstrated early on in the novel, even before war and revolution strike. As a seventeen year old girl, while working alone and unprotected in her family's fields, Aksinia is raped by her father. This violent encounter is punished by rough vigilante justice. After Aksinia "sob[s]

out the whole story” to her mother, her mother and brother “frenziedly” beat the rapist father to death.⁷ Although Aksinia continues to figure prominently in the novel’s plot, her teenage rape is never mentioned again. Instead, the event serves a primarily ideological purpose within the narrative. Introducing one of his major characters against a backdrop of incestuous rape and bloody revenge-killing, Sholokov effectively highlights the moral depravity and civilizational backwardness of the pre-revolutionary Cossacks. Aksinia is acknowledged as a victim, but her victimization is quickly forgotten within the text itself. Furthermore, Sholokov seems to suggest that there is hardly anything deeper in Aksinia’s suffering to explore; rather, the narrative frames rape as a detestable but fundamentally natural function of non-socialist masculinity.

Rape is again used as a storytelling device later on in the novel, when Aksinia’s lover, Grigori, is on campaign with a Cossack regiment on the Austro-Hungarian front of the First World War. The soldiers are billeted on a country estate, on which lives the “pretty young housemaid . . . Franya.”⁸ Franya immediately becomes an object of interest for the men, and, according to Grigori’s flawed narrative perspective, appears rather to enjoy “bath[ing] in the streams of lasciviousness that came from three hundred pairs of eyes.”⁹ Unlike Aksinia, whose innocence is clearly and sympathetically portrayed, Franya’s brazen flirtatiousness is treated as the primary catalyst for her brutal gang-rape by a group of Cossack officers and soldiers. Grigori, the morally upright hero of the novel, attempts to rescue Franya, but is beaten, tied up, and threatened into submission and silence. In the aftermath of the attack, Grigori’s failure to rescue the victim triggers feelings of deep shame and emasculation.

Although the novel is narrated by an omniscient third person, and frequently changes perspectives between characters, this particular incident is told with the focus entirely on Grigori. Unlike Aksinia’s earlier rape, which occupied only a single vague paragraph, this sequence is highly graphic and drawn-out—but focuses, not on the victim, but on Grigori’s feelings of humiliation as a helpless bystander. Franya is all but incidental to her own violation; her considerable trauma functions only as a plot device through which to narratively probe Grigori’s pained psyche.

7. Mikhail Sholokov, *And Quiet Flows the Don*, trans. Stephen Garry (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1934), 63–64.

8. Sholokov, *And Quiet Flows the Don*, 407.

9. Sholokov, *And Quiet Flows the Don*, 407.

The injury to Grigori's masculinity is twofold: first, in his inability to protect a civilian woman, and second, in having been physically overpowered by his fellow soldiers.¹⁰ Indeed, it is this humiliation before his peers which appears to make the greatest impact on Grigori. Following the rape scene, Grigori is reprimanded by a troop commander for a missing button on his great-coat, which had been torn off in the altercation with the other soldiers. Grigori "glance[s] down at the little round hole left by the missing button . . . [and] for the first time in years, he [feels] like crying."¹¹ In this moment, his victimization is absolute; disrespected by his colleagues, scolded by his commander, cowed into silence, and unable to live with himself in the wake of his forced moral compromise, he is fundamentally powerless and dehumanized, alienated from all expressions of traditional masculinity.

The portrayals of rape in *And Quiet Flows the Don* are ideologically motivated and masculine-centric. However, when placed in the original context in which Sholokov was writing and publishing, an overarching purpose begins to crystallize, beyond the generally clumsy and insensitive manner in which the rapes are portrayed in the text. Aksinia and Franya's rapes demonstrate the high degree of sexual danger under which women commonly lived in pre-revolutionary Russia. Aksinia, as a rural woman subject to her father's tyrannical control, and Franya, as a working woman assaulted by future White Army class enemies, were both placed at risk as a result of traditional male authority. The corrupt tsarist system failed to protect either woman—but the female emancipation promised by the revolution, embodied in early feminist Bolsheviks like Aleksandra Kollontai and Nadezhda Krupskaya, might have spared both Aksinia and Franya. Although it is not Sholokov's primary narrative focus, the message is still implicitly communicated: such acts of barbarism, permissible and even inevitable under the tsarist system, are unthinkable in the socialist state, rendering these incidents objects of morbid curiosity to the Soviet reading public.

10. Karen Petrone, *The Great War in Russian Memory* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 154.

11. Sholokov, *And Quiet Flows the Don*, 412.

She Defends the Motherland: Rape in the Context of the Great Patriotic War

The advent of World War II—or the Great Patriotic War, as it was termed in the Soviet Union—indelibly changed the face of Soviet culture and, in particular, cinema. With invading German forces directly threatening the cultural capitals of Moscow and Leningrad, the Soviet film industry decamped to Alma-ata, Kazakhstan in the autumn of 1941. From this remote location of self-imposed internal exile, Soviet filmmakers threw themselves into the production of full-length propaganda war films. One of the most influential and beloved of these was *She Defends the Motherland*, released in 1943 and awarded the Stalin Prize in 1946.¹²

This particular film features a strongly-implied off-screen rape as one of its climactic moments, a rare portrayal in 1940s Soviet cinema. From the 1930s onwards, Stalinist censorship had produced a regressive and patriarchal media culture, rendering the subject of wartime civilian rape essentially taboo—even as the Soviet Union's Western allies released propaganda which prominently featured rape as a shorthand for Nazi depravity.¹³ However, due to the fact that the central rape takes place off-screen, *She Defends the Motherland* escaped censorship. As in *And Quiet Flows the Don*, rape functions primarily as a plot device within the story. However, while Sholokov's novel was far removed from the war it portrayed, *She Defends the Motherland* was the product of a real, present, and ongoing war—and so rape occupies a far more emotionally charged role within the narrative, acting as a violent catalyst for the transformation of an upstanding Soviet farm-wife to a frenzied avenging angel. Even so, however, *She Defends the Motherland* essentially follows and only moderately adapts the precedent established by *And Quiet Flows the Don*. Within the narrative, rape's significance for the victim is overshadowed by the crime's significance to those around the victim. In Sholokov's universe, this meant the male bystanders to

12. *She Defends the Motherland*, directed by Friedrich Ermler (Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan: Tsentralnaya Obedinennaya Kinostudiya Khudozhestvennikh Filmov, 1943); Stephen M. Norris, "Defending the Motherland: The Soviet and Russian War Film," in *A Companion to Russian Cinema*, 415–417.

13. Helena Goscilo, "Slotting War Narratives into Cultures Ready-Made," in *Fighting Words and Images: Representing War Across the Disciplines*, ed. Adam Muller, Elena V. Barbaran, and Stephan Jaeger (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 144.

the crime; in the wartime fervor of *She Defends the Motherland*, this meant the Soviet nation as a whole.

The main character of the film is Praskovia Lukianova, known initially by her nickname, Pasha, and later by her *nom de guerre*, Comrade P. At the beginning, Pasha is a blissfully happy young wife and mother, renowned as a tractor driver on her collective farm. However, her profession, her community, and her family are all shattered by the German invasion forces, who destroy her tractor and the other machinery of the collective farm, kill her husband, and, in a particularly gruesome scene, shoot her toddler son and proceed to run over his lifeless body with a tank. In the midst of this vision of horror, Pasha herself is dragged into the forest by a German soldier and raped. Although this particular act of violence takes place off-screen, there can be little doubt about what occurs. The next scene finds Pasha wandering alone through the devastated countryside. The camera follows Pasha from a distance initially, as she takes her first unsteady steps through a now-alien and barren landscape. As she approaches, the viewer sees that her clothes are ripped and tattered, and that her expression is now strangely blank and empty. Her transformation is absolute; she has metamorphosed, seemingly overnight, from a pretty young woman to the fearsome, hardened figure at the centre of the iconic “Motherland Mother” propaganda poster.¹⁴ Fueled by rage over her rape and the murder of her young son, Pasha is, from this moment onwards, reborn as Comrade P., the ruthless leader of a band of partisans, mercilessly exacting revenge on the occupying German army.

As in *And Quiet Flows the Don*, rape is used as a shorthand to demonstrate the absolute depravity of an enemy—though *She Defends the Motherland* invokes a foreign military enemy, as opposed to an internal class enemy like the Cossacks. Although the two cultural products share some superficial differences in their handlings of rape, the portrayal of Pasha’s violation in *She Defends the Motherland* generally follows the pattern established in *And Quiet Flows the Don*. Sholokov’s novel was dominated by a male perspective; the impact of the rape upon the actual victims was never explored. These non-consensual encounters were more significant as ideological demonstrations, or for their insight into a man’s psyche, than for what they meant for the actual women. By contrast, in *She Defends the Motherland*, the focus ostensibly rests on Pasha. The rape itself is

14. Konstantin Rudnitsky, “O Vere Maretskoi,” *IK*, no. 1 (January 1979), 119, quoted in Youngblood, *Russian War Films*, 61.

treated as an act of pure evil, and Pasha's vengeful reaction is treated with grim approval. On the surface, this endorsement of feminine violence might seem to be a betrayal of the Stalinist ideal of traditional femininity, which was generally prevalent in the vast majority of Soviet wartime propaganda.¹⁵ However, the rape, set in the fraught context of the war, is what sets Pasha apart. Her personal violation is symbolic of the national violation of Nazi invasion; her rage is an example of the ideologically-ideal reaction of the Soviet people of a whole. Through her suffering at the hands of the Germans, she has become a warrior in her own right; her brutalization has earned her the right to be brutal.

But even so, *She Defends the Motherland* fails to give Pasha—and, by extension, the millions of wartime civilian rape victims she represents—a platform on which to meaningfully express her trauma. The rape is never discussed or even mentioned again; it simply exists, the untold origin story of a hero of the Soviet Union. Except for the ways in which it galvanizes her to anti-Nazi resistance, her pain is inconsequential; her rape, then, serves as almost as much of a plot device as in *And Quiet Flows the Don*. This fundamental disinterest in personal experience is typical of the Stalinist cultural establishment—but in this regard, *She Defends the Motherland* falls short of its tremendous opportunity to authentically explore the emotional reality of life under wartime.

***The Cranes Are Flying:* Rape in Retrospection**

In 1957, in the midst of the cultural thaw associated with the early Khrushchev era, the film *The Cranes Are Flying* offered a more nuanced interpretation of rape retrospectively set against the backdrop of the Great Patriotic War.¹⁶ The story centres on three main characters: Veronika, an innocent young woman in love with her fiancé; Boris, Veronika's fiance who volunteers for frontline duty; and Mark, Boris' cowardly cousin who is also in love with Veronika. With Boris away in the army, and her own family killed in an aerial bombing campaign, Veronika moves in with Boris' family—only for Mark to force himself on her in the midst of an air-raid. As in *She Defends the Motherland*, the film does

15. Helena Goscilo, "Graphic Womanhood Under Fire," in *Embracing Arms: Cultural Representations of Slavic and Balkan Women in War*, ed. Yana Hashamova and Helena Goscilo (Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press, 2012), 160–161.

16. *The Cranes Are Flying*, directed by Mikhail Kalatozov (Moscow: Mosfilm, 1957).

not graphically depict the central rape; rather, it includes an extended scene of Veronika violently but ineffectually struggling to fight Mark off, before she faints and is carried away. There is no question of Veronika's culpability for the rape; instead, she is presented as an unambiguous and highly sympathetic victim. The film presents little question of Veronika's culpability for Mark's actions; rather, at least as far as the rape itself is concerned, she is unambiguously represented as a victim.

However, Veronika's reaction to her rape takes a notably different form than Pasha's. While Pasha responded by violently reclaiming her body as a tool of destruction and revenge, Veronika simply shrinks in on herself, losing interest in life and passively drifting along. For example, in the aftermath of the incident, she marries Mark—not because she loves him, nor out of a misplaced sense of guilt or duty, but simply because she can no longer visualize a happy future with her beloved Boris.¹⁷ Veronika's bitterness and shame reach a climax when she decides to commit suicide by jumping before a moving train—but before she can do so, she rescues and ends up adopting a young war orphan. This is the turning point for Veronika; becoming a surrogate mother is what saves her. She gathers the strength to leave Mark and, although she is devastated by news of her first love's death on the front, the film ultimately ends on a hopeful note.

Veronika is a singular character within Soviet cinema. As a rape victim, she utterly defies the conventions of categorization established by epic works of literature like *And Quiet Flows the Don*, or by wartime films like *She Defends the Motherland*. Unlike Aksinia and Franya, Veronika's rape is not treated something fated to happen to her as an inherently vulnerable woman living in a non-socialist country. Her rapist is not a foreign fascist, nor a brutish class enemy, but a fellow Soviet, notable more for his banality and weakness than for his embodiment of absolute evil.¹⁸ Unlike Pasha, Veronika's body is not implicitly depicted as a symbol for the nation itself; her violation is not a metaphor for the humiliation of invasion. While the rape does not rob Veronika of her intrinsic value as a person, it also does not make her better or stronger in any way; rather, it breaks her spirit and her will to live. Although Veronika's human frailties disqualify her for classification as an archetypal Soviet film heroine, she is, regardless, depicted with absolute sympathy and compassion.

17. Denise J. Youngblood, "A War Remembered: Soviet Films of the Great Patriotic War," *American Historical Review* 106, no. 3 (June 2001), 846.

18. Josephine Wohl, *The Cranes are Flying: A Film Companion* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 28–29.

The treatment of rape in *The Cranes Are Flying* represents a significant shift in the attitudes of the cultural establishment, typical of the Khrushchev Thaw. Rape is portrayed on an unflinchingly human scale; there is no abstraction of Mark's actions into something symbolically significant, and there is no escaping the depth of Veronika's pain and despair over what she has suffered. The act is framed, not as an attack on the nation, or an act of renegade masculinity, but as a profoundly damaging wound against the victim. This individualization of suffering is highly representative of the prevailing cultural trends under Khrushchev.

Conclusion

Portrayals of rape in any society are difficult to analyze and deconstruct, by virtue of their inherently sensitive character. In the Soviet case, cultural depictions of rape gradually became more nuanced and complex over time between the 1920s and 1950s, reflecting a growing space for the individual within Soviet society and an increasing level of interest in the feminine experience. Early rape narratives, such as those found in *And Quiet Flows the Don*, were shaped by the overwhelming ideological imperative of the immediately post-Civil War era, and used rape as a plot device to villainize the Bolsheviks' class enemies. These portrayals of rape were told from a masculine perspective and were, therefore, limited to the experience of the male bystander; female victims were all but incidental to their own violation. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet cinema used rape as a metaphor for more extended German atrocities against the Soviet people at large. Female victims like Pasha reacted to rape in ideologically consistent and profitable ways, using their brutalization as the catalyst for their transformation into valiant defenders of the motherland. However, in the post-war era, as the Khrushchev reforms helped to elevate the status of the individual in Soviet culture and society, the cultural establishment began to treat rape as an emotional, rather than symbolic, devastation; within Soviet cinema, female characters like Veronika were given the space to respond to their rapes in contradictory, ideologically unhelpful, and thoroughly human ways. Despite this generally progressive trajectory, Soviet portrayals of rape through the Khrushchev era remained intrinsically flawed, indelibly influenced by casual sexism and traditional gender roles.

It is crucial to note that, even by the late 1950s, rape was still heavily stigmatized within Soviet culture, primarily only portrayed in the context of

wartime. Although *The Cranes Are Flying* initiated the beginnings of a broader shift, the cultural establishment still treated rape as something unthinkable evil and, therefore, something which fell outside the realm of normal, day-to-day socialist experience. In so doing, these cultural depictions actually marginalized the lived experience of ordinary Soviet women, who suffered rape at roughly the same rates and under the same circumstances as their counterparts in the West.¹⁹ However, it would take into the Brezhnev era for portrayals of rape, such as in the 1980 classic *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears*, to begin to more authentically and honestly reflect the Soviet female experience.

Susannah Morrison is a senior studying history, with an emphasis in British history and a lifelong fascination with all things Soviet. A German-Canadian, she plans to defect to Moscow after graduation to learn Russian, before pursuing graduate study in Berlin. She would like to here to acknowledge the innumerable female role models, the unquenchable feminist rage, and the unlimited quantities of '80s music which played so indelible a role in producing this paper.

19. Chalidze, *Criminal Russia*, 133; see also *USSR Crime Statistics and Summaries: 1989 and 1990*, trans. Joseph Serio. (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1992).



*Adolescent Girl, a Spinner, in a Carolina Cotton Mill, 1908.
Lewis W. Hine. Courtesy Princeton University Art Museum.*

Focusing on “The Human Document”

Lewis Hine and the Role of Photography in Child Labor Reform in Early Twentieth-Century America

Miranda Jessop

LEWIS WICKES HINE, NOW KNOWN AS THE FATHER OF SOCIAL DOCUMENTARY photography, changed the course of the child labor reform movement of the early twentieth century. The incorporation of his potent photographs of pitiful child laborers into the literature of the private, non-profit National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) and the reactions they elicited from the public revolutionized social reform. Simply put, his photographs, personal and powerful, changed public opinion as they were publicized in investigation reports, exhibition panels, posters, and newspapers. As Hine’s work reached increasingly larger numbers of Americans, it swayed public opinion in favor of child labor reform, which led to the passage of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916, a federal law that restricted child labor.

Child labor has its roots in the Industrial Revolution, which increased the demand for cheap labor. Agricultural production accelerated and the manufacturing of goods moved from the home into newly-built factories. Large populations followed employment opportunities to urban areas where men, women, and children found work in new centers of industry. Employers quickly recognized the economic advantages of hiring children, whose wages were less than those of their adult counterparts. America’s first factory, built by Samuel Slater in Pawtucket, Rhode Island in 1790, was filled with child laborers.¹ Not only

1. Walter I. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor Reform in America* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 26.

was child labor significantly cheaper, but “it was also believed [that children] were more tractable, reliable, and industrious . . . and as labor unions developed, less likely to strike.”² Factory managers saw children as ideal employees.

Although several states passed laws regulating or restricting child labor during the mid- nineteenth century, these laws were largely unenforced by government officials or sidestepped by employers. Following the conclusion of the Civil War, industrial growth and expansion exploded during what came to be known as the second Industrial Revolution. All of America’s major industries became increasingly mechanized, driving up the demand for cheap, unskilled labor. Consequently, the number of child laborers grew quickly. The 1870 census was the first to count the number of children that were “engaged in gainful occupations.”³ By 1880, a little over a million children fell into this census category. Within the next two decades, that number had nearly doubled. The 1900 census records that approximately 1.75 million American children were employed;⁴ however, this number only represents working children between the ages of ten and fourteen. Thousands of younger children were also employed, increasing the total estimate to approximately 2 million.⁵

Progressive social groups began to oppose child labor during the final years of the nineteenth century. However, their attention was often divided between causes, and their strategies varied. Some organizations, such as the American Academy of Political and Social Science, published reports and articles decrying the issue. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) took up the cause of child labor in the late 1890s increasing public awareness of the need for child labor legislation in Alabama through the publication of leaflets and newspaper articles. Their efforts saw some success there in 1903, due in large part to the writings of Edgar Murphy, an influential member of the Alabama Child Labor Committee.⁶

The membership of the New York Child Labor Committee, which had been founded the November prior, included Hunter and Florence Kelley and Felix Adler. Like the AFL, they saw some success in the passage of five state

2. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 27.

3. Julia E. Johnsen, *Selected Articles on Child Labor* (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1925), 28.

4. Hugh D. Hindman, *Child Labor: An American History* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 32.

5. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 41.

6. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 47–51, 55.

child labor bills;⁷ however, they recognized the need for a federal law. The two child labor committees soon joined forces, and on 15 April 1904, the National Child Labor Committee met for the first time under the direction of Felix Adler as president and Edgar Murphy as secretary. That night, Adler delivered a speech in which he emphasized the importance of gathering information about child labor "since a knowledge of the facts will be the most useful of all means of accomplishing results."⁸ In essence, the newly formed NCLC saw the collection and publication of data as its greatest asset in agitating for child labor legislation. However, they were unable to repeat Murphy's success on the national stage.

At the time of the NCLC's conception, large numbers of children were hired in coal mines, glass houses, and textile factories. Still more worked in agricultural production, while others did "homework" in the tenements. The NCLC published some thirty-five hundred pieces of literature and announcements and 45,500 pamphlets in a single year, each containing detailed statistical descriptions of child labor, or the "facts" Adler had emphasized. It also published the proceedings of its conferences in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.⁹ Although their written material proliferated, the NCLC's publications would not have the desired effect on public opinion until they included Lewis Hine's photographs.

Lewis Wickes Hine was born in Oshkosh, Wisconsin in 1874. He began working in a furniture factory at the young age of sixteen in order to support his mother and sister following his father's suicide.¹⁰ Over the next five years, he also worked cutting wood, delivering packages, and selling door to door while attending night school. With the help of Frank Manny, an educator at the Ethical Culture School and progressive reformer, Hine enrolled at the University of Chicago in 1900 and went on to receive a master's degree in pedagogy from New York University in 1905.¹¹ During this time, he made the acquaintance of Felix Adler and Owen Lovejoy, who would succeed Adler as the president of the NCLC.

7. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 57.

8. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 58–59.

9. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 75.

10. Mary Panzer, *Lewis Hine* (New York: Phaidon Press Limited, 2002), 3.

11. Kate Sampsell-Willmann, *Lewis Hine as Social Critic* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009), 18.

In the summer of 1908, Hine left his teaching position and became a full-time photographer for the NCLC.¹² During the next decade, he wrote detailed investigation reports, took thousands of photographs, and headed exhibitions for the NCLC, sometimes traveling as many as thirty thousand miles in a single year—all in an effort to raise public awareness and call for social change.¹³ Hine would become known as “the father of social documentary photography” because of his powerful photographs, which were a result of both his artistic style and ideology.¹⁴ His work focused on what he called “the human document;”¹⁵ his photographs emphasized people over conditions.¹⁶ In a letter likely addressed to one of Hine’s former associates at the Ethical Center School, Hine wrote, “My child labor photos have already set the authorities to work to see ‘if such things can be possible.’ They try to get around them by crying ‘fake,’ but therein lies the value of data & a witness. My ‘sociological horizon’ broadens hourly.”¹⁷ In the years that followed, the detailed data of the NCLC would authenticate Hine’s photographs, the purpose and power of which lay in transforming bystanders into witnesses.

In June 1909, Hine delivered a lecture titled “Social Photography: How the Camera May Help in the Social Uplift” at the thirty-sixth annual session of the National Conference of Charities and Correction in Buffalo, New York. While using a stereopticon, a type of slide projector, to present his photographs, Hine outlined what he believed to be the reason for photography’s pivotal role in social reform:

We might pause to ask where lies the power in a picture. Whether it be a painting or a photograph, the picture is a symbol that brings one immediately into close touch with reality. It speaks a language learned early in the race and in the individual . . . For us older children, the picture continues to tell a story packed into the most condensed and vital form. In fact, it is often more effective than the reality would have been, because, in the picture, the non-essential and conflicting interests have been eliminated. The picture is the language of all nationalities and all ages.¹⁸

12. Daile Kaplan, ed., *Photo Story: Selected Letters and Photographs of Lewis W. Hine* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 4.

13. Panzer, *Lewis Hine*, 7.

14. Sampsell-Willmann, *Lewis Hine as Social Critic*, 3.

15. Sampsell-Willmann, *Lewis Hine as Social Critic*, 21.

16. Sampsell-Willmann, *Lewis Hine as Social Critic*, 63.

17. Kaplan, ed., *Photo Story*, 7.

18. Lewis W. Hine, “Social Photography; How the Camera May Help in the Social Uplift,” *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction at the Thirty-sixth*

Each of Hines's photographs was carefully crafted. Although his subject matter was by no means fabricated, his photographs were a calculated portrayal of the truth. Rather than focus on the factory itself or the sheer number of child laborers within it, Hine presented the public with the coal-blackened face or mangled hand of a single child, or the dirty, barefoot appearance of small groups of child laborers in mines, fields, factories, and city streets. Hine held his camera level with the faces of his subjects, forcing the viewer to look directly into their eyes.

Academics have long argued that photographs are not truthful representations of reality and therefore not reliable sources; however, historian Kate Sampsell-Willmann argues that historians are able to treat photographs "as primary sources of ideas."¹⁹ As the title of her book *Lewis Hine as Social Critic* indicates, she asserts that Hine was not only a photographer, but also a critic, and thus, when studied within the larger political, intellectual, and social context of the time, each photograph represents a specific ideological statement that is Hine's alone, not the camera's. This claim is of great significance to other scholars in that it reevaluates and reshapes the way historians use photographs; namely, as "primary sources of ideas" rather than fundamentally untrustworthy representations of the past. By effectively interpreting Hine's photographs as evidence of his own specific ideology, Sampsell's book helps historians to analyze photographs in a new way and to see Hine and other reformers as *both* artists and intellectuals. Decades before Sampsell, the NCLC recognized the potential power in Hine's method and harnessed it to communicate a specific message to the observer in order to change public opinion. For this reason, Hine and the NCLC published thousands of pages of literature featuring his photographs coupled with articles and reports detailing the conditions of child labor and calling for change.

The NCLC published ninety-one folders' worth of investigation reports, which included more than four hundred documents, each anywhere from one to several hundred pages in length. The majority of these reports were written between 1908 and 1915. Most are comprised of the notes of "a single investigator studying child labor conditions in a single industry in a single state or region," but some include the notes of multiple investigators about multiple industries in multiple states.²⁰ Each investigation, systematic in its organization

Annual Session held in the City of Buffalo, New York, June 9–16, 1909, (Fort Wayne, IN: Press of Fort Wayne, 1909), 355–59.

19. Sampsell-Willmann, *Lewis Hine as Social Critic*, 3.

20. Hindman, *Child Labor*, 379.

and meticulous in its detail, provided foundational evidence on which the NCLC built their case for child labor reform. Hine himself proved to be a valuable and resourceful investigator. In the late summer of 1908, he received his first traveling assignment from the NCLC leadership: Hine was to spend five weeks working in several industrial Midwest cities, West Virginian mining towns, and North Carolinian textile mills. As part of this assignment, Hine accompanied another NCLC investigator, Edward Clopper, who later wrote that Hine “displayed both tact and resourcefulness . . . and gathered a large amount of valuable material, not only photographic.”²¹ During this first investigative assignment, Hine produced more than 230 photographs.

In time, Hine, together with six other investigators, would write sixty-five of the NCLC’s ninety-one published reports. Trained in stenography, Hine was able to take detailed shorthand notes. When denied entrance by employers, he would pose as some kind of salesman or magazine representative in order to gain access to certain factories or mills. Ever resourceful, he often measured the children’s height against the buttonholes of his coat.²² In addition to the notes he kept on small cards hidden in his pocket, Hine took special care to record a detailed caption for each of his photographs. Between the years of 1908 and 1917, Hine’s notes and photographs were included in twenty-eight investigation reports ranging from New England textiles to California agriculture to Vermont street trades.²³ Like the leaders of the NCLC, Hine valued data in that it corroborated the social injustices exposed in his photographs, rendering his argument even more impactful.

“Child Labor in the Sugar-Beet Fields of Colorado” is one of the investigation reports that included both Hine’s photographs and Clopper’s writings. The text includes descriptions of the children, their work, and their families’ living conditions, as well as tables of statistics representing both the number and ages of children working in agriculture in relation to total enrollment, absences, and “per cent of pupils retarded, normal, ahead enrolled by grades.”²⁴ Hine’s photographs show young children hoeing, “topping,” “thinning,” and pulling beets. One photograph displays a boy holding a beet on one knee seconds before

21. Panzer, *Lewis Hine*, 32.

22. Hindman, *Child Labor*, 380.

23. Hindman, *Child Labor*, 384.

24. Edward N. Clopper and Lewis W. Hine, *Child Labor in the Sugar-Beet Fields of Colorado* (New York: National Child Labor Committee, Inc., 1916), 30.

using the enormous sixteen-inch knife in his hand to cut off the top of the beet. The text accompanying the image informs the reader that "as the knee is not protected, children not infrequently hook themselves in the leg."²⁵ Unlike the NCLC's earliest reports, which were comprised of only statistical data and saw limited success in the communities in which they were published, reports such as this one, which combined detailed findings with photographs, proved to be much more effective in changing public opinion because they put faces to previously impersonal numbers.

From 1913 to 1917, Hine worked as the head of the NCLC's exhibition department. To fulfill this role, he designed posters and prepared storyboards to illustrate the objectives of the NCLC.²⁶ He also gave presentations in which he used a stereopticon to project images of his photographs while lecturing. Hine's exhibits attracted thousands of people. In 1911, Hine directed the Child Welfare Exhibit in the seventy-first Regiment Armory in Manhattan. Approximately 2,050 people, nearly 10 percent of the total population of New York County at the time, attended the exhibit during the twenty-six days that it was open to the public.²⁷ Strings of statistics alone would never have elicited such a turnout. New Yorkers came to Hine's exhibit to look into the faces of child laborers, and were impacted by what they saw and felt. The exhibits provided a venue in which observers could have a personal experience with Hine's photographs and their subjects.

Exhibition panels, or posters combining Hine's images and powerful statements condemning child labor, were also an effective way to broadcast the NCLC's message to the American people. They included such strong headlines as "Children may Escape the Cogs of the Machine but They Cannot Escape the Deadening Effect of Long Hours, Monotonous Toil, Loss of Education, Vicious Surroundings . . . Would You Care to Have Your Child Pay THIS Price?"²⁸ This particular poster features a photograph of a smiling "normal child" juxtaposed with a photograph of a deadpan "mill child." Hine's exhibitions often contrasted current work conditions with successful or ideal change, clearly illustrating the benefits of social reform.

25. Clopper and Hine, *Child Labor in the Sugar-Beet Fields of Colorado*, 12.

26. Panzer, *Lewis Hine*, 9.

27. Sampsell-Willmann, *Lewis Hine as Social Critic*, 82–83.

28. Panzer, *Lewis Hine*, 40.




Figure 3.

children to gain an education rather than toil in factories.

Similarly, another of the NCLC's posters states, "'Children are not equipped by experience to care for themselves in modern industry' and so They Pay With a Maimed Life. Three times as many industrial accidents occur to children as adults."³⁰ At the center of the poster (figure 2) are two of Hine's photographs, both individual portraits of boys—one who lost his arm "running [a] saw in box factory," ca. 1909, and a twelve-year-old boy who was employed in a cotton manufacturing company in North Carolina and fell into the gears of a spinning machine, which tore off two of his fingers in 1912.³¹ This poster provides a simple example of the powerful addition of Hine's photographs to the NCLC's emphasis on presenting the facts of child labor to the public. Rather than simply reading that "three times as many industrial accidents occur to children

29. Sampsell-Willmann, *Lewis Hine as Social Critic*, 81.

30. "1913: The Exploitation of Child Workers." http://inquiryunlimited.org/ss_1900s/1913_child_labor/1913_child_labor.html (accessed April 1, 2017).

31. Panzer, *Lewis Hine*, 80.

At times, Hine edited his photographs in order to make his message as clear and effective as possible. For example, his poster "Making Human Junk" (figure 1), publicized in 1914 and 1915, provides a visual representation of children, "good material at first," taken from the streets and forced to work in a textile factory—a process that turned them into "junk" with "no future and low wages."²⁹ In order to make this message as powerful as possible, Hine cropped a smiling girl out of the photograph, leaving behind three straight-faced mill girls. By editing the photograph in this way, Hine again contrasts the images of children at work with those who attend school, visually reinforcing the NCLC's demand for child labor legislation allowing children

as adults," the viewer is confronted with the small, mangled bodies and pitiful faces of two child laborers. This added a human element to the NCLC's publications that had been largely missing prior to the inclusion of Hine's photographs.

One of Hine's most powerful posters, published in 1913, includes a map of the United States filled with dozens of photographs of child laborers (figure 3). The images have been resized and cropped in order to completely fill the space with the faces of children at work. The map is surrounded with a chain whose links are labeled with the names of the industries that NCLC members thought were to blame for what they saw as injustice toward child laborers. Beneath this, the poster cries out, "Child Labor is a National Menace / THE CHILD LABOR CHAIN / Shall

We Let Industry Shackle the Nation."³² Although each child's portrait is compelling on its own, the placement of multiple photographs within the "chained" United States makes the NCLC's purpose clearer and more powerful, conveying in moments what would normally fill pages of an investigative report.

Although Hine's photographs were published in the thousands of pages of NCLC investigation reports, they reached an even wider audience through newspapers and other periodicals. The 8 January 1910 edition of *Harper's Weekly*, a popular illustrated news journal that had surpassed two hundred thousand copies per issue,³³ included an article by Frank Marshall White titled "The Babies Who Work." The article discusses the proposed "Children's Bureau" bill that was to be introduced in the next session of Congress. In addition to describing




Figure 2.

32. Hindman, *Child Labor*, 82.

33. Theodore Peterson, *Magazines in the Twentieth Century* (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), 55.



Figure 3.

the reasons necessitating the creation of the Children's Bureau, the article also provides statistical information regarding child labor in the United States and ends by explicitly stating the aims of the NCLC. The article is illustrated with four large prints of Hine's photographs, including a six-year-old newsboy, "a child spinner," "a typical group of spinners," (the youngest of which had already been working there for five years), and "a group of spinners and doffers in a South Carolina cotton-mill, where they work twelve hours daily." These photographs heighten the effect of the article by presenting the reader with a visual representation of those who would be affected by the creation of the Children's Bureau and introducing the reader to the work of the NCLC.

Hine saw the most widespread publication of his photographs in 1914 and 1915 as the NCLC used them to garner support for the Palmer-Owen bill, which was introduced in Congress during this time. Like the Beveridge bill of 1906, the Palmer-Owen bill established fourteen as the minimum age for factory work and limited the workday of employees between the ages of fourteen and sixteen to eight hours; however, it also banned products of child labor from interstate commerce.³⁴ On 15 July 1914, the *Willmar Tribune* of Minnesota published a short article titled "Dr. Adler Favors Palmer-Owen Bill: Child Labor Measure Pending Before Congress—Federal Law Badly Needed" together with Hine's photograph of a boy "at midnight in a glass factory." This article, like the one in *Harper's Weekly* a few years earlier, effectively connected Hine's photographs

34. Hindman, *Child Labor*, 65.

with the current political question of child labor. The Palmer-Owen bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 237 to 45 on 13 February 1915.³⁵

The Evening Star in Washington, D.C., as well as numerous other newspapers across the nation, often published short announcements about upcoming NCLC conferences or exhibits. In this case, "Children's Labor Conference Topic: National Organization to Meet in Washington Tuesday and Wednesday," was published in the 3 January 1915 paper. Later that month, the paper printed a half-page spread titled "Child Labor Exhibit for Panama-Pacific Exposition" that included five of Hine's photographs which were labeled "New York Tenement Workers Making Artificial Flowers," "Boy Worker in a Cotton Mill," "These Little Girls Shucked Oysters in a Canning Factory," "The Children Work All Day Picking Nuts," and "Children in the Field Picking Cotton." These photographs again lend the article, which includes statistics about the widespread and exploitative nature of child labor and details about the federal child labor bill drafted by the NCLC, new weight and meaning.

Although the Palmer-Owen bill passed in the House of Representatives on in 1915, it was blocked in the Senate, and the session ended without a vote on this issue. To avoid a second dismissal of its bill, the NCLC mounted a concerted effort to disseminate their information from August to December of that same year. To accomplish this, a series of the NCLC's articles was published throughout the country. These included "No Children in the Mines: California Eliminates Children Under Sixteen From Mines and Quarries," "Forestalling Child Labor," "Special Favors to Tennessee Cannery: Amendment to Child Labor Law Passed This Year—Need for a Federal Law," and "Messenger Service a 'Crime Factory,'" among others. The articles usually included one or two of Hine's portrait photographs of boys working in coal mines. Within a few months, these articles appeared in Newberry, South Carolina's *The Herald and News*; Berea, Kentucky's *The Citizen*; *The Bismarck Daily Tribune*; *The Guthrie Daily Leader*; *The Ogden Standard*; *The Labor World*; *Golden Valley Chronicle*; *The Patriot Volume*; and other newspapers across the country. Many people who otherwise would not have viewed Hine's photographs or read the NCLC's statistics were exposed to both through these newspapers.

The Palmer-Owen proposition was successfully reintroduced in the next session of Congress as the Keating-Owen bill. Leading newspapers in at least

35. Hindman, *Child Labor*, 66.

thirty-two states published editorials in support of the Keating-Owen bill.³⁶ Some rallied support through emotional appeals. One impassioned article published in the *Chicago Tribune* declared, “[Child labor] challenges our hearts and our brains. There should be no more doubt about its abolition than about the enforcement of a statute against murder, or the appropriation of money to check a plague.”³⁷ The publication of the detailed findings of the NCLC’s investigations, coupled with Hine’s photographs, “challenged” both the mind and heart of the nation.

Despite this display of public support for the bill, it was repeatedly struck from the Senate calendar by those who opposed it. This opposition came primarily from manufacturing Southern Congressmen who claimed the bill violated states’ rights. Although the House passed the bill by a vote of 343 to 46 (a vote that transcended party lines), Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina caused the bill to be set aside again in early June 1916, just before Congress recessed for the national political conventions. During these conventions, in response to the public’s growing awareness and concern, both the Republicans and the Democrats adopted planks favoring “the prohibition of child labor”³⁸ to their platforms. In spite of this, Southern Congressmen continued to oppose the Keating-Owen bill and even threatened to filibuster the bill if it was introduced again. However, a month later, due to “public pressure for immediate enactment,”³⁹ President Woodrow Wilson announced to party leaders that he would not accept the Democratic re-nomination unless the Keating-Owen bill was passed during the current session.

The bill was reintroduced on the Senate floor on 3 August 1916. This time it passed by a vote of 52 to 12 with 32 Senators abstaining from the vote. On 1 September, President Wilson signed the Keating-Owen bill into law. The next day, he formally accepted the Democratic renomination and discussed some of his achievements, including “the emancipation of the children of the nation by releasing them from hurtful labor.”⁴⁰ The public had been heard in the highest levels of government; the “chain of child labor” had been broken.

The NCLC saw minimal success in affecting public opinion and the passage of child labor legislation during its first few years of operation. However,

36. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 126.

37. “Child Labor,” *Chicago Tribune*, July 28, 1916.

38. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 129.

39. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 130.

40. Trattner, *Crusade for the Children*, 131.

the inclusion of Lewis Hine's powerful, personal photographs transformed the NCLC's literature from strings of faceless statistics into shocking, intimate confrontations with the harsh realities of child labor. Rather than simply reading the details of an investigative report, readers now looked into the young, innocent faces of child laborers. The combination of the NCLC's meticulous statistics and writings with Hine's compelling photographs in investigative reports, exhibition panels, posters, and newspapers changed public opinion as an increasingly larger percentage of the American population was exposed to Hine's "human document." In response to the rising public outcry over child labor, Congress passed the Keating-Owen bill, establishing maximum workday and minimum age parameters for child laborers. Lewis Hine set a new standard for using photography to garner support for social reform by directing the public eye to shocking images of conditions and lives he wanted to change.

Miranda Jessop is an aspiring historian who loves learning and sharing knowledge with others. She studied German for six years before serving in the Illinois Chicago West Mission, Spanish-speaking. Miranda currently studies both languages, is part of the BYU Honors Program, maintains a 4.0 GPA, and works as a closed captioner at BYU Broadcasting. She enjoys exploring the world through music and dance. For years, she danced as a soloist and member of the company class of the Utah Artists' School of Ballet and is now part of BYU Folk Dance. In her free time, she also likes to cycle and spend time with her four younger brothers, who have taught her football skills, tae kwon do moves, and how to laugh. Miranda also has a passion for service and has spent time volunteering in high school credit recovery classes and teaching free English classes to Spanish speakers. Miranda recently received the Sechin Jagchid Award in Non-Western History, is also being published in Spanish this semester, and will intern in the Volkskundemuseum (Austrian Museum of Folk Life and Folk Art) in Vienna this spring.



*Ronald Reagan meeting Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (center),
December 7, 1982. Courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library.*

Pakistani Proliferation or Power Politics?

A Reexamination of Pakistan's Involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War

Peter Abernathy

IN PAKISTAN'S SEVENTY-YEAR HISTORY, FEW FIGURES HAVE BEEN AS polarizing as its sixth president, Muhammed Zia ul-Haq. Zia's improbably close personal friend, American Congressman Charles Wilson, said, "In history I have three heroes: Winston Churchill, President Lincoln, and President Zia ul-Haq."¹ Others were not so impressed. In his book, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq*, journalist Stephen Kinzer provided the following review of Zia's regime: "Pakistan's democratic order had been upset when General Zia al-Huq [*sic*] seized power in a military coup. Zia fervently dedicated himself to two goals: building a nuclear bomb and imposing what he called 'a genuine Islamic order' in Pakistan."² Kinzer evidently believed that Zia's support of the Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet Union was motivated by a desire to advance Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and to divert international attention away from Pakistan's alleged development of nuclear weapons. Although greater Islamization of both Pakistan and Afghanistan was indeed an important objective of Zia's regime, nuclear

1. George Crile: *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 480.

2. Stephen Kinzer: *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 265.

proliferation was not. Rather, Zia's support of the Mujahideen was meant to provide Pakistan with greater security by keeping Soviet forces from invading Pakistan and by maintaining US support against the threat of Indian aggression.

Muhammed Zia ul-Haq was born in Punjab (a city in what is now Pakistan) on 12 August 1924.³ He began a military career in the Indian army under British colonial command, which included fighting against the Japanese in the Pacific theater during WWII.⁴ When the British left South Asia and Pakistan became an independent nation in 1947, Zia relished the opportunity to serve in a Muslim army; during his command of the Technical Training Wing of the Armored Corps Center at Cherat, he implemented the practice of Quran recitations as part of his recruits' morning formation.⁵ Later, when India humiliated the Pakistani army by seizing East Pakistan in 1971, Zia was in Jordan, supporting King Hussein in a fight against the Palestinian Liberation Organization.⁶ Zia's success in this assignment resulted in a promotion to major general, leaving him one of the few high-ranking officers in Pakistan unsullied by the debacle of 1971.⁷

In 1974, only three years after Pakistan's miserable defeat in East Pakistan, India detonated its first nuclear bomb.⁸ With that detonation, what had previously been a battle for influence and power in the region became an existential threat to Pakistan. To counter India, Pakistan pursued its own nuclear weapons program during the administration of ruling Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The cost of this program soon proved to be higher than Pakistan could afford; the United States disapproved of the nuclear program and consequently suspended its aid to Pakistan in April 1977.⁹ This suspension damaged US-Pakistani relations so severely that it would take a change in leadership in both countries to bring them back together.

This change in Pakistani leadership came in July 1977. In answer to growing civil unrest caused by an allegedly rigged national election, Major General Zia

3. Hussain Haqqani: *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 112.

4. Khalid Mahmud Arif: *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977–1988* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 116.

5. *Ibid*, 117.

6. *Ibid*, 118.

7. Bruce Riedel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2014), 58.

8. Arif, *Working with Zia*, 362.

9. *Ibid*, 332.

ul-Haq declared martial law and overthrew Prime Minister Bhutto on 5 July 1977.¹⁰ Though martial law was meant to persist only until parliamentary elections could be held, military rule continued indefinitely, culminating in Zia's ascension to the presidency on 16 September 1978.¹¹ No sooner had the new regime taken hold than Islamic reforms began in Pakistan at Zia's behest. The number of state-recognized Islamic schools increased threefold, and moral uprightness became a criterion for military promotion.¹² Less than six months after Zia assumed the presidency, he reformed the penal code to better reflect Islamic principles.¹³

Despite these many changes, Islamization was not Zia's only priority. From the earliest days of his regime, Zia understood the external threats facing his country, and he began long-term plans to mitigate them. Along with expanding Pakistan's military, Zia dramatically increased the size and scope of the country's chief intelligence bureau, the Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI). This agency began developing strong ties with financially powerful nations such as Pakistan's Muslim brother Saudi Arabia. More importantly, however, the ISI began to build ties with the CIA.¹⁴ To lead the ISI during this crucial period, Zia chose his lifelong friend, Akhtar Abdur Rahman. Aside from being well qualified for the position after a lengthy career in the Pakistani army, General Akhtar had the acutely desirable trait of being a vehement enemy of India, a quality that no self-respecting member of Zia's regime could do without.¹⁵

Pakistan's security concerns became more complicated when Soviet tanks rolled into neighboring Afghanistan in the final week of 1979. With the Soviet 40th Red Army much too close for comfort, Pakistan faced another existential threat besides that of a nuclear-capable India. Worse still, the two nations threatening Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union, were cooperating with each other, as illustrated by a CIA communique dated 1 January 1980: "Zia on the ropes, seemingly abandoned by U.S. Indira¹⁶ has good chance to return in India; her government likely to be even more pro-Soviet in outlook than

10. Shahid Javed Burki, "Zia's Eleven Years: A Chronology of Important Events," in *Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 155.

11. *Ibid.*, 157.

12. Riedel, *What We Won*, 59.

13. Burki, *Pakistan Under the Military*, 157.

14. Riedel, *What We Won*, 59–60.

15. *Ibid.*

16. "Indira" here refers to Indira Gandhi, the president of India at the time.

present government.”¹⁷ That Zia felt “abandoned” by the United States was demonstrated again later in 1980, when President Carter offered Zia a meager four hundred million dollar economic and military aid package to support Pakistan against the Soviets.¹⁸ Regarding this offer, Zia asked a foreign journalist, “When the Soviet weapons are breathing fire on Pakistan’s border, what can she buy with that measly amount to enhance her national security? Peanuts?”¹⁹ Zia rejected the offer, and American news media were quick to poke fun at the former peanut farmer, President Carter. Fortunately for Zia, 1981 marked a pronounced shift in US-Pakistani relations. Because of Pakistan’s status as the frontline state against the Soviet Union’s incursion into Afghanistan, the CIA recognized the threat that the Soviets posed to Pakistan.²⁰ The more cooperative Ronald Reagan agreed, and in September 1981 he approved a \$3.2 billion economic and military aid package, which included several American F-16 fighter aircraft.²¹

This change of heart in Washington was not exclusively a result of a change in the presidency; it also came from the Pakistani leadership’s shrewd handling of the Afghan question. From the earliest days of the Soviet-Afghan War, Akhtar of the ISI recognized an opportunity to secure Pakistan against both of its major threats by helping the Afghan Mujahideen fight the Soviets. By aiding the Mujahideen, Akhtar told Zia, Pakistan could protect itself from Soviet invasion by keeping the Soviets bogged down in an indecisive war in Afghanistan. Furthermore, aiding the Mujahideen militarily (and Afghan refugees with humanitarian aid) would go a long way in regaining the American support that Pakistan had lost in the previous years.²² The result of Zia and Akhtar’s decision

17. Central Intelligence Agency. *CIA, DDCI Notes + NIO/USSR-EE, January 1, 1980, Secret.* ed. Matthew Aid, in the Cold War Intelligence Online, accessed November 30, 2017, <http://primarysources.brillonline.com.erl.lib.byu.edu/browse/cold-war-intelligence>.

18. To put this amount into perspective, the United States gave Israel a \$5.1 billion package (nearly thirteen times the sum offered to Pakistan) that same year. See <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel-1949-present>.

19. Arif, *Working with Zia*, 335.

20. Central Intelligence Agency. *CIA, Memorandum, NIC Warning Agenda for April 13, 1981, Top Secret.* ed. Matthew Aid in the Cold War Intelligence Online, accessed November 30, 2017, <http://primarysources.brillonline.com.erl.lib.byu.edu/browse/cold-war-intelligence>.

21. Arif, *Working with Zia*, 342.

22. Muhammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story* (Melksham, UK: Redwood Press, 1992), 25–26.

to provide aid to Afghanistan was an enormously complex operation between the CIA and the ISI to fund, equip, and train Afghan Mujahideen to fight the Soviets.

This operation began small. Less than two weeks after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, the CIA began providing the ISI with dated British Enfield bolt-action rifles to give to the Mujahideen.²³ The CIA did not want the weapons to be traced back to the United States; Pakistani cooperation enabled the CIA to focus on acquiring Soviet-style weapons that could not be easily traced. Eventually, the CIA purchased rifles, heavy and light machine guns, and shoulder-fired rockets from Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and China, before turning them over to the ISI for distribution.²⁴ This clandestine armament of the Afghan Mujahideen grew steadily until it became undeniably overt when the CIA began sending American-made, state-of-the-art FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles in 1986.²⁵

While the CIA procured the weapons, the ISI undertook the true heavy lifting of arming and training the Mujahideen. After weapons and supplies arrived in the Pakistani port of Karachi, the ISI had the uniquely challenging task of getting them into the hands of the Afghans. This operation was complex and dangerous, and the ISI constantly strived to keep supplies moving. Secrecy was paramount to protect the shipments which, if discovered, could become a very vulnerable target.²⁶ To maximize munitions' potential, the ISI distributed weaponry to the several parties of Mujahideen based not on their size, but on their combat effectiveness. The more effective a party proved itself to be in accomplishing missions assigned by the ISI, the more weapons and supplies it received. Much to the CIA's distaste, this frequently meant that hardline Islamic fundamentalist parties received more weapons than other groups.²⁷ This has caused some critics, including Stephen Kinzer, to suggest that Zia consciously chose to support radical Islam in Afghanistan.²⁸ The ISI's operations' procedure, however, suggest that combat effectiveness, not religious fundamentalism,

23. Riedel, *What We Won*, 103.

24. Kurt Lohbeck: *Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan* (Washington DC: Regnery Gateway Inc., 1993), 183.

25. Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 117.

26. *Ibid.*, 99–102.

27. *Ibid.*, 105.

28. Kinzer, *Overthrow*, 267–268.

was the standard. The ISI used specifically planned missions as the basis of what equipment and training to give to the Mujahideen: rather than simply giving fighters weapons and telling them to kill communists, they were told how to use a set of weapons to accomplish a specific goal. If the Mujahideen succeeded with their mission, they were given more. This process minimized the unnecessary wasting of equipment and maximized combat effectiveness, evidenced by the casualties on the Soviet side.²⁹ According to official Soviet reports, losses were high; according to Yuri Khlusov of the 40th Red Army, they were staggering:

During the one and a half years that I spent in Afghanistan, I lost 35–37 good friends, 7 of whom were especially close. . . . [W]e were told that 19,000 Soviet soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan, 2,000 of them by their own hand. This number of killed was calculated up to the end of 1981. If the officially announced 19,000 killed were to be multiplied by ten, it would be closer to the truth. There was an incalculable number of wounded.³⁰

Yuri's account is far from unique; similar accounts from Soviet soldiers speak of dismally poor morale and rampant suicide.³¹ With the CIA's help, the ISI was able to focus its attention on distributing supplies to the most effective groups of Mujahideen, and thus achieve Akhtar's vision of eliminating the threat of a Soviet invasion of Pakistan.

Throughout all of these operations, the ISI jealously guarded access to the Mujahideen from the CIA, and even from other agencies within Zia's government. Although this generated no shortage of frustration from the Americans, it made sense to Zia for two critical reasons. First, the ISI was better positioned geographically to make decisions about how to conduct the war. The ISI could collect and act on intelligence very quickly through Pakistan's decidedly porous border with Afghanistan, whereas the CIA would have to expend enormous resources to achieve that same flexibility. The second reason for the ISI's control was far more political. Had Zia allowed the CIA to interact directly with

29. Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 16–117.

30. Yuri Khlusov, "Yuri K.," in *The Soldier's Story: Soviet Veterans Remember the Afghan War*, ed. Anna Heinamaa, Maija Leppanen, and Yuri Yurchenko, trans. by A.D. Haun. (Berkeley, Regents of the University of California, 1994), 32–33.

31. Arytom Borovik, *The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan* (New York: Grove Press, 1990), 121.

the Mujahideen, he would have lost considerable leverage with Washington. Both the US and Pakistani governments clearly understood that supporting the Mujahideen was the primary reason that the United States renewed its lapsed interest in Pakistan.³² Having seen US support of Pakistan falter at several points during his career, Zia likely wanted to maintain assurance that the United States would not halt its support of Pakistan by seizing control of operations from the ISI.

That Zia would be so cunning in maintaining US economic and military aid should come as no surprise. Before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan had been under the shadow of a prospective Indian hegemony. India's nuclear capability in particular created a complex security issue in South Asia, described well by Zia's Vice Chief of Army Staff, Khalid Mahmud Arif:

Denunciation of nuclear weapons and their destruction are better options than the strategy of deterrence. However, if one country in a troubled region adopts a policy of deterrence, the other is hardly left with a viable alternative. In this scenario, neither India nor Pakistan can unilaterally renounce the nuclear option for reasons of security, public opinion, and national prestige. Either both the countries jointly renounce the nuclear weapons or both should acquire them.³³

Arif's position on the nuclear issue took a much harder line than Zia's. Evidence suggests that Zia was more concerned with reaching a balance of power in South Asia than with acquiring nuclear weapon. For example, on 23 October 1985, Zia declared before the United Nations that "Pakistan has neither the capability nor the desire to develop nuclear weapons."³⁴ In this same address, Zia recognized that elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide should be the goal of humanity, yet he pragmatically observed that first addressing the issue regionally, rather than globally, was a more immediately attainable goal. To that end, he suggested that South Asia be declared a nuclear-free zone, guaranteed

32. Central Intelligence Agency. *CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11/37-85, The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan::Implications for the Regional Powers and the United States, April 1985, Secret.* ed. Matthew Aid, in the Cold War Intelligence Online, accessed November 30, 2017, <http://primarysources.brillonline.com.erl.lib.byu.edu/browse/cold-war-intelligence>.

33. Arif, *Working with Zia*, 384.

34. Muhammed Zia ul-Haq, *President Zia-ul-Haq's Address to the 40th Commemorative Session of the United Nations General Assembly* (October 23, 1985), in JSTOR, accessed December 3, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394222>.

by India and Pakistan's simultaneous entrance into the Non-Proliferation Treaty.³⁵ This even-handed approach to the nuclear issue in South Asia suggests that Zia was not so concerned with acquiring a viable nuclear weapon for Pakistan as much as he was with countering or eliminating the nuclear threat that India posed.

Zia's desire for a balance of power can also be seen in his acceptance of aid from the United States offered under the Reagan administration. The \$3.2 billion aid package offered in 1981 came with the condition that assistance would be terminated "if it [Pakistan] transfers a nuclear explosive device from any country or detonates such a device."³⁶ In other words, Zia sacrificed the immediate possibility of developing a nuclear weapon during his regime in favor of maintaining American aid. That military and economic support from the United States would even the balance of power between India and Pakistan was certainly understood in New Delhi. It is likely for this reason that India so vehemently opposed Carter's proposed support in 1980. So loud were India's objections that Carter did not increase his offer beyond the four hundred million dollars that Zia called "peanuts."³⁷

From Pakistan's declared policies, as well as India's response, it is clear that American aid was Zia's preferred alternative to a nuclear deterrent. Zia's trump card in guaranteeing support from the United States was the ISI's operations in Afghanistan. A CIA National Intelligence Estimate from April 1985 succinctly stated the following:

U.S. support for Pakistan—principally in the supply of modern weapons—is essential to Pakistan's survival. Support for the Afghan resistance has allowed Islamabad to develop closer ties to the United States . . . strengthening its defenses while . . . keeping the Soviets from consolidating their hold on Afghanistan.³⁸

The effectiveness of Zia's Afghan operations in countering the existential threat of Indian dominance can be seen both in the money invested in Pakistan

35. Ibid.

36. Arif, *Working with Zia*, 343.

37. Ibid., 334.

38. Central Intelligence Agency. *CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11/37-85, The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan: Implications for the Regional Powers and the United States, April 1985, Secret.*

by the United States and in India's response. Over the course of the Soviet-Afghan War, US aid to Pakistan increased from the four hundred million dollars offered by Carter and rejected by Zia in 1980, to \$3.2 billion in 1981 and eventually \$4.02 billion in 1986.³⁹ The aforementioned National Intelligence Estimate described India's reaction to US-Pakistani cooperation as follows.

In New Delhi's view, the renewal of military ties between Pakistan and the United States and the permanent U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean are a direct result of the war in Afghanistan and a major setback to India's goal of regional hegemony.⁴⁰ Evidently, by helping the CIA humiliate the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Zia managed to address both of the greatest threats faced by Pakistan in the 1980s.

At first glance, Muhammed Zia ul-Haq may appear to be exactly what Stephen Kinzer and others have made him out to be: a fundamentalist Islamic despot obsessed with obtaining a nuclear weapon. However, as we come to understand him in the context in which he lived, particularly with respect to the dramatic threats faced by Pakistan during his administration, he emerges as a remarkably shrewd and realistic player in international politics. True, he had a vision of "a pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims of the Soviet Union."⁴¹ Yet Zia proved himself to be as pragmatic as he was idealistic: a master of exploiting geopolitical crises to Pakistan's benefit. When Zia overthrew Bhutto in 1977, Pakistan faced the seemingly impossible task of protecting itself from an India that had repeatedly demonstrated its military superiority. Furthermore, relations with the United States were at an all-time low when the Soviet 40th Red Army was at the proverbial gates in 1979. Rather than caving under these pressures, Zia saw supporting the Mujahideen as an opportunity to keep the Soviets away from Pakistan and to ensure US support against India.

Although Congressman Wilson's comparison of Zia to Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill was perhaps exaggerated, one must wonder what Zia's legacy might have been had his vision not been cut short by his death in a mysterious plane crash in 1988. While other Islamic leaders of the twentieth century

39. Arif, *Working with Zia*, 345.

40. Central Intelligence Agency. *CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11/37-85, The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan: Implications for the Regional Powers and the United States, April 1985, Secret.*

41. Riedel, *What We Won*, 59.

had a similar vision of a unified Islamic alliance, few, if any of them, had Zia's successful track record.⁴² Had Zia survived, it is not entirely implausible to think that Pakistan might have been able to help Afghanistan remain far more stable in the wake of the Soviet pullout, even if it never became the strong Islamic state that Zia had initially envisioned. Sadly, the United States all but forgot about South Asia following Zia's death, and left Afghanistan to tear itself apart with the CIA's weapons. Now, nearly twenty years later, the price of this negligence is still visible.

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42. Zia's efforts not only promoted national security for Pakistan, but also helped develop its economy; during his eleven years in office, Pakistan's GDP doubled. See Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan's Economy Under Zia," in *Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991), 87.



*Destroyer USS Shaw exploding during the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.
National Archives.*

From Freeze to Fire

How Economic Sanctions against Japan Led to the War in the Pacific

Mitch Rogers

ON JULY 26, 1941, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FROZE JAPANESE-owned financial assets in the United States. American merchants no longer accepted dollars from Japanese businesses and firms, stopping almost all trade. The United States had long been wary of Japanese expansion in South Asia, particularly in China, and President Roosevelt's administration saw a financial freeze as a convenient means short of war to curb Japanese ambitions. Roosevelt administration officials rested on the false confidence that the Japanese would never attack the United States. Five months later, Japanese pilots bombed Pearl Harbor. While the enormity of the December 7 attack seems to render all previous U.S. strategy toward Japan irrelevant, it is still worth considering whether Roosevelt's economic sanctions were wise or whether they precipitated a war that could have been avoided. By understanding the international views of both the United States and Japan and considering the theory of economic sanctions, we can now conclude that the economic sanctions directly contributed to the eruption of the War in the Pacific.

Advantaged with the gift of hindsight, most scholars and historians have ruled the economic sanctions placed on Japan as failures. By imposing restrictive sanctions on a determined, expansionist Japan (which by 1941 had been stockpiling war materials for several years), the United States provoked a violent conflict that was by no means inevitable. However, in spite of the staggering volume of scholarship criticizing the economic sanctions against Japan, some

scholars still view the sanctions as successful. According to David A. Baldwin in the book *Economic Statecraft*, the sanctions were useful in allowing the United States to retain vital war materials for itself while denying war materials for a potential enemy.¹ For Baldwin, the goals of the sanctions were to increase the costs of war and conquest for Japan, and the sanctions were thus (technically, theoretically) successful—if one assumes that war with Japan was inevitable. Steve Chan, in the book *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft*, refutes Baldwin's argument well by pointing out that the use of economic isolation in order to weaken an enemy can no longer be defined as economic *sanctions*, which is designed to change policies, but rather economic *warfare*, which is intended as a form of attrition.² Chan reminds Baldwin that at the time of the sanctions, the United States was *not* at war with Japan, and few (if any) people in the Roosevelt administration expected Japan to attack the United States. Thus, by engaging in unilateral economic warfare against a nation it was not at war with, the United States drew itself closer to a Pacific War that potentially did not need to happen in the first place.

A study of the effect of the United States' economic sanctions against Japan must begin by analyzing the United States' attitudes toward Japan's expansion in South Asia. As early as 1905, when President Theodore Roosevelt brokered the peace ending the Russo-Japanese War, the United States had suspicions of Japan's intentions in the region.³ Roosevelt commissioned the development of a strategy to curb potential Japanese expansionism. Created by Admirals George Dewey and Alfred Thayer Mahan, this strategy became known as War Plan Orange and rested on the ability of the United States to economically isolate the island nation before striking a decisive military blow. While the 1920s saw refreshing peace and cooperation between Japan and the Allied nations, relations became strained again as the global Great Depression forced nations to pursue isolationist, protectionist economic and foreign policy.⁴ Losing trading partners thrust Japan into economic trouble, which then led to a domestic

1. Baldwin, David A. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, 167–172.

2. Chan, Steve and A. Cooper Drury, eds. *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 130.

3. Miller, Edward S. *Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007, ix.

4. James, D. Clayton. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War." As found in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 704–705.

resurgence of nationalism. Once again, Japan looked to conquer, and War Plan Orange returned to relevance. According to historian Edward Miller, with the Great War still fresh in every American's mind, and perhaps with just a touch of optimistic self-delusion, "the helplessness of Japan, if isolated economically and financially, evolved into an axiom at a time when the U.S. government was averse to fighting a war."⁵

Japan expressed its rediscovered aggression by seizing Manchuria in 1931. Five years later, in July 1937, Japan launched an invasion of mainland China. This was met with strong opposition by both the citizens and the government of the United States. Since 1899, the United States had pursued the Open Door Policy in regards to China, allowing all nations equal access to Japanese markets. Hoping to respond to Japan's violation of this policy, Roosevelt considered economic sanctions as a valuable mechanism by which to strangle Japanese imperial ambitions. In his famous "Quarantine Speech" given on October 5, 1937, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared that certain countries—left unnamed but clearly referring to Japan, Germany, and Italy⁶—had generated "international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality."⁷ "When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread," Roosevelt said, "the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease." In this context, the "quarantine" meant economic actions which left Japan isolated.

International relations leading up to 1937 puts FDR's desire to resort to economic means into context. While the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, Japan was, and Article 16 of the League of Nations charter discusses "the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State . . ."⁸ This meant that any member nation which broke the covenants of the League of Nations (i.e. engaged in warfare with another member state) were to be economically and financially isolated. While this was not legally binding for any actions between

5. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, x.

6. Borg, Dorothy. "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech." *Political Science Quarterly* 72, no. 3 (September 1957): 405–433.

7. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Speech given on October 5, 1937. Accessed at <https://miller-center.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/october-5-1937-quarantine-speech>

8. Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted December 1924. Accessed at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#arti6

the United States and Japan, it reflects the readiness of countries at the time to use economic tools to regulate the policies of rogue nations. It established a precedent of economic isolation on an international scale, even after Japan left the League of Nations in 1933. Additionally, in 1935 and again in 1937, the United States enacted Neutrality Acts which restricted trade to nations on either side of a war.⁹ Merchants who wished to trade with these countries were required to attain licenses from the Department of State. According to these acts, the president had certain leeway in what was and was not labelled “war.”

The United States’ first economic moves against Japan began with what were called “moral embargos.” Between 1937 and 1938, exports of U.S. airplanes to Japan increased dramatically, and spectators suspected that the Japanese were using these planes to bomb China. Because the Neutrality Acts forbade trade with countries on both sides of a war, Secretary of State Cordell Hull knew that declaring Japan’s actions “war” would probably hurt China more than it hurt Japan. Instead, he ordered the Department of State in mid-1938 to discourage U.S. airplane manufacturers from selling to Japan. Entirely extralegal and non-binding, this “moral embargo” succeeded in slowing the flow of airplanes to Japan; however, by this time, Japan had already stockpiled enough planes for itself that the action had little effect.¹⁰ This was repeated again in 1939 with a moral embargo on the metals aluminum, magnesium, and molybdenum, to similar effect.

The tensions between Japan and the United States became even more complicated on September 27, 1940, when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This treaty obligated the powers to support one another in the event of war with non-Pact nations. American officials feared that this could lead the United States into war with Japan, as the United States had already shown substantial support to Britain and France in the face of the European Axis powers. At least one Japanese official, however, had a different opinion. Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka stated on September 19, 1940, while considering a draft of the Tripartite Pact, that he thought signing the Pact would cause the United States to “stiffen temporarily, . . . [but then] recover a level-headed attitude; of course, the chances are fifty-fifty as to whether it will stiffen more and more, leading to a more critical situation. . . .”¹¹

9. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, chapter 6.

10. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, chapter 6.

11. Morley, James William, ed., and David A. Titus, trans. *The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, 6.

And “stiffen” America did. The moral embargos on airplanes and metals were ineffective because Japan had been able to stockpile those goods ahead of time or supply itself through other means. Embargos on scrap ferrous materials were enacted on September 26 in response to Japan’s alliances with the Axis powers and to Japan’s attack on French Indochina; this embargo “pinched but did not retard Japan’s aggressive policies,”¹² because Japan had the capability of diverting scrap metal from civilian to military production. One good that Japan could not supply for itself, however, was oil, and Japan was California’s largest foreign consumer of petroleum.¹³ The Roosevelt administration thought that squeezing Japan’s oil supply could finally end Japan’s aggressive expansion. In 1941, after months of failed negotiations, the administration began to draft an executive order that would freeze all Japanese assets in the United States, with the intent of stopping Japanese purchases of Californian oil. But unlike the previous economic actions taken against Japan, this move required additional political justification. When the United States had restricted the trade of other goods to Japan, the United States could reasonably justify the sanctions by saying that the country needed to conserve those goods for national security. Oil, however, was in abundant supply in California. In order to justify the financial freeze and the blockage of oil to Japan, FDR exploited false public perceptions of the United States’ national resources.

Under the Neutrality Act (which was again updated in 1939), a warring nation could still trade with the United States as long as it paid in cash and carried the goods away in its own ships. This system was called “cash-and-carry,” and greatly favored Britain and France, who each had large shipping fleets and reserves of dollars and gold. On March 11, 1941, the United Kingdom was further aided by the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed the United Kingdom to borrow U.S. tankers to ship oil across the Atlantic. Government advisers stated that this could potentially cause shortages on the East Coast, and Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes publicly called for a gasoline reduction in the eastern states. FDR used this to his political advantage. In a speech in New York City on July 24, FDR stated that East Coast citizens should be outraged that they were asked to cut gasoline consumption while Japan received near-endless oil from the West Coast. According to FDR, “we are helping Japan in what looks like an act of aggression.”¹⁴

12. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, 93.

13. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, 182.

14. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, 189.

FDR's stance rested on two fallacies: first, no East Coast oil shortage materialized; second, even if the shortage was real, the difficulty of shipping oil from the West to the East Coast was great enough that California would not be able to supply all of the East Coast's needs.¹⁵ But the ploy worked, and on Friday, July 25, FDR announced Executive Order No. 8832. The executive order, which came into effect the next day, froze Japanese-owned American dollars in their bank accounts and prevented the acquisition of more dollars. Great Britain and the Dutch Indies soon followed, further increasing Japan's trade isolation. On Monday, July 28, when the bankers and traders returned to work, both countries saw immediate changes to their financial markets. International bank branches in both countries closed. Japanese silk futures were suspended, and stocks for firms producing rayon (a silk substitute) rose.

Soon after the executive order was issued, negotiations between the two countries centered on thawing the financial freeze. The Department of State remained resolute in its enforcement of the freeze, restricting licenses for trade down to the bare legal essentials, such as allowing for the fulfillment of pre-freeze orders and granting Japanese ships dollars in order to return to their home country. Japanese officials and merchants pursued alternative schemes and loopholes to get around the sanctions, but none worked. Although Japan had stockpiled a significant amount of gold before 1941, it was not allowed to cash it in at the U.S. Treasury for dollars, and U.S. traders were prohibited from purchasing the gold because of the Trading with the Enemy Act.

In order to properly understand the effect the financial freeze had on Japan, one must understand the ideology behind the Japanese expansion. To the Japanese, their imperial conquest was vital in order to form what was disingenuously called the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."¹⁶ Since the days of the Russo-Japanese War and the origins of War Plan Orange, Japan sought to become a legitimate Great Power. In Japan's eyes, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere would "contribute to world peace."¹⁷ According to historian Michael A. Barnhart, "The United States was what Japan wanted to be—rich in resources, internally strong, and dependent on no one."¹⁸ Japan had learned

15. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, 189.

16. Morley, *The Final Confrontation*, 8.

17. Ike, Nobutaka, ed. and trans. *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, 78.

18. Barnhart, Michael A. *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, 9.

from Germany in World War I that nations needed to have economic prosperity and independence in the new age of total warfare, where all forms of production, expertise, and skill must be mobilized against the enemy. A sudden freeze on dollars and petroleum could ruin Japan's whole plan. As Matsuoka said in January 1941 in response to his American counterpart Hull, "The United States has evinced no adequate understanding of the fact that the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is a life-or-death requirement for Japan."¹⁹ Japan believed that it had as much right as the United States to, in the style of Alfred Thayer Mahan, establish military posts across the Pacific for its own defense.²⁰

Clearly, FDR and his cabinet did not realize that Japan would push back against the financial freeze. According to historian Jonathan Utey, the freeze was optimistically meant to be "a final warning, designed to bring Japan to its senses, not its knees."²¹ In possibly the greatest strategic blunder on the American side, American officials never truly imagined that Japan would attack the United States. If anything, American officials assumed that if Japan was pinched too tightly, it would attack southward, against the nearby, resource-rich Dutch East Indies, or (only after Germany attacked the USSR in 1941) northward, against the Soviet Union.²² For this reason, FDR and his cabinet secretaries thought it only necessary to project deterring power in the Pacific—which included stationing a significant portion of the Pacific fleet as far west as Pearl Harbor. In February of 1941, as FDR's cabinet was still debating which course of action to take, Hull wrote to FDR, saying, "It may be advisable . . . [to give] by our acts in the Pacific new glimpses of diplomatic, economic, and naval 'big sticks.'"²³

The strategic value of economic sanctions, as seen in this narrative, has long been debated. One can almost interpret the United States' action against Japan as arrogant and deluded by hubris: because the United States was the economic powerhouse it was, it believed it could throw its weight around the Pacific without fear of violent retribution. This explains the "diplomatic, economic, and

19. Morley, *The Final Confrontation*, 8.

20. Ibid; see also Freedman, Lawrence. *Strategy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 115–120.

21. Utey, Jonathan G. *Going to War with Japan, 1937–1941*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985, 154.

22. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, 218, 226.

23. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, 219.

naval “big sticks.” The United States never truly wanted to put its foot down against Japan, and considered economic sanctions as a safe and convenient way to avoid that. As economic scholar Valerie L. Schwabach has written, “The choice of a policy that has been publicly touted as an alternative to war seems an unlikely way to convince an opponent of the willingness to go to war.”²⁴ While it is hard to speculate what the United States could have done better, it is clear to see that the strategy it adopted—economic aggravation and annoyance—did little besides provoke Japan to war.

By understanding American attitudes (an aversion to military mobilization, a comfort in its own economic might), Japanese goals (dominance of South Asia), and the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions, it is clear why a freeze of dollars led to the fire of war. Japan could easily work around embargos of airplanes and scrap metal by stockpiling and diverting internal resources; when the United States finally began to get tough by freezing Japan’s American dollars and blocking the sale of oil, Japan was angry and armed enough to bring its ire down upon Pearl Harbor. Engaged with a mighty belligerent in the Pacific and honor-bound to support its Allies in Europe, the United States was now caught in the throes of World War II.

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24. Chan, Steve and A. Cooper Drury, eds. *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, 187.

Awards for Outstanding Papers Written in 2017

Women's History Award

Jake Moeller, "Murderesses and Wretches: Infanticide as the Defining Act of Women in Victorian England (1840–1910)." Written for Jeff Hardy, Hist 306.

LeRoy R. Hafen Award in North American History

Samantha Beck, "The Rutherford Redemption: Understanding the Source of Fraud in the Election of 1876." Written for Mark Choate, Hist 200.

Sechin Jagchid Award in Non-Western History

Miranda Jessop, "Making History: Ken Burns' *The Civil War*." Written for Stewart Anderson, Hist 311.

De Lamar and Mary Jensen Award in European History

Christine Edvalson, "Too Old to be Evacuated but no Old Enough to be 'Called Up': 'Teenagers' in World War II England." Written for Rebecca de Schweinitz, Hist 490.

Carol Cornwall Madsen Award in Mormon Women's History

Holden Brimhall, "Historical and Contemporary Responses to Sexual Assault by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints." Written for Rebecca de Schweinitz, Hist 390R.

History of the Family Award

Daniel Handley “Where Is Father Now? Absent John Adams and His Tender Twigs.” Written for Kendall Brown, Hist 490.

Personal Family History Award

Becca Curtis, “You Are the Father: A Study of the Effects of Paternal Financial Support of Illegitimate Children in Dorset, England 1848–1868.” Written for Rebecca de Schweinitz, Hist 490.

Cultural History Award

Robert Swanson, “A Revolution of Heart and Mind: The Transition of Richard Stockton from Moderate to Revolutionary.” Written for Stewart Anderson, Hist 200.

2017 Faith and Reason Essay Competition Award

Sarah Rounsville, “The Way to Salvation: Comparing Ana de San Bartolome and Martin Luther.” Written for Craig Harline, Hist 303.

Ethnic History Award

Morgan Fronk, “Corporate Autonomy: French Jews and the Price of Citizenship.” Written for Chris Hodson, Hist 294.

History of Empire

Ian McLaughlin, “Sovereignty and Civilization in Proposals to Regulate the East India Company, 1772–1773.” Written for Karen Auman, Hist 490.

African or Middle Eastern History Award

Courtney Cook, “Defending Communal Identity in the Ottoman Empire: Hagop Gagosian and the Mormon Armenians, 1890–1910.” Written for Christine Isom-Verhaaren, Hist 490.